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FORWARD
Until a few years ago, it was widely held that, ‘apartheid cannot be reformed, it can only be 
destroyed’. Today, all participants in the negotiation process are agreed that one fundamental 
characteristic of the social order must be preserved: the new South Africa is to be a capitalist 
society; the productive wealth of the country will be the private property of a small number 
of capitalists, and the vast majority will try to sell their labour for a wage to capitalists who 
will buy it only when that labour can contribute to their profits.
There is still disagreement about how small or large the number of capitalists will be; about 
the colour of their skins; about who they will appoint to manage their mines, banks, factories 
and farms for them; about the rules that will govern disputes over wages; and above all about 
the use that the state will make of the taxes paid from their profits. There is also 
disagreement about the extent to which capitalism can afford to meet popular needs. But all 
of these disagreements take place within the framework of a common belief that the future 
is capitalist.
The aim of this seminar series, held by the Marxist Theory Seminar at the University of the 
Western Cape in April/May 1993, was to pose the question: What are the limits of social 
reform in a capitalist South Africa? Can the fundamental needs and aspirations of the vast 
majority of South Africans be met within a capitalist framework?
Very often these questions are brushed aside with the argument that, given the present 
balance of local and international forces, there is no alternative to capitalism in SA today. 
Even if this argument is correct, it still remains necessary to ask what can be achieved within 
the framework of the capitalist society to which there is no alternative. If that question is not 
posed in the most rigorous way, all kinds of illusions will be created about what the future 
holds in store for us.
The question of the limits of capitalist reform in SA is posed a it concerns five different 
areas; democracy, education, economic growth and employment, land and the oppression of 
women. What will democracy mean in a new SA which depends on foreign investment and 
capitalist profitability? Can the education crisis be resolved while meeting the needs of 
capitalist growth? Will economic growth take place in a capitalist SA, and will this lead to 
the creation of jobs and a higher standard of living for the majority? Can land be restored 
to the dispossessed, the virtual slavery of millions of farm workers ended, and land used in 
a way that produces food for all? What are the prospects of ending the oppression of women 
in a capitalist South Africa?
MTS does not believe that there are simple answers to these questions. Certainly, these 
questions cannot be answered by a general condemnation of the inequality and inhumanity 
of capitalism. In each case, it is necessary to give clear answers to such questions as: Has 
capitalism served historically to support the struggle for democracy or to oppose it? How has 
it affected education in SA? What are the present interests of the capitalists in solving the 
land question, or giving women control of their lives? To what extent can capitalism be
forced to make concessions - to provide jobs, for example - by the struggles of the 
oppressed?
In the past, capitalism has shown itself to be much more flexible than its critics have 
supposed. That does not mean that capitalism can do anything it likes, nor that the working 
class can force it to meet whatever demands it has. One of the indispensable insights of 
Marxism is that processes of social change are not determined by the intentions or integrity 
of political leaders, but rather by the fundamental relationships of society and the ability of 
the major classes to pursue their interests created by these relationships. We hope that the 
publication of this seminar series contributes to making this insight available to a wider 
audience.
Andrew Nash
CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN SOUTH AFRICA
Neville Alexander 
Faculty of Education, UCT.
In this paper I shall consider the prospects of democratic rule in a deracialising (so-called 
post-apartheid) but capitalist South Africa against the background of the history of the 
relationship between capitalism as a system of social economy and democracy as a form of 
rule. For reasons that will become obvious below, the first part of this paper consists of 
a critical summary of the first chapter of Ronaldo Munck’s book, Latin America: The 
Transition to Democracy and of a consideration of an as yet unpublished paper by Ian 
Shapiro of the Department of Political Science of Yale University in New Haven, USA. 
In the second part of the essay, I consider a few of the more feasible or controversial 
predictions about the future of democracy in a rapidly changing South Africa. In conclusion, 
I discuss briefly the democratic socialist alternative in South Africa.
Ralph Miliband’s recent restatement of the classical Marxist understanding of the notion of 
bourgeois democracy is as good a starting point as any for our analysis. In his acid response 
to Fukuyama’s attempt at glorifying the neo-liberal "victory" over socialism, he wrote that
Capitalist democracy is a contradiction in terms, for it encapsulates two opposed 
systems. On the one hand there is capitalism, a system of economic organisation that 
demands the existence of a relatively small class of people who own and control 
the main means of industrial, commercial, and financial activity, as well as a major 
part of the means of communication; these people thereby exercise a totally 
disproportionate amount of influence on politics and society both in their own 
countries and in lands far beyond their own borders. On the other hand, there is 
democracy, which is based on the denial of such preponderance, and which requires 
a rough equality of condition that capitalism ... repudiates by its very nature 
(Miliband 1992:109).
In this essay, we shall have to try to predict how the tension between these two "systems" 
is likely to be resolved in the South African context.
In "Democracy Reconsidered", the first chapter of his book on the transition in Latin 
America, Munck writes as follows :
There has in recent years been a profound rethinking and re-evaluation of democracy 
by the left, due in part to the post-1968 ferment within Marxism, but due also to the 
onslaught of the new right in ideological and practical terms. The ’question of 
democracy’ has joined gender, race and nation, once neglected by Marxism but now 
centre-stage. This chapter reviews the treatment of democracy in the classical 
Marxist tradition, and some of the major contemporary debates. We consider 
whether democracy is a means to an end (socialism) or whether it is an objective in 
its own right for socialists. Is democracy the "best possible shell" for capitalism or 
is it, rather, profoundly contradictory to the objectives of late capitalism ? What do 
we mean by ’bourgeois democracy’ and how is it distinguished from the duly 
patented socialist version? (Munck 1989:1).
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As a matter of interest, I should mention that he also reviews the present debate concerning 
the relationship between "democracy” and "development" in the so-called Third World, an 
issue which will be addressed in the South African context in later presentations in this 
seminar series.
Munck highlights the aboriginal ambivalence of the founding fathers of Marxism on the 
question of democracy. On the one hand (in The German Ideology, 1846) Marx and Engels 
saw democracy, the struggle for the franchise, as "merely the illusory forms in which the 
real struggles of the different classes are fought out among one another" (quoted in Munch 
1989:1); on the other hand (in The Class Struggles in France, 1850), Marx considered "the 
most comprehensive contradiction" of the bourgeois democratic republican constitution of 
1848 to lie in the fact that, "...it gives political power to the classes whose social slavery it 
is intended to perpetuate : proletariat, peasantry, petite bourgeoisie. And it deprives the 
bourgeoisie, the class whose social power it sanctions, of the political guarantees of this 
power" (quoted in Munck 1989:2).
In the wake of the events around the Paris Commune of 1871, Marx and Engels became 
convinced that the rising and militant proletariat could not simply take over the democratic 
apparatuses of the bourgeois state, but had to smash these and abolish the distinction between 
legislative and executive (administrative) power by establishing organs of direct democracy 
("communes", "soviets", "workers’ councils", etc.). Indeed, Munck discerns an ultra-left 
streak in some of Marx’s later writings in which he allegedly condemned struggles for reform 
and suggested that only the (violent) revolution matters (see Munck 1989: 2-3). However, 
in general, both Marx and Engels hold that the democratic institutions of the bourgeois state 
should be used by the working class to gain important socio-political and socio-economic 
reforms. Engels, in the twilight of his life, even appeared to lean towards the view, later 
espoused by Eduard Bernstein and other "revisionists", that a peaceful road to socialism via 
the bourgeois parliament was completely feasible. In what has come to be called his 
political testament (i.e. his introduction to the 1895 edition of Karl Marx’s work on The 
Class Struggles in France), Engels wrote, inter alia, "...the franchise has been ... 
transformed...from a means of deception, which it had been before, into an instrument of 
emancipation .... Rebellion in the old style, street fighting with barricades, which decided 
the issue everywhere up to 1848 was to a considerable extent obsolete" (quoted in Munck 
1989:3).
Munck, correctly, I think, concludes that this represented a tactical, not a strategic, shift 
in Engels’s thinking, one which on the one hand accepted the validity of revolutionary 
parliamentarism and, on the other hand opposed "the mistaken conception of the revolution 
as a ’revolution of the minority’" (Munck 1989:3).
After the death of Engels and largely because of developments within the German Social 
Democratic Party, the debate among Marxists centred on disagreements over the strategy of 
parliamentarism as opposed to the violent conquest of power by the mobilised proletariat and 
other oppressed strata before, during and immediately after World War I. In this debate, 
the extreme positions were propagated by the revisionists (Eduard Bernstein, Conrad 
Schmidt and, later, Karl Kautsky) on the one hand and the Bolsheviks (Lenin, Trotsky and 
others) on the other hand.
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Bernstein saw the transformation of capitalism into socialism as a smooth process : "the 
liberal organizations of modem society ... are flexible, and capable of change and 
development. They do not need to be destroyed, but only to be further developed". 
Kautsky arrived at a similar position somewhat later, in effect espousing a strategy of 
"gradualist class struggle based on ... the revolutionary advocacy of reforms" (see Munck 
1989:3). As against the revisionists, the Bolsheviks argued, in the words of Lenin (in The 
State and Revolution, 1917) that "fully consistent democracy is impossible under 
capitalism..." and if it were to become so (fully consistent), the limits of the bourgeois 
republic would have to be transcended, i.e., a "republic of labour" would have to be brought 
into being.
In capitalist society, under the conditions most favourable to its development, we 
have more or less complete democracy in the democratic republic. But this 
democracy is always restricted by the narrow framework of capitalist exploitation, 
and consequently always remains, in reality, democracy for the minority, only for 
the possessing classes, only for the rich (Lenin 1971: 336).
Lenin saw the democratic republic as the ideal "shell” for capitalism since it fetishised the 
rule of the bourgeois to such an extent that no change of personnel at the top could shake that 
rule. This "ideal state" has been attained hitherto only in some of the most advanced 
industrial capitalist societies. In less industrialised countries, bourgeois rule has had to find 
other "shells". While exposing the fraudulence and limitations of bourgeois democracy, 
Lenin stressed that it does afford the proletariat the opportunity to organise itself into a class 
against the capitalist system. Hence democratic tasks remain a priority for the working class. 
It is , however, only through smashing the state apparatuses of the capitalist class that the 
workers can achieve their democratic demands. The most consistent implementation of 
democratic principles automatically puts into question the bourgeois democratic republic and 
leads the workers on to the establishment of workers’ rule.
Socialist democracy rises out of the ashes of bourgeois democracy, of bourgeois rule as such. 
Democracy is seen as an instrument, a means to the end of establishing new economic and 
social relations that will guarantee the abolition of all exploitation. For Lenin, democracy 
is not an end in itself, i.e., a set of practices, rules and constraints to regulate social 
relations, so valuable that they are "smashed" only at our peril. Hence Munck (and many 
others today) consider this Bolshevik myopia to be one of the greatest faults in the genetic 
heritage of what was until recently the really existing socialism of Eastern Europe and the 
USSR. Lenin’s proletarian democracy, "equated with the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
inevitably became that Stalinist monster described disingenuously by Joe Slovo as "socialism 
without democracy" .
Be that as it may : the development of the Soviet system is a subject that lies beyond my 
brief for this paper. It is in the writings of Rosa Luxemburg that Munck finds a source for 
reconciling the obvious historical advance represented by the bourgeois democratic 
institutions and the need to graft essential principles of equality and liberty that they mask 
and distort on to the new system of economic and political relations brought about by a 
workers’ social revolution. Her works, specifically her polemics against the revisionists, 
Bernstein and Schmidt, (Reform or Revolution, published in 1899) and against the 
Bolsheviks ("Zur russischen Revolution" written in 1918 as an incomplete untitled essay
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while she was in prison shortly before she was assassinated), are indeed a valuable source 
for understanding the relationship between capitalism and democracy.
Luxemburg rejects Bernstein’s teleological notion that democracy is the (inevitable) end 
towards which all social evolution is straining. She accuses him of a vulgar, petty bourgeois 
overgeneralization of a few decades of bourgeois rule in Western Europe and demonstrates 
that democratic forms of rule have existed in many different pre-capitalist social formations 
just as absolute monarchies and various kinds of dictatorships have. She traces the history 
of capitalist development and shows that in France alone, since the Great Revolution in 
1789, there had been a succession of democratic republics alternating with undemocratic 
forms such as the Directory, the Napoleonic Consulate, the Empire and the bourgeois 
monarchy. She concludes that :
The uninterrupted victory of democracy, which to our revisionism, as well as to the 
bourgeois liberalism, appears as a great fundamental law of human history and, 
especially of modem history, is shown , upon closer examination, to be a 
phantom. No absolute and general relation can be constructed between capitalist 
development and democracy. The political form of a given country is always the 
result of a composite of all the existing political factors, domestic as well as foreign. 
It admits within its limits all variations of the scale, from absolute monarchy to the 
democratic republic. (Luxembourg 1978:46).
In retrospect, it seems baffling that any other point of view could have been entertained 
seriously. Today, in spite of the artificial euphoria induced by the myths of neo-liberalism, 
even such well-known apologists for capitalism as Peter Berger are forced to echo the insight 
of Rosa Luxemburg,
A useful way to describe the relationship between democracy and capitalism is to say 
that it is asymmetrical. Capitalism is a necessary - though not sufficient- condition 
for democracy but democracy is not a precondition for capitalism. This, it seems to 
me, is what the empirical evidence indicates. (And he adds propagandistically NA) 
As it happens, I regret this; I would much prefer a symmetrical relation, where the 
two institutional arrangements could be seen as the two sides of the same coin of 
liberty. Alas, they are not. (Berger 1992:11).
Luxemburg, far from equating capitalism and democracy, dialectically uncovers the real 
tendency for capitalist societies to abandon democracy as the rule of the bourgeois becomes 
established common sense. Hence any challenge to bourgeois rule leads to the diminution 
or even erasure of the cherished "rights of man" without, in general, affecting adversely 
the further operations of the capitalist class. Because of this tendency, the revisionists at 
the time propounded a soft line so as not to frighten the bourgeoisie into the arms of 
reaction. They called for a toning down of socialist demands and socialist propaganda since 
extra-parliamentary mass action could only be detrimental to the effective organisation of the 
workers. Luxemburg makes short shrift of this argument, one which has a familiar ring to 
socialists in South Africa today, and she turns it in upon itself by demonstrating that only 
the growing strength of the socialist movement can ultimately guarantee democracy. It is
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worth quoting her at length on this pivotal question.
(Bernstein)... advises the proletariat to disavow socialism, so that the mortally 
frightened liberals might come out of the mouse-hole of reaction. Making the 
suppression of the socialist labour movement an essential condition for the 
preservation of bourgeois democracy, he proves in a striking manner that this 
democracy is in complete contradiction with the inner tendency of development of the 
present society.... In view of the fact that bourgeois liberalism has given up its ghost 
from fear of the growing labour movement and its final aim, we conclude that the 
socialist labour movements is today the only support for that which not the goal of 
the socialist movement - democracy. We must conclude that democracy can have 
no other support. We must conclude that the socialist is movement is not bound to 
bourgeois democracy, but that, on the contrary, the fate of democracy is bound with 
the socialist movement. We must conclude from this that democracy does not 
acquire greater chances of life in the measure that the working class renounces the 
struggle for its emancipation, but that, on the contrary, democracy acquires greater 
chances of survival as the socialist movement becomes sufficiently strong to struggle 
against the reactionary consequences of world politics and the bourgeois democracy. 
He who would strengthen democracy should want to strengthen and not weaken the 
socialist movement. He who renounces the struggle for socialism renounces both the 
labour movement and democracy (Luxemburg 1978:47-48).
As we shall see presently, the answer to the question of how much democracy we shall 
enjoy in a post-apartheid capitalist South Africa turns on the way we position ourselves 
towards the orientation and the practices of the workers’ movement. Of course, it can be 
argued that with the emergence of the "New World Order”, all such theorising is irrelevant. 
After all, today the world bourgeoisie is not only overwhelmingly dominant but, via the 
neo-liberal myths of the "free market" and "democracy”, also becoming increasingly 
hegemonic. In our own movement , we are right now observing the slide into social 
democratic (i.e. revisionist) ideologies and strategies by yesterday’s "revolutionaries" and ” 
Marxists". This is a world-wide tendency which, despite the surface strength of workers’ 
organization in South Africa, we are unable to escape precisely because of the dependence 
of all sectors of our society on international sources (of capital, funds, ideas, skills, etc.).
James Petras in an illuminating article (1991), identified seven great transformations brought 
about in the 'seventies and ’eighties through the activities of the neo-liberal ideologies and 
strategists. Of these two are most relevant for the purposes of this essay. Transformation 
No.4 refers to "the extension of electoral regimes to vast areas of the Third World and 
Southern and Eastern Europe" (so-called transitions to democracy). He points out that these 
regimes were largely inserted into "authoritarian state structures and elitist economic systems 
that immediately defined the political-economic agenda for the electoral regimes : to provide 
legitimacy to the neo-liberal model, facilitating Western pillage" (Petras 1991:17).
The sixth transformation refers to what I have called the social-democratisation of the Left 
and the integration of traditional social-democratic and communist parties into the neo-liberal 
project. Petras (1991:18) adds significantly that, "...this integration of traditional parties - 
coupled with the flight of intellectuals from the movements to the institutes - deepened the 
tremendous gap between the political-electoral intellectual stratum and the mass of victims
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of neo-liberal economics." It is clear that we need to have a closer look at what the theorists 
and strategists of capitalist democracy actually mean when they preach their new gospel to 
the "underdeveloped" masses of the Third World and of Southern and Eastern Europe.
In a review essay due for publication in World Politics, Prof. Ian Shapiro of the Department 
of Political Studies in Yale University, New Haven, USA., discusses the contested meanings 
of democracy among Western theorists, strategists and political groups. Referring to Eastern 
Europe, he makes the point that most people there have only a vague sense of what 
“democracy" and "the market" , the twin pillars of their new-found freedom, mean and tend 
to use these terms interchangeably in a way that suggests "that they function as little more 
than vague symbols of an inchoate good that people believe they have been denied." (Shapiro 
1993:2). In reply to the question whether it matters, i.e., whether "sustainable democracy 
requires people to agree on what democracy means", he sets out to consider four recent 
attempts by prominent bourgeois theorists to deal with this problem, viz., those by Adam 
Przeworski (1991), Giuseppe Di Palma (1990), Samuel Huntington (1991) and Donald 
Horowitz (1991).
The gravamen of Shapiro’s analysis is that the tendency towards "anti-substantive, minimalist 
or procedural" definitions of democracy has become established in ruling-class circles since 
the ’seventies. This approach, whatever the variant, traces its pedigree back to Joseph 
Schumpeter’s classic treatise, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, first published in 1942. 
In that work, Schumpeter defines democracy as "that institutional arrangement for arriving 
at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a 
competitive struggle for the people’s vote." (Quoted in Shapiro 1993:2). Ultimately this 
reduces to the claim that a social formation can be said to be "democratic" if there are 
"contested elections based on universal franchise as well as the civil and political freedoms 
of speech, press, assembly and organisation "that are necessary to political debate and the 
conduct of electoral campaigns" (Shapiro 1993:2-3 citing Huntington 1991).
All such definitions, he points out, effectively do away with former substantive notions of 
bourgeois democracy as involving the pursuit of "the general good" or the expression of "the 
will of the people". They go beyond this, however, since the Schumpetrian notion of 
democracy also abandons the representational aspects of classical bourgeois democratic theory 
and is unashamedly elitist and leaderist:
He modelled his democratic theory on the neo-classical account of markets. Would-be 
leaders compete for roles, just as firms compete for business in capitalist markets. 
Although political elites must in some minimal sense be responsive to voters (or at 
least less unresponsive than their competitors), politics is not about representation; it 
is about selling a product - governmental output - in exchange for votes (Shapiro 
1993:3).
In this political universe, all that matters is that competing elites should come to agree on 
the rules of the game against the backdrop of a minimal sensitivity to the needs of those they 
supposedly "represent". Hence, as Huntington observes, the euphoria that accompanied 
the toppling of authoritarian regimes in most of the recent cases of "transition to democracy” 
has been quickly followed by a sense of disillusionment and betrayal on the part of "the 
masses". Their leaders have invariably been accused of "selling-out" the interests of their
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constituents but Huntington, paradoxically and cynically, sees the degree of such disaffection 
as the measure of these leaders’ success, "...this is because there is a trade off, in ‘the 
democratic bargain’, between participation and moderation. Leaders moderate their demands 
in order to be included, and those who fail to realize that moderation "is the price of power” 
are marginalized" (Shapiro 1993:4).
Having demonstrated the bourgeoisie’s tendency to "abandon democracy", as Rosa 
Luxemburg pointed out almost a century ago, Shapiro goes on to apply the insights of these 
theorists to the South African case by way of testing their descriptive accuracy and their 
predictive capacity. We would have to burst the bounds of this paper to do justice to 
Shapiro’s careful analysis. I shall, therefore, only mention a few of the most relevant 
propositions he deduces from his study of these authors. From Przeworski, he infers that, 
"...democracy is a highly fragile institutional order, unlikely to be brought into existence in 
a sustainable way via negotiated pacts, and it is not easily compatible with disruptive and 
painful economic reforms" (Shapiro 1993:9).
Unless, therefore, groups who have the power to destabilise this "institutional order" have 
developed a "normative commitment to democracy" i.e., unless they believe that they will 
eventually be able to promote and further their interests, democracy is unsustainable. In 
such contexts, military or new authoritarian outcomes are very likely.
To avoid this, the fledgling democratic regimes have to attempt a "neo-corporatist" 
(social-contract) solution, otherwise they have to destroy the unions, opposition parties and 
"other encompassing and centralized organizations". In short, they have to abandon all 
pretences of a commitment to democracy.
Shapiro, optimistically, points to the fundamental difference between Eastern Europe and 
South Africa, i.e., the fact that the latter has experienced a continuous, century-long 
expansion of a capitalist infrastructure and markets so that, unlike the case of Eastern 
Europe, "...the economic reforms that will follow democratization are less likely to breed 
foundational resistance to the democratic regime, even though they will involve 
redistribution that will be resisted by some strategically powerful sectors" (Shapiro 1993:14).
He also suggests, less persuasively, I think, that the Afrikaner elite in South Africa may 
well have developed the necessary "normative commitment to democracy" and discusses, 
in this context, the 1986 declaration by the Dutch Reformed Church of the incompatibility 
of apartheid and Christianity (see Shapiro 1993:16-17). It is, in my view, at such points that 
the importance of the historical method becomes obvious. The temptation to treat similar 
social phenomena according to standard paradigms, usually derived from the detailed study 
of only a few cases, is very great in sociology and politics as academic disciplines. Under 
the rubric of "transitions to democracy", sociological and socio-psychological generalisations 
are applied to the most diverse historical phenomena simply because at a certain level of 
abstraction, they are categorically the same. Hence, for example, the South African case, 
which is more akin to the struggles for the universal franchise by the working classes of 
Western and Central Europe during the 19th and early 20th centuries, gets lumped with 
superficially similar anti-authoritarian movements in the contemporary world , as in Eastern 
Europe, Latin America and other African countries. Such approaches inevitably lead to 
inadequate descriptions of the situation, schematic explanations that seem convincing at first 
blush but which are quickly exposed as fallacious as soon as they have to be applied in the
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sphere of practical interventions.
Be that as it may: in Di Palma’s account Shapiro highlights his speculation that the transition 
to democracy is only viable if democracy is "divorced decisively from any redistributive 
economic agenda" and concludes that democracy "may lead to redistribution, but it may not 
and need not” (Shapiro 1993:19). He rejects Di Palma’s exclusive concentration on the 
beliefs and the behaviour of elites and makes the pivotal point that in South Africa with its 
well-developed and highly politicised civil society, "relations between elites and masses are 
likely to be decisive in determining whether or not democracy can survive" (Shapiro 
1993:22).
It is in the depths of Huntington’s Third Wave ,however, that Shapiro fishes most 
abundantly in relation to the South African case. A few of the more important propositions 
must suffice. Thus, Huntington distinguishes between four methods of transition, viz., 
transformations ("when the elites in power take the lead in bringing about 
democracy"),replacements (when opposition groups take the lead), transplacements ("when 
democratization occurs from joint action by government and opposition group") and 
interventions ("when democratic institutions are imposed by an outside power") (see Shapiro 
1993 : 23). He places the South African case in Huntington’s category of "transplacements" 
where governments and resistance groups ("opposition") recognise that they "are incapable 
of unilaterally determining the nature of the future" (Huntington, quoted in Shapiro 1993:23). 
Such transplacements are only possible, in Huntington’s model, "when reformers are stronger 
than standpatters in the government and moderates are stronger than extremists in the 
opposition" (Shapiro 1993:28).
In line with the tenets of modernisation theory, Huntington considers economic growth to 
be a necessary condition for democratisation. Shapiro also discusses other factors such as 
degree of complexity of communications and alleged cultural limits to democratisation as 
postulated by Huntington. In addition to these factors, Huntington infers from recent history 
that racial orders are extremely resistant to democratisation and that democratic transitions 
in such orders are always accompanied and undermined by high levels of violence. He 
points out that South Africa is one of the most violent societies in the world and that even 
if a successful negotiated settlement were to take place, violence could still scuttle 
"democratic consolidation " (see Shapiro 1993:31-32). In the end Shapiro suggests that "a 
degree of confidence in the possibility of a successful transition is warranted” , based on 
Huntington’s model (see Shapiro 1993:31).
In his discussion on Horowitz’s work on A Democratic South Africa?, Shapiro deals with 
the other major modem bourgeois paradigm of a democratic order, i.e., consociational 
democracy, which is deemed to be more appropriate to so-called plural or "deeply divided” 
societies, "...the central question in this literature is whether questions concerning electoral 
systems and constitutional design should be approached differently in countries where there 
are enduring ethnic cleavages which dominate other divisions than in the multiple-cleavaged 
societies of the developed West" (Shapiro 1993:33). This "contentious" literature 
distinguishes between "single-cleavaged",i.e., deeply divided, and "multiple-cleavaged", 
societies. In the latter societies, as in the developed West", the likelihood of destabilising 
revolutionary change is remote.
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Leaving aside the fallacious perceptions about the nature of the "developed West", this 
theory arrives at a model of government for deeply divided societies based on "elite cartels" 
as opposed to "circulating (or alternating) elites" in the Schumpetrian model. In this regard, 
Shapiro - following Horowitz - concludes, in my view correctly, that consociationalism is 
a non-starter in South Africa, at least in the short term, since the recentness of the history 
of apartheid, "...makes the idea of group rights - with or without a territorial basis - taboo 
among too many of the relevant layers for its survival to be a serious prospect" (Shapiro 
1993:37).
Various ways of preventing racial and ethnic polarisation in electoral contests are explored 
by Horowitz who, opposes both majoritarian and proportional representation systems in 
favour of vote-pooling by elites representing heterogeneous constituencies but combining in 
coalitions (see Shapiro 1993:39). However, as Shapiro points out, Horowitz’s assumption 
that "the relevant groups" would have to be identified in advance in the electoral law is 
unrealistic and poses the question once again of the nature of the various social groups in 
South Africa, specifically the extent to which the country is ethnically divided "underneath 
it all”, as it were. He adds (Shapiro 1993:41) astutely that, "Given that the immense and 
often overlapping complexities of racial, tribal, ethnic, linguistic, religious and other cultural 
bases of affiliation are so little understood, it seems to me that no one knows what the most 
salient groups in South African politics would be two elections hence."
Shapiro then discusses briefly the relationship between inner-party democracy, civil society 
and the sustainability of a democratic (capitalist) order. In particular, he believes that a 
hypothesis that merits serious attention is the proposition that "the likelihood of an opposition 
movement’s achieving sustainable democracy once it comes to power varies with the degree 
to which its own organization in opposition is internally democratic" (Shapiro 1993:43). 
He also reminds us of the Tocquevillean tradition in which the institutions of civil society, 
though controlled by their members, are not necessarily democratic. He concludes his 
review essay with the eminently relevant statement that,
In the end...democratic habits of thought and action have to be learnt by being 
practised in the routine activities of everyday life. There is no convincing reason to 
think this will occur in an authoritarian political culture. In debates about the relations 
between civil society and democratic politics, we should eschew questions about how 
‘weak’ or ‘strong’ civil institutions might be, and turn instead to the study of how 
democratic they are, and how democratic they might be made to be” (Shapiro 1993: 
45).
It ought to be obvious that Shapiro’s essay is extremely useful not only because it is a 
state-of-the-art summary of bourgeois theories of democracy but also because it helps us to 
locate the main theories and strategies of South African activists and political elites. I am 
concerned here to make two simple points, viz., that all the extant bourgeois theories of 
democracy of South African political scientists and elites are either of the Schumpetrian 
("liberal", in our context) or of the consociational ("conservative”, "racist") variety, and that 
the rampant social-democratisation of the ex-liberation movement is rapidly leading to a 
convergence of former radicals and leftists on the Schumpetrian position. Examples of all 
these abound in the recent literature on South Africa’s "transition to democracy”.
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Thus, Die Suid-Afrikaan, in a recent special focus entitled Preparing for Democracy , 
features a series of articles by well-known pro-capitalist political analysts such as Andre du 
Toit, Alex Boraine, Van Zyl Slabbert and Heribert Adam. It is safe to assume that their 
views on the future of bourgeois democracy in South Africa reflect more or less the prevalent 
thinking among those who are nowadays labelled as "the main players". Let us consider a 
few examples briefly.
On my reading of Andre du Toit’s article on "The meaning of democracy", he considers a 
normative commitment to democracy and the recognition of the right to dissent to be the 
defining characteristics of a democratic order. The existence in such an order of space for 
legitimate opposition means that opponents of the regime "do not need to resort to rebellion 
or treason" (du Toit 1993:6). Being aware of the contending class interests in South Africa 
and the consequent contention over the meaning of democracy, he advises that South 
Africans not only choose for democracy but also between democracies. He concludes that 
this will necessitate honest debate but, I would add, also class struggle, including mass 
action in the streets. Like Huntington, Heribert Adam for his part considers economic 
growth to be crucial to the realisation of limited democracy in South Africa. As he sees it,
...the democratic dilemma lies in the fact that a "democratic oligarchy" - an 
authoritarian order with a semblance of popular participation - is likely to perform 
better economically and attract more foreign capital at lower labour costs than a 
genuine institutionalization of the popular will .... That predicament does not bode 
well for the prosptects of genuine democratisation beyond the ritual of manipulated 
ptopular endorsement (Adam 1993:11).
In recent months, as if by magic, most South African political commentators and journalists 
have similarly and simultaneously discovered that the euphoria of 1990-91 was ill-founded 
and that we ought to prepare ourselves, in the words of the editorial in Die Suid-Afrikaan, 
for a dispensation of multi-racial domination rather than for genuine democracy. Or, as 
Heribert Adam puts it even more bluntly in the same journal: "The reluctant partners in joint 
domination may both reach the conclusion that they can afford only limited democracy" 
(Adam 1993:9)
This is par for the course as far as bourgeois "journalism" goes since it is obviously the 
flavour of the year. More to the point, however, is the fact that these same scribes are also 
beginning to reflect the rapid convergence of "the main players", to wit, the ANC and the 
NP leaderships, on all the issues that matter for the creation of a new Pact government. 
The best writing in this genre has come from the pen of Shaun Johnson who, in a significant 
analysis published in the Argus on 9/10 1993, put the matter beyond all doubt. Predicting 
that the year 1993 would be a better one than 1992 had been, he asserts that the economic 
disaster coupled with a general sense of despair among South Africans and the growing 
impatience of the "international community" were forcing the ANC and the NP into shared 
positions on many of the central questions
This shared government/ANC world view is the glue which holds South Africa’s new 
political centre together : there are and will be vast differences in policy between the 
Nationalists and the ANC, but there is now almost total convergence on the 
fundamental rules of the game.
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In the pages of the newsletters (and journals) of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative 
in South Africa, the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy, and even of the Human Sciences 
Research Council as well as numerous similar "institutes" sponsored by the private sector and 
foreign foundations, a veritable assault has been launched on all political activists of the 
ex-liberation movement. The purpose for which these millions of Rands are being invested 
is to circumscribe and confine their understanding of democracy within the minimalist 
Schumpetrian (in some cases, the consociational) models, lest traditional radical or Marxist 
notions of democracy towards which most of these activists were until recently inclined, 
reassert themselves as more appropriate analytical instruments. Literally hundreds of 
workshops are being held inside and outside South Africa in order to grow this "culture of 
democracy" among trade-union, student, women and other community activists under 
hot-house conditions, as it were. A typical example of such a workshop was reported in the 
MPD News, no. 4 of December 1992 under the title "Playing to the Rules". In that 
workshop, Prof. Lawrence Schlemmer and Dr Ziba Jiyane set about teaching the participants 
the basics of democracy a la Huntington and others in a completely unproblematical manner.
The point of drawing attention to all this ideological activity by ruling-class and middle-class 
intellectuals and publicists is to stress that in the road-maps that influence the decisions and 
actions of the main players, there is nothing that would indicate any attempt to come to grips 
with substantive notions even of bourgeois democracy. Almost to a person, all of these 
people are concerned merely with "the rules of the game" of "democracy".
From the point of view of the ex-liberation movement, the final concession to the bourgeois 
position was made in Slovo’s "sunset clause” article (see Slovo 1992) which came to inform 
the "strategic perspectives" of the ANC. When all is said and done, this position accepts 
that until + - the year 2000, South Africa will remain under the thumb of the white minority 
even if its hold on power will have been relaxed in important respects. More than that, as 
I shall demonstrate presently, it commits the entire population to the rule of capital within 
its "ideal shell" if ail goes well. Needless to say, the spokespersons of the ex-liberation 
movement continue to make redistributive noises ("demands") and fondly imagine that their 
collaboration with the class enemy in various national and regional forums is somehow part 
and parcel of establishing a " culture of democracy". It does not, indeed cannot, strike 
them that these forums as constituted at present are mechanisms to attenuate the class 
struggle, i.e., to prevent the mobilisation and radicalisation of the downtrodden toilers 
through the institutionalisation of their struggle by means of such elite-level co-operation. 
In this perverted form, "democracy" becomes the enemy of class emancipation and of 
freedom per se.
Before we consider the social-democratic strategy/theory of the ANC-SACP, we need to 
summarise concisely aspects of a Marxist theory of the bourgeois state that are relevant to 
our understanding of the so-called transition to democracy in South Africa. This has become 
necessary because so many former activists have either "forgotten" or quite deliberately 
jettisoned their former Marxist analytical tools as so much ballast from another epoch. The 
point of departure of all reformism whether liberal bourgeois or social democratic, is that 
the capitalist state stands above class interests and can work in the interests of "society as a 
whole". Although crude instrumentalist theories abstract from the complex functions of the 
late capitalist state, it remains true that "the state in capitalist society has always been first 
and foremost the guarantor of capitalist property relations” (Sweezy 1970 : 349) even though,
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as Kautsky realised more than eighty years ago now, "the capitalist class rules, but it does 
not govern. It is content to give orders to the government" (Quoted in Mandel 1987:479). 
Paul Sweezy, some fifty years ago developed an argument to demonstrate that this is the 
real nature of the capitalist state by taking the reformist position ad absurdum. I take the 
indulgence to quote the relevant passage (Sweezy 1970:350) in full :
What is required apparently is a mass party dedicated to reform which can meet the 
following specifications : (a) it must keep itself strictly free of capitalist influence, 
not only for a time but permanently; (b)it must acquire power and eliminate capitalists 
and their representatives at least from all critical positions in the state apparatus, and 
it must do so by non-revolutionary means; and (c) it must establish its position so 
firmly that it would be overwhelmingly plain that any resistance by capitalists in the 
economic sphere would be futile.
He goes on to point out (Sweezy 1970:351) that in such circumstances, any power-sharing 
is unthinkable and concludes that reformism as a strategy is futile since "in the sober world 
of reality, capital holds the strategic positions" and that "the outstanding characteristics of 
all movements of reform ... (is) the progressive bartering of principles for respectability and 
votes. The outcome is not the reform of capitalism but the bankruptcy of reform " (Sweezy 
1970:352).
In Late Capitalism, Emest Mandel restates the Marxist theory of the state under the changed 
circumstances obtaining since the end of World War II. He shows in detail the concrete 
mechanisms by which the capitalist class "rules" but does not "govern" and, amongst other 
things, insists that so-called socialist notions of using redistributive policies to bring about 
"socialisation" are typically "no more than preliminary stages in the development of a 
reformism whose logical end is an outright programme for the actual stabilisation of the 
capitalist economy and its levels of profit" (Mandel 1987:483). All the recent debates and 
actions of the social-contract partners in South Africa demonstrate the correctness of this 
proposition no matter how militant the rhetoric in which it is necessarily packaged in order 
to "persuade" the target constituency of unemployed or at-risk workers.
Mandel also discusses the tendency of the bourgeois state in the period of late capitalism 
towards the "strong state" which restricts democratic liberties and takes to its logical 
conclusion, as it were, the principles of the separation of powers and of a professional 
bureaucracy that effect "the permanent prevention of any direct exercise of power 
(self-administration) by the mass of the working class" (Mandel 1987:495). This reminds 
us that in the Marxist analysis of the capitalist state the relative autonomy of the repressive 
state apparatuses (army, police, judiciary, penal services and civil service generally) 
represents the last line of defence of the bourgeoisie should any political party tend to work 
against the perceived interests of their class (see, for example Harman 1983:47-50; Bums 
1978:35-36; Mandel 1987: Chapter 15, passim; Sweezy 1970: Chapter 13, passim). In the 
words of Emile Bums (1978:35),
However far democracy might go in the representative institution, there has been 
much experience to support the view that it was unable to penetrate into the tough 
core of the State machine. So long as no serious issues arise, the fact that the State 
machine is separated from the democratic parliament is not obvious.
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To the domination of the repressive state apparatuses by the bourgeoisie should be added 
their massive control of the ideological apparatuses, especially of the media. This is a 
well-researched area and I need do no more here than to point to the recent works of Noam 
Chomsky(1991) that have exposed the lie of "freedom of the press” to a gullible American 
public. Against the background of the foregoing historical and theoretical notes on the 
relationship between capitalism and democracy, it is possible to put forward a few pointers 
to what is likely to happen in a South Africa that is undergoing a process of rapid 
socio-political change.
In the first place, it is abundantly clear that all the strategists of the ruling class are intent 
on restricting the process of democratisation to procedural (rules-of-the-game) issues. They 
are attempting to smother any talk about “historical redress", the colonial-apartheid 
Wiedergutmachung complex, or even large-scale "affirmative action" notions under a 
blanket of constitutionalist verbiage in order to ensure the maintenance of the capitalist status 
quo. Since all of them are also very clear that for the foreseeable future, there will be no 
major economic growth, they are- through their media- preparing the populace for the 
eventuality of the strong state, i.e., a capitalist state in which the ordinary bourgeois 
democratic liberties are severely curtailed.
This is necessary because, in the short term, the right wing and other conservative (mainly 
Bantustan) interests can be expected to attempt to destabilise the transition since its 
constituency stands to lose most immediately. In the longer term, as it becomes obvious to 
the urban and the rural poor that the pact government (of national unity) cannot "deliver the 
goods" of jobs, housing, health care, education and other social facilities, the left wing will 
mobilise for the radical restructuring of the economy but the likelihood is great that 
simultaneous pressure from both wings for the attainment of their contradictory ends will 
make a military government of some kind unavoidable.
Constitutional technicalities about regionalism, federalism, a unitary state, etc., are important 
insofar as they reflect the balance of forces between the competing elites, but they will not 
be resolved arbitrarily. Historical and traditional factors, in short, ideology as a material 
force, will have a limiting influence on any compromises arrived at during the process of 
negotiations.
Of course, the social and democratic demands for reform emanating from the black working 
and middle classes are the immediate reason for the attempted "transplacement" or 
realignment of class forces in the power bloc. Even Heribert Adam (1993:9-11) concedes 
that the restriction of the content of democracy to human-right issues is impossible in South 
Africa. On the other hand, he points to the fact that, "...the accumulated demands that real 
"people’s power" would reflect, would at the same time drive away manifold vested interests 
on whose co-operation the performance of the new order depends."
In other words, he points to the interconnectedness of the mode of production and the mode 
of distribution, a structural feature of the capitalist system, the ignoring of which Rosa 
Luxemburg cited as a reason for the self-deluding character of social-democratic reformism.
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In her celebrated critique of Bernstein’s revisionist treatise, she accused him of attempting 
to deflect the revolutionary socialists’ struggle from one against the capitalist mode of 
production to one against the mode of distribution within the capitalist framework.
It cannot be denied (she wrote) that the direct cause leading the popular masses into 
the socialist movement is precisely the ’’unjust" mode of distribution characteristic of 
capitalism. When the social democracy (read revolutionary socialism NA) struggles 
for the socialization of the entire economy, it aspires therewith also to a "just" 
distribution of the social wealth. But, guided by Marx's observation that the mode 
of distribution of a given epoch is a natural consequence of the mode of production 
of that epoch, the social democracy does not struggle against distribution in the 
framework of capitalist production. It struggles instead for the suppression of 
capitalist production itself. In a word, the social democracy wants to establish the 
mode of socialist distribution by suppressing the capitalist mode of production. 
Bernstein’s method, on the contrary, proposes to combat the capitalist mode of 
distribution in the hope of gradually establishing, in this way, the socialist mode of 
production (Luxemburg 1978:44).
This is in principle the answer to the new social democrats in South Africa with their trendy 
slogan of "growth through redistribution" even if it does not indicate the tactics of the 
democratic socialist alternative. Insofar as they insist on substantive definitions of 
democracy, e.g., "economic democracy", redistribution, affirmative action, etc., theelite 
of the ex-liberation movement, speaking generally, close their eyes to the "sober reality" 
of capitalist relations of production. Typical of this approach are the recent writings of Karl 
Von Holdt and other regular contributors to the South African Labour Bulletin. In vol. 17, 
no. 1 , Von Holdt writes, among other things,
(T)he aim - or declared aim - of strategic unionism is the radical democratisation and 
gradual transformation of the social order. Is such democratisation and 
transformation compatible with participation in corporatist institutions such as the 
NEF and NMC , when these tend to stabilise society ? Indeed, can corporatist 
institutions serve as a vehicle for democratising and transforming society? Is a 
gradual, ’reformist’ route to socialism possible? .... (I)f such a socialist strategy 
is possible (and I believe it is ), it will only be so if the labour movement develops 
the strategies outlined above - that is , builds an active, mobilised and confident base 
around an independent popular programme for economic and social reform....
This naivety is only a degree less than that of Ebrahim Patel (1993) who goes to the extent 
of advising (Big) "Business" on the best way to stabilise the system and accuses them of 
having "lost the vision of how to grow the economy".
The more audacious and consequential new social democrats take matters to their logical 
conclusion. Thus, Mike Morris and Doug Hindson (1992) in a sophisticated analysis of the 
roots of the present violence in effect warn the South African capitalist class that mere 
neo-liberal socio-economic policies (involving one or other Schumpetrian solution of the 
question of "democracy" NA) are doomed to fail and to increase instability because they 
cannot cushion the rising black middle class against the pressures from the urban and the 
rural dispossessed.
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In a telling passage they state unequivocally that,
...we have to be willing to accept the process of differentiation between classes and, 
by recognising different interests, construct working relationships between classes 
around different elements of urban reconstruction. In other words, adopting an 
approach that recognises the continual existence of class contradictions but which 
attempts to contain the excesses of the market/private property system rather than 
trying to eliminate them (Morris and Hindson 1992;56).
This is, obviously, the ultimate testimony to the social-democratisation of the trade-union 
left and of all those who advocate the resuscitation of the South African capitalist economy 
through the adoption of the policy of "growth through redistribution" instead of the 
neo-liberal nightmare of "redistribution through growth". My point is not that this strategy 
is "wrong", the point is that it is an unashamedly capitalist solution, a defeatist capitulation 
that declares in effect, "if we can’t beat them, let’s join them."
This particular article is important for two other reasons. Firstly, it demonstrates on the 
basis of careful research that if this social-democratic solution is not adopted by the powers 
that be or by the powers that will be, increasing violence and instability will make any 
semblance of a democratic solution to the conflict in South Africa impossible. The authors 
in fact go to the extent of advocating strong military action against all armed formations and 
the enforcement of “the law" (!) against all who are opposed to the disarming of the people 
even though they concede pro forma that depoliticised neighbourhood self-defence units 
should be allowed to exist.
Secondly, they sketch in their conclusion a theme which Morris (1993) takes up later, i.e., 
the evolution of a "50% society" as the result of a "successful" neo-liberal strategy. In such 
a society, half of the population will be tolerated on the edges of social life while a niche 
is found within a slightly altered neo-apartheid South Africa for the black middle class and 
for some of the skilled working strata. This is, of course, an updated variant of the Marxist 
analysis of the present "transition to democracy" put to quite a different use from that to 
which we have always put it. Instead of serving as proof that only anti-capitalist, socialist 
solutions can solve the problems of the urban and rural poor and therefore act as a spur to 
class struggle and mass action, it is used by these authors as a kind of bogeyman that should 
frighten the working class into embracing the contending social democratic "solution". They 
quite correctly, let it be said, warn that such a 50% society will mean that "we will have 
shaken off apartheid only to find ourselves back in a new form of authoritarianism" (Morris 
and Hindson 1992:59).
In what can be said to be a sequel to this audacious but admirably honest analysis, Morris 
makes it quite clear that the present transition involves the absorption i.e., the co-option of 
the black "middle strata" and that it is not about "the transfer of power" (read attainment of 
"national democracy" ). Because the old ruling forces have not been decisively defeated,
i.e., because there has been no revolutionary overthrow of the apartheid state - a point 
which Slovo was the first, in the Congress-SACP camp to spell out publicly- the 
"opposition" cannot sweep aside the old institutions.
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Indeed, it has like its predecessors in 19th century Germany, set out on the long march 
through the institutions.
It has to try and shape the terms on which it is incorporated into the state as a new 
ruling group. It has to extend and thereby transform state institutions so that they 
will cover new constituencies and new aspects of social life (Morris 1993:8)
In what is obviously a sincere but erroneous analysis based on some notion of the neutrality 
of the capitalist state, Morris advocates a policy that will redistribute resources and 
"institutional power" to be carried out by a new grand alliance of classes pivoting on "the 
middle strata" in such a way that the "marginalised masses" will be included rather than 
"fenced out". Even if we leave aside the fact of the worldwide economic depression and the 
consequent improbability of any significant economic growth in the next crucial period, this 
policy is a non-starter on more fundamental grounds since it misunderstands the systemic 
sources of the capitalists’ lack of vision. Morris, Patel, Manuel, Mboweni et. al can wax 
eloquent until the cows come home and try to persuade the captains of industry and of 
finance to adopt more sensible (capitalist) policies, but "in the sober world of reality, capital 
holds the strategic positions". Their scripts, which prompt many of "the main players" in the 
ex-liberation movement, are a recipe for disaster for working people, no matter how 
well-intentioned they might be. Even if they do not say so explicitly, they anticipate, 
correctly, a period of "strong" government before the dawn of the democratic paradise.
The theory and strategy of the new social democrats do not hold out any real prospect of a 
democratic outcome of the present negotiations process other than the minimalist trappings 
of bourgeois democracy. Above all, if any further proof is necessary, they demonstrate the 
profound truth of Rosa Luxemburg’s vision almost 100 years ago when she wrote that
(P)eople who pronounce themselves in favour of the method of legislative reform in 
place of and in contradistinction to the conquest of political power and social 
revolution, do not really choose a more tranquil, calmer and slower road to the 
same goal, but a different goal. Instead of taking a stand for the establishment of 
a new society they take a stand for surface modification of the old society. If we 
follow the political conceptions of revisionism, we arrive at the same conclusion that 
is reached if we follow the economic theories of revisionism. Our program becomes 
not the realization of socialism, but the reform of capitalism: not the suppression 
of the system of wage labour, but the diminution of exploitation, that is, the 
suppression of the abuses of capitalism instead of the suppression of capitalism itself 
(Luxemburg 1978:50).
Ultimately, the differences between the new social democrats and democratic socialism boil 
down to differences in philosophical assumptions about human beings and analytical concepts 
about how societies are structured. Democratic socialists continue to base their political and 
organizational strategies on what Morris (1993:9) cavalierly dismisses as "the daydreams of 
the past” . The basic tenets of our position I have dealt with briefly elsewhere (Alexander 
1992).
In regard to the question of democracy, I want to repeat that for democratic socialists the 
immediate tasks consist in struggling for the most radical forms of peoples’ and workers’
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power that the capitalist system will tolerate. This refers in one respect to the struggle for 
the unfettered universal franchise at national, regional and local levels. We must at all costs 
reject ultra-leftist disdain for formal-democratic institutions without, however, falling victim 
to the fetishism that comes with those institutions. Marxists accept, in the words of Paul 
Sweezy (1970:250) that
Only under a democratic form of government can the working class organise freely 
and effectively for the achievement of its ends, whether they happen to be socialist 
or merely reformist in character. It is for this reason that one of the first demands 
of the labour movement in all non-democratic countries has always been the 
establishment of democratic forms of government ... (Sweezy 1970:250).
The struggle for workers’ power at another more fundamental level refers specifically to the 
democratisation of all organs of civil society. Much of the faddish discussion of the concept 
of civil society takes it for granted that the trade unions, civics, community organisations 
, new social movements, etc., to which the term refers, are as if by magic automatically 
possessed of some indestructible disposition towards something called "democracy". This 
is patently untrue, however. In the liberal-democratic tradition the organs of civil society, 
though controlled by their members, are not necessarily structured democratically. Or, to 
put it differently, it is usually not understood that "one person’s consensus is often another’s 
hegemony" or that "agreement can mask all kinds of things from cultish following, to 
strategic behaviour of various kinds, to ignorance of interests and of how to protect them" 
(Shapiro 1992:17). This is the reason for the existence of a contending social-democratic 
tradition that stretches back via the now well-known propositions of Gramsci to Engels’s 
Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State (see Shapiro 1992 :10) which insists 
on the eminently political character of civil society. (For a good local exposition of this 
approach, see Narsoo 1991). If we accept the criticism, as I think we should, that the 
unrestrained invasion of civil society by the state can and usually does have exactly the same 
cdrrosive totalitarian consequences as do the built-in social inequalities that derive from the 
unrestrained operations of the "free market” in the liberal-democratic tradition, it ought to 
be obvious that one of the most urgent and most difficult tasks of democratic socialists in 
South Africa is to fight for the independence of the organs of civil society from 
party-political domination or bias. This is, in my view, the single most important thing that 
socialists can do at present in order to break the stranglehold which bourgeois and petty 
bourgeois nationalist conceptions (and practices) of democracy and of social ends have on 
the working people of South Africa. Whatever transitional consensus prevails within civil 
society, it is of the essence that it be the organic consequence of a process in which a 
hundred flowers bloom and a thousand schools of thought contend.
Democracy is both means and end as long as it remains necessary to restructure power 
relations in order to eradicate all exploitation and oppression of one human being by another. 
In this sense, it ought to be clear from the foregoing exposition that whatever democratic 
gains may come out of the present negotiations for power sharing, they will hardly begin 
to address the profound socio-economic, cultural and political problems that confront the 
working class, employed and unemployed, in the real South Africa at the end of the 20th 
century. In this profound sense, therefore, the struggle continues.
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CAPITALISM CRISIS AND EDUCATION REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA
Bupendra Makan 
Khanya College
INTRODUCTION
This paper attempts to examine the factors associated with the dialectical relationship between 
education and the economy, thus focusing to some extent on the nexus between education and 
the system of social economy of capitalism. The analysis will pose questions on, why and 
how the state has intervened to secure the labour requirements of the economy, to contribute 
to a "gluttonous" form of Capitalism. The educational institution in South Africa, according 
to the dynamics of ideology and strategy, has seen a fundamental historical relationship 
develop between the forces of state and capital for whom:
Education is......an investment in the future legitimacy of a capitalist social order,
helping to maintain a particular and unequal disposition of class based power and 
wealth (Nasson, 1990:73).
At the outset, and of obvious consequence, it is important to recognise that there are various 
theoretical and concomitant ideological approaches to addressing the question of the 
relationship between Education and the Capitalist Economy. The theme of “Capitalism and 
Economic Reform in SA" is analyzed historically by examining the ideological roots of 
Apartheid - segregated mass education: and by presenting and developing a critique of the 
strategy of reforming education under capitalism. Moreover, a few areas considered 
important to opening the debate are introduced by way of examining the political economy 
of education and capitalism. The paper will not however, present in detail issues related to 
"alternative strategies" on the relationship between Education and the Economy. Rather 
linked to the latter approach, various questions will be posed leading from the historiography 
of South African education.
The aim of this paper is to provide a broad analysis to contextualise the inter-relationship 
between the two fundamentally linked social institutions of Education and the Economy 
(capitalism), and the history of South Africa. Based on this approach, the limits of capitalist 
reform to education will be explored.
SETTING THE SCENE: THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE:
The historiography of South Africa reveals a deeply politicised educational struggle and a 
crisis-ridden economy. The decades of struggle directed at educational institutions in S.A. 
have to some extent become crystallised by the demands for "people’s education for people’s 
power”. The report of the national Education Consultative Conference n the Crisis in
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Education, in December 1985, resolved that:
PEOPLE’S EDUCATION aims to:
a) enable the oppressed to understand the evils of the apartheid system and prepares 
them for participation in a non-racial democratic system;
b) eliminate illiteracy, ignorance and the exploitation of one person by another;
c) eliminate capitalist norms of competition, individualism and stunted intellectual 
development, and replaces it with one that encourages collective input and active 
participation by all, as well as stimulating critical thinking and analysis;
d) equip and tain all sectors of our people to participate actively and creatively in the 
struggle to attain people’s power and to establish a non-racial democratic South 
Africa;
e) allow students, parents, teachers and workers to be mobilised into appropriate 
organisational structures which enable them to participate actively in the initiation and 
management of people’s education in all its forms;
f) enable workers to resist exploitation and oppression at their workplace.
Enshrined in the resolution on people’s education was the realisation that education has been 
subservient to the demands of the capitalist economic system. The impetus provided by the 
renewed struggle for people’s education in 1985, represented a new direction and significant 
departure (especially at an ideological level) from the earlier challenges to the racist and class 
based educational system initiated in the 1950’s and continued in the 1970’s.
What arose from the 1980’s endeavour is that: "the class stratification of education proceeds 
in a similar way to the class stratification of the workforce/society."
In other words, the way schools are organised is often the way work is organised", which 
forms part of apartheid and capitalism’ hidden curriculum strategy. The Educational strategy, 
in accordance with the racist minority’s apartheid education has failed dismally in providing 
a suitable rationale for legitimising a social order which is, and has been, characterised by 
gross inequalities of colour, class, income, wealth and power, in fact, the system of 
apartheid - racially segregated mass state schooling - has been severely disabled and thrown 
into crisis.
Since the educational crisis in S.A. is a key component linked to the structural complexities 
confronting the transformation of the economy, debates as to education’s role in said 
economy are raging. Most have not been conclusively resolved.
To gain perspective in this debate we need to focus on the relationship between 
education/schooling and the existing order of economic and political power in a racially 
divided and class-biased South African society. There is a serious need to revisit the
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theoretical premises at the centre of this debate.
THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF EDUCATION
In analysing the issues and debates on "Education and the Capitalist Economy" as forwarded 
by various political actors and analysts, it is clear that education is given prominence as a 
mechanism either of social reproduction or social transformation. The basis of each strategy 
rests on ideological, theoretical or political approaches which are adopted to guide policy for 
change.
The pivotal role of education with regard to the socio-economic order could be presented 
rather starkly as a mechanism either of:
* social reproduction of the racial order and the relations of 
production; or
* social transformation of the stratification system, towards redistribution of the occupational 
opportunities.
Wolpe and Unterhalter, in "Reproduction, Reform and Transformation: the analysis of 
Education in South Africa" argue that:
...education may be a necessary condition for certain social processes, but it is not 
a sufficient condition, and hence cannot be analyzed as an autonomous social force. 
From the standpoint of the struggle for social transformation, the importance of this 
condition is that the structure and processes of educational change must be linked to 
changes in other social conditions and institutions (Unterhalter et al, 1991:3)
These formulations have developed out of ideas postulated by earlier writings tracing the 
relationship of the role of education in the social system of capitalism. Elements of a Marxist 
conception of education began to be promulgated in the 1840’s, through the various works 
of Marx and Engels (for example in Capital I, Ch 13, Principles of Communism - {Engels 
1847}). Subsequent contributions developed the theory of education in a coherent manner, 
with major impetus provided by the October Revolution and its call for a Marxist education 
practice. In essence, Marxist educational theory was presented as a theory of praxis.
The four central components of the theory argued for:
a) Free public education, compulsory and uniform for all children, assuring the abolition 
of cultural or knowledge monopolies and of privileged forms of schooling. Thus, the 
role of "education in institutions". The justification provided dealt with preventing 
the poor living conditions of the working class from hindering the overall 
development of the individual; weakening the role of the family in social 
reproduction; raising children under less unequal conditions; and utilising the 
socialising force of the community. Educationalist, Paulo Freire who conducted 
research on the basis of these tenets, introduced the concepts into the education 
institutions in Latin America and Cuba.
b) The combination of education with material production (or as Marx quipped... the
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combination of instruction, gymnastics and productive work!). "The objective 
implied here is neither a better vocational training, nor the inculcation of a work 
ethic, but rather the closing of the historical gap between manual and mental work, 
between conception and execution, by assuring to all the understanding of the 
productive process." This intention in itself may be theoretically quite valid, but in 
practise there has been mixed results given the conditions of rapid scientific progress 
and technological change.
c) Education to ensure the all-round development of the personality. With science and 
production unified, the human being can become a producer in the fullest sense. This 
process ideally releases the potentialities of the individual, activating the individual 
in all spheres of life including consumption, pleasure, creation, enjoyment of culture, 
participation in social life, interaction with others, and self-fulfilment. The realisation 
of this objective requires, amongst other things, the transformation of the social 
division of labour (a formidable task still in its infancy).
d) The community to be assigned a new and vast role in the educational process. The 
focus being on addressing group relations in schools, on encouraging a move from 
competitiveness to co-operation and support, opening up the relationship between 
school and society, and presupposing an active and mutually enriching dual 
relationship between teacher and student. (Ferge, 1987:144)
Here it is important to highlight these principles and to acknowledge their prevalence in 
debates. The broad principles of Marxist theory, and the praxis corresponding to them, are 
the cause of many a dilemma. These principles also form part of the debates (both amongst 
Marxists, and between Marxists and non-Marxists) about the role of schooling and education 
in social reproduction; and the innovative potential within prevailing social determinisms. 
The relative importance of the contents, the methods and the structuring of education in 
promoting social (economic) change also stimulates discussion. Of great importance is their 
relevance regarding the theme of "capitalism and educational reform."
In their analysis, "The Capitalist System - Schooling and the reproduction of Inequality", 
Bowles and Gintis argued that, "the social relations of the school (education) correspond to 
and are largely determined by the social relations of the workplace, and thereby tend to 
minimise the ideological and political significance of educational policy and practice." 
(Bowles and Gintis, 1972:79). Furthermore, it was contended that efforts to equalise 
education through the exercising of state power via government policy and intervention will 
at best scratch the surface of inequality and ensure that inequality will continue to be built 
into society.
Thus, arising from the ideological underpinnings and various contributions from the praxis 
literature in South Africa, it could be argued that to achieve meaningful and necessary 
structural change, the broader socio-economic roots of education in the hierarchy of work 
relations (the social division of labour) will need serious scrutiny. As will the associated 
differences in class culture, and the vast inequalities arising from the distribution of economic 
power, in order to allow the processes of social transformation of the capitalist system. 
Therefore, the terrain of education should be a necessary component to a total strategy of 
change in various other social institutions and practices, in order to give life to "people's
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education” and "education for liberation" projects.
In applying this theoretical framework to South Africa, the latter analysis aims to provide 
evidence to expose the manner in which educational policies in South Africa have been 
applied in an isolated manner, without any consideration of other necessary components, 
thereby exposing the inherent contradictions.
In the crucial task of tracing the nexus between education and the economy, this analysis will 
focus on the state and capital, and selectively provide the "theoretical assumptions underlying 
the particular educational policies", as pursued over various periods. Of important 
consequence will be the introduction of reformism in bantu education between 1953-1988,, 
together with an overview of an attempt to locate it within the apartheid regime’s political 
and economic strategies.
Moreover, the paper aims at contextualising the foundations of state and capitalist education 
strategies - locating them firmly in the ambit of "the reproduction of the racial order and the 
relations of production." A strategy which is intent on preserving hegemony over the terrain 
of education and its role in the capitalist order. This then provides the perfect opportunity 
in turn, to contextualise the "education for liberation" project as based on the "transformation 
of the stratification systems and towards redistribution of the occupational opportunities." 
More importantly, however, it provides the basis for examining the foundations of the latter.
ECONOMIC THEORY AND EDUCATION: A BRIEF STATEMENT
There are various areas that could be covered to provide an insight into the mechanisms 
underlying the nexus between economic theory and educational strategy. This analysis will 
confine itself to exploring the socio-political features of education, and economic theories are 
used to illustrate various relationships as emanating from the state reform ideology. Of 
importance to this analysis is an overview of the role of education as an allocator of 
economic roles, and of its relation to economic growth.
The areas of relationship range from considering education and intersectoral links; 
employments; income distribution; social class; discrimination; economic growth; and 
economic crisis.
THE POLICY OF BANTU EDUCATION: EDUCATION FOR THE REPRODUCTION 
OF THE RACIAL AND CLASS ORDER AND THE PRESERVATION OF POWER
In examining the history of education in South Africa, it is clear that the underlying 
preoccupation of the architects responsible for bantu education was that of ensuring that 
education maintained a role for the "reproduction of the social order". During the 1950s and 
1960s education was regarded as the essential mechanism for the reproduction of specific 
components of white domination at an economic level, and the maintenance of the ideology 
of white supremacy. At the level of economic interest, this meant the reproduction of 
segregated occupation structures, which maintained that blacks were excluded from all job 
categories apart from those of unskilled and cheap labour.
The mechanism to enforce the state’s strategy was the Bantu Education Act f 1953, an
28
ideological policy, which stressed segregation in education. The act initially meant moulding 
the structure of education to guarantee white supremacy hegemony over education. It later 
contributed to minority monopoly of economic interests and power. White education would 
provide only for a basic level of skills, and impart the values of Christian Nationalism. The 
primary objectives of bantu education, being to ensure a subordinate and readily available 
cheap supply and resource base of labour. In this manner, the labour requirements and basic 
economic interest of profitability for the white capitalist class were to be realised, as based 
on the segmented, unequal and segregationalist educational model.
Thus, the political and economic order served to foster and support the racial occupational 
structure and subordination, and the instalment of the bantu Education system under this 
structure contributed to the reproduction of the cheap labour requirements. The latter, 
however, also served as a foundation for maintaining the hegemonic position of the state, and 
for the appeasement of the burgeoning white bourgeoisie.
On examining the functionalist view of early apartheid education, there is the debate of 
"education serving the needs of capital", and- or "education of black South Africans for 
oppression and barbarism", where inequality, segregation, repression and authoritarianism 
are viewed as central characteristics which contributes to subordination. In examining the 
"Changing aspects of reformism in bantu education", Unterhalter stresses the periodisation 
of various reform strategies in order to establish a relationship to the apartheid regime’s 
overall political and economic policies regarding the dominant forces in society.
In the periodisation, from 1953-1988 of the "moments of reformism", unterhalter identifies 
four distinct stages:
a) 1953-1963: the period of segregation and incidental reformism,
b) 1963-1973: the regime’s utilisation of educational expansion to underpin the 
bantustan development strategy,
c) 1973-1983: education reform for economic expansion and political stability,
d) 1983-1989: education reform and repression of popular mobilisation.
Unterhalter asserts that there was sufficient overlap between periods when focusing on 
strategy. (Unterhalter et al, 1991,37). The contribution importantly posits reformism within 
the educational system, in relation to the unfolding political processes and the state’s 
economic strategies. The intended objectives of bantu education in the early period post- 
1953, was met with varied and contradictory responses, including organised political 
opposition, which altered its original purpose and operation.
Resultant changes in the apartheid economy and the political system during the 1960’s, and 
indeed within bantu education itself, began to undermine the conditions which had facilitated 
the "reproduction function" given to bantu educadon. Importantly, the 1960’s saw a period 
characterised by demands from large sections of the oppressed population for an expansion 
of educational provision for black South Africans. The demands included calls from sections 
of monopoly capital, for an educated workforce who would in turn contribute to economic 
growth. These developments and the resultant mass mobilisation which occurred during the 
late 1960’s and early 1970’s, related primarily to the challenges aimed at the conditions of 
white domination. The upshot was a slow erosion of the old doctrine (of predetermined
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occupational structures) led by conditions emanating from the economy and the new demands 
for labour by capital.
Therefore (it is clear that) the notion of bantu Education operating under specific conditions 
as a mechanism for the reproduction of social relations, did not derive solely from the 
ideological motivations of the regime, but was also beginning to reflect the needs of the 
dominant capitalist class. When the situation became critical, capital, faced with the option 
of economic survival versus political allegiance, opted for the former, which necessitated a 
reformist strategy.
SOUTH AFRICAN CAPITALISM IN THE 1970’S - 1980’S AND EDUCATIONAL 
REFORMISM - THE STRATEGY FOR TRANSFORMATION
At this juncture, the focus is to be that of examining the turbulent period of the 1970’s, with 
especial consideration of the needs of capital against the backdrop of the liberal reform 
initiative of the state. The central issue of the interrelationship between race, class and 
education will predominate. In order to allow the analysis to explore the relation between 
apartheid, capitalism and education. Also to be considered is whether there existed any 
deviation fro the reproduction of the racial order and the preservation of power.
During the 1970’s, the conditions upon which bantu education were based - ie. as of the 
mechanism for the reproduction of white domination in the workplace and in the political 
structures of society - were increasingly being met with resistance not only from the 
displaced majority, but also from certain sectors of capital. The June 1976 revolt and the 
regime’s subsequent brutal and repressive response served to expose the educational crisis 
and to reassert the plight of the economically and politically deprived majority. As a result, 
the increased international focus; sanctions; the declining rates of profitability of 
investments; trade union mobilisation; and changing labour) as relating to the mechanisation 
of production resulted in the capitalist classes reacting to the increasing pressure, was 
therefore forced to explore a new theoretical approach and reconsider policies regarding 
education. This formed the context for the De Lange Commission of 1981 and the White 
Paper of 1983.
The central objectives of corporate capital, given the need for the expansion and restructuring 
of the capitalist political economy, was aligned to the liberal premise of assigning an 
autonomous and determining role to the state in the redefining of the racialised system of 
social stratification. According to this strategy education change was seen as the route to 
social change. The engineers therefore striving for equal access for all to educational 
opportunities, and in this manner to providing for entry into skilled, well-paid and high-status 
employment. The intention was to achieve equality in education, from within the existing 
system, and thereby the reform of the education system would engineer the reform of the 
system of capitalism. Importantly, the strategy was not only aimed at education, but was 
intended to impact indirectly on affecting and stabilising black trade unions and at the 
provision of black housing.
The strategy proposed by capital on the role of education, was in turn supported by reformist 
elements within the state structure. The De Lange Commission of 1981 and the White Paper 
of 1983 were based on a liberal premise, calling for the abolition of bantu education, and its
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replacement by a system claiming to equalise the provision of education, which would allow 
for equal mobility and access of blacks and whites to the occupation structure (i.e; including 
the provision of technical training). The commission also placed emphasis on economic 
growth and productivity, where mass education was viewed as a service industry to 
reproduce and process a force of stable, urban, skilled operatives for a workplace structured 
by the requirements of modem science, technology and management skills.
The central criticisms aimed at the "unusually liberal" De Lange commission are many and 
varied, yet worthy of consideration. It was argued to be a reformist and modernisation 
strategy in that it was an instrument for the transformation of South Africa into a dynamic 
capitalist economy. Nevertheless, it reflected the preservation of the foundations of bantu 
education as linked to the reproduction of white domination. Schooling in itself was viewed 
as a subordinating and adaptive social practice, necessarily tailored to the reproduction of 
labour for unequal and hierarchical social relations of production (Davies, 1984).
Moreover, the "reform" of the education system was an attempt to resolve the economic and 
political crisis confronting the state, thus the concern with the ideological dimensions of 
change. Given the power of the state and its capacity to manage the educational reform, plus 
the new structural form introduced, the aim was to depoliticise education as a "site of 
struggle" into more market-regulated forms of social differentiation. Therefore, by isolating 
the needs of the dominant capitalist class and the state, it is evident that: "... in a capitalist 
society, education is not a means to social mobility, but an important mechanism to the 
reproduction of capitalist relations of production, and hence of the crystallisation of class 
divisions (Unterhalter et al, 1991:6; Kallaway, 1984).
In short, simply a reproduction of the dominant capitalist strategy. The analysis on 
"Apartheid Education and Popular Struggles", outlines in detail, the two major arguments 
as when dealing with the state, acting as in instrument of capital, which in turn provides the 
structures and processes to ensure the reproduction of capitalism, the "functional 
requirements of the capitalist system for a particular labour force to produce the means to 
satisfy those needs." (Unterhalter et al, 1991:6).
The factors and points arising from the educational reforms of the 1970’s and 1980’s, as 
located within the aim of transformation, points directly to the impossibility of assigning a 
transformative role to education, when there is a distinct lack of consideration of the social 
political and economic conditions which would allow the strategy to prosper and become 
effective. "In practice, would the deracialisation of education change the entry of people into 
particular occupations, if legislation continued to maintain white monopoly of skilled jobs, 
white trade unions continued to utilise their power to exclude black workers from 
apprenticeships, and capital itself refused to facilitate the employment of black supervisors 
and managers." (Unterhalter, 1991:9).
In concluding this section, it is reiterated that education in itself is a contested terrain, and 
that the results of reform are not without contradiction.lt is asserted that the capitalist demand 
for labour of a specific type meant that the educational system needed to reform in response. 
The response merely perpetuated the reproductive role assigned to apartheid education, and 
perpetuated and exacerbated the definite race and class divisions.
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STATE EXPENDITURE AND THE MARKET AGENDA:
The extent and devastating impact of inequalities in educational spending as generated under 
apartheid, contribute in a significant manner towards the assigned reproductive functioning 
of black education. The apartheid policies, with their concomitant reproduction of inequality, 
overrode and precluded any impetus of actual changes in spending since the 1950’s. In 
effect, the strategy went as far as ignoring the restructuring of the capitalist political 
economy. Therefore, as a result of state inequity in spending on education the occupational 
structuring was maintained thus embedding the racialised system of social stratification.
The S.A. educational system has a clear differential pattern of development. This is 
expressed with reference to the resource provision by the state, touched on above. White 
education is of a higher level, and comparable to the best in the industrialised world, whereas 
black education is characterised by an inequitable allocation of resources; overcrowded 
classrooms; high failure and dropout rates; and an insufficient and poorly qualified teacher 
base. Thus, bantu education is noted for its inferiority and is constructed so as to confine 
blacks to lower-class occupations. The differences within black education are further sub­
divided, making African education the most underdeveloped. (Pillay, 1991:30). The 
inequalities in various aspects of S.A.’s education are numerous. However, state expenditure 
is the key indicator to examine the disparities.
Table 1: Expenditure on Education by segregated education departments, 1960-88 (millions 
of rands).
African Coloured Indian White Total
1960 19,5 24,3 7,9 79,0 130,7
1965 24,9 30,9 14,3 252,3 322,4
1970 66,3 45,0 19,8 366,0 497,1
1975 160,2 104,9 43,8 738,7 1 047,6
1980 553,0 247,1 122,7 1 360,9 2 283,7
1985 1 816,0 724,1 324,0 2 973,7 5 837,8
1988 4 096,6 1 103,4 463,2 3 727,5 9 390,7
(Source: Unterhalter, 1991, SAIRR 1988/9)
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Table 2: Proportional expenditure on segregated education departments, 1955 - 88 
(percentages)
African Coloured Indian White
1960 14,9 18,6 6,1 60,4
1965 7,7 9,6 4,4 78,3
1970 13,3 9,1 4,0 73,6
1975 15,3 10,0 4,2 70,5
1980 24,2 10,8 5,4 59,6
1985 31,1 12,4 5,6 50,9
1988 43,6 11,8 4,9 39,7
(Source: as above, derived from table 1)
Table 3: Per Capita Expenditure on education in segregated education department,
1953-88 (rands).
African Coloured Indian White
1953 17,08 40,00 40,00 128,00
1955 15,68 n/a n/a n/a
1960 13,60 74,50 74,50 114,00
1965 12,70 71,00 91,50 357,00
1970 47,64 87,30 121,00 428,00
1975 50,00 126,00 171,00 605,00
1980 87,27 286,00 318,00 1 021,00
1985 293,86 891,62 1 386,00 2 746,00
1988 582,93 1 325,64 1 980,41 3 982,82
(Source: Unterhalter 1991, Du Plessis et al 1989, SAIRR 1988/9)
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Table 4: Expenditure on African education as a percentage of total state expenditure 1953- 
85 (millions of rands)
Expenditure 
on African 
education
Total
government
expenditure
Expenditure on 
African education 
as a % of total 
govt expenditure
1953 16,0 0,57
1955 15,8 0,49
1960 19,5 655 3,00
1965 24,9 653 3,80
1970 66,a* 1 993 3,30
1975 160,2 5 157 3,10
1980 553,0 11 542 4,80
1985 1 816,0 31 144 5,80
1988 4 096,6 53 963 7,60
(Source: Unterhalter, 1991:53)
Table 5: Expenditure on white education as a proportion of total state expenditure, 1960-88 
(millions of rands).
Total State 
Expenditure
Expenditure on White Education 
as a % of the total
1960 79,00 12,1
1965 252,30 38,6
1970 366,00 18,4
1975 738,70 14,3
1980 1 360,90 11,8
1985 2 973,70 9,5
1988 3 727,56 6,9
(Source: Unterhalter, 1991, 53).
The differential pattern of development is linked to the differences in expenditure, which, 
when translated to per capita expenditure (PCE), reveals that from the 1950’s to the 1980’s, 
spending on the education of each white child was approximately ten times spending on the 
education of each African child. (See table 1). Since 1953, there has been a steady increase 
in PCE on white children, whereas the PCE for black - African children slowed to steady 
decrease. Since 1985, there has been a slight narrowing of the differential, as evident by
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1988, when the PCE on each white child was approximately six times the PCE on each 
African child. (See table 3).
When examining the state budget, there is clear evidence to suggest the continuing disparities 
in so-called reformism of South African education. State legislation restricting the finance 
available for black education illustrates the low political and economic priorities given to 
expanding african education beyond rudimentary provision. The increases in spending on 
African education since 1985 need to be placed in the context of the increases in educational 
expenditure for all South Africans, and particularly needs to be examined in relation to 
accelerated increase in expenditure on white education. (See tables 4 & 5).
Overall, the tables show that the greater proportion of state expenditure on school education 
was for the white minority up to the 1980s. Although the proportion of total government 
expenditure on african education has increased since the 1960’s, education spending as a 
whole in the segregated departments has decreased markedly since 1965. Therefore, the 
proportional increase on African education in the mid-1980s is all the more "significant", put 
into perspective (Unterhalter, 1991:54).
In addition, the shifts in expenditure and enrolment need to be seen in relation to the 
changing political and economic condidons, nodng the reformist policies of the dominant 
forces in society. During the 1953-1963 period the demands from monopoly capital for an 
expansion of educadon provision for blacks was minimal. The economic expansion which 
occurred in the secondary industry during the 1960’s demanded an increase in the 
employment of black workers, but with low levels of skill and literacy, moreover, the state 
felt that, given their high levels of profits the mine-owners could institute their own on-the- 
job training where necessary (Innes, 1984:150-154).
The other dominant employer groups in the economy shared the view that there was little 
need to develop and expand black educadon. White farmers resented the idea of increased 
provision of educadon for blacks arguing that urbanisation would affect the insufficiently 
mechanised and labour-dependent agricultural sector. On the other hand, the white working 
class, an important and protected political force in the National Party government, entrenched 
their positions as favoured artisans and skilled workers in manufacture and mining, by 
arguing against competition from educated black workers (O’Meara, 1983:239).
The De Lange commission of 1981, contained major recommendations for expanding and 
reforming educational provisions, such as providing for the "needs of the economy”. This 
reformist strategy was ideologically related to ideas that "a more educated workforce would 
provide for higher levels of productivity/profits and hence economic growth and also would 
provide for a stratum of better-paid workers with a stake in the system, who would be 
politically pliable". (Unterhalter, 1991:64).
The human capital formulae is significantly apposite to the modemisation/reformist 
programme, since there is still a widening remuneration gap between white and black 
workers in the manufacturing and public sector services. This could be explained by the fact 
that equal opportunity programmes are their infancy, but particularly because state 
expenditure has been somewhat laggard in actual performance to say the least.
35
During the 1973-1983 period, and particularly after the Soweto uprisings, there was collusion 
between state and Capital (corporate sector) once again it was aimed at redividing educational 
strategies geared to gaining a better supply of skilled black labour, to creating more wealth 
in the economy and also to maintaining political order and stability.
In agreement with the state, major corporations engaged in large-scale investment in various 
educational and training alternatives for displaced black students and workers. Thus, the 
ethos of these "corporate social responsibility" projects need to be seen in light of the overall 
"reformist" strategy.
SA LABOUR MARKET, CORPORATE SECTOR INTERVENTION IN BLACK 
EDUCATION AND TRAINING
During the 1960’s the state discouraged private sector involvement in education. However 
the 1970’s saw a shift in policy towards that of allowing investment in education and training 
facilities for blacks in urban areas. The core of corporate investment strategies was based 
on the "ethos of social responsibility" via a programme of human resource development.
The structuring of the mass segregated schooling system prevalent in S.A. has had a direct 
bearing on the segregation and differentiation of the labour force. This is evident when 
examining the occupational distribution of whites and blacks and the race composition of high 
level manpower. (See tables 6, 7, 8).
Table 6: The Occupational distribution of blacks and whites in 1985.
Category Percentage distribution
Blacks Whites
Professional and technical 39,9 60,1
Managerial and executive 12,4 87,6
Clerical and sales 47,1 52,9
Production workers 92,3 7,7
Unskilled 98,9 1,1
Source: Compiled from Department of manpower’s Manpower Survey No. 16, 1985. Data 
exclude employment in agriculture and domestic service and in the ‘independent homelands’.
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Table 7: Race composition of South Africa’s high level manpower, 1979, 1985
High Level manpower
1979 1985
Africans 17,1 20,2
Whites 71,9 69,2
Coloureds 7,8 7,2
Indians 3,2 3,4
Source: National Manpower Commission, Report on high level manpower in South Africa, 
1980, 1987. Data exclude Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda.
Table 8: Percentage distribution of blacks in some key occupations, 1965, 1975 and 1985.
Occupation 1965 1975 1985
Engineers 0,0 0,5 0,1
Architects and surveyors 0,0 1,2 2,9
Doctors 2,0 5,7 8,1
Technicians 5,4 11,7 17,8
Scientists 0,6 3,7 5,5
Nurses 44,9 8,5 60,0
Accountants and auditors 0,3 4,5 7,4
Lawyers 0,9 5,0 6,0
Managing directors 3,6 6,9 3,9
Educationists 56,2 61,2 63,0
Source: National manpower commission, 1987.
Given the racial composition of S.A.’s "high level manpower", (see table 7, 8, 9) it is clear 
■that the economy has a divided and segmented labour market in which the white workforce 
monopolises key occupations.
Therefore, since the 1960’s the issue of “human resource development" has been a major 
concern of corporate education commitments, particularly for mining companies with
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international ties like anglo American Corporation (AAC) and GENCOR. The emphasis 
being on promoting stability and encouraging a better supply of skilled black labour. The 
different forms of private sector investment must be contextualised as part of the larger 
reformist strategy. On the other hand, Afrikaner institutions were bound by social and 
political limitations and as a result their initiatives have remained limited and on a small 
scale. During the 1980’s there were comparatively large allocations of funds directed from 
the private sector into both formal and non-formal black education programme. These 
corporate sector projects were aimed at the improve and upgrading of black education; the 
promoting of skills development; and towards in-house training and education for employees 
of companies. The underlying motivation and impetus of the corporate sector’s involvement 
in education and training has been towards the promotion of political and social stability and 
to provide for both the general and specific human resource needs for economic growth. 
(Swainson, 1991:97). The corporate sector intervention in the educational terrain has had a 
very limited impact due to a range of associated factors. They failed to reduce social conflict 
and to improve the supply of skilled blacks in the economy. Moreover, contrary to their 
corporate statements there was minimal movement of blacks into managerial and professional 
positions. Since the 1970’s the corporate sector’s large investments have been accompanied 
by a period of wholesale deterioration in the quality of black education. In fact, these 
projects failed to meet set objectives largely due to limited credibility from the workforce and 
communities.
Corporate initiatives have in many cases been associated with the state education authorities, 
which has consistently caused problems of legitimacy. It is still apparent, granting that 
corporations are formulating new strategies for educational intervention, that their main 
interest is the maintenance of the private enterprise system, based on the goal of: 
"...acclimatising black South Africans to the contagious ‘logic’ of capitalist materiality." 
(Nasson, 1990:75)
EDUCATION AS A MECHANISM OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION - PEOPLE’S 
EDUCATION FOR PEOPLE’S POWER:
The people’s education programme contained within it a redefinition of the relationship 
between education and the social system of capitalism. It became evident that the 
implementation of a transformation project could not be implemented within the specific 
conditions of apartheid’s reproductive educational system. This attempt would merely 
constitute the creation of new educational structures and institutions of new practices, which 
in tum would be subversive and thus not conducive to the notion of transformation. In itself, 
this constituted a rejection of the notion of education as a functionalist instrument of the 
reproduction of the system. The challenge then posed to the National education Crisis 
Committee (NECC), was whether education was a means of social transformation. The 
NECC formulated its positions for the construction of an alternative education system, which 
would clarify its meaning,, content and envisaged organisation.
In effect the strategy of people's education put forward objectives as, an education "which 
serves the people as a whole, which liberates, which put people in control of their lives and 
which is determined by and accountable to the people" (Sisulu, 1986) and an education 
"which prepares people for the total human liberation and for full participation in all social, 
political or cultural spheres of society, helps people to be creative, to develop a critical mind
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and to analyse" (Mkatshwa, 1985 - as quoted in Unterhalter, 1991, 10). The objectives 
presented in the ideals were argued to be the basis for a future educational system. (See 
Page 2).
Wolpe and Unterhalter argue that, it was necessary to conceive of people’s education as an 
element of the national liberation struggle, to which it was ideologically, organisationally and 
strategically linked. "The transformative role of people’s education was not, in the first 
place, seen to be in the content or character of people’s education but rather in its use as a 
means of mobilising and organising teachers, students and parents as a political force in a 
particular sphere of struggle for national liberation."
NEW POLICIES IN TRANSITION: LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES
The new era, ushered in by the unbanning of political organisations, and the release of 
political prisoners, made a radical impact on the context, and especially the manner, in which 
struggles were conducted. The "shifting terrain" confronted the opposition forces of the 
state, on the manner in which to engage the state. The period of transition of the 1990’s, 
was accompanied by a number of policy researched educational proposals for a future 
educational system, these are from the state (ERS - Educational Renewel Strategy), the 
African National Congress, the Congress of South African Trade Unions, and the NECC 
(NEPI - National Education Policy Initiative). There is broad agreement that the educational 
system is in crisis and needs a massive national effort to be transformed. Furthermore, 
principles of universal education, literacy, and innumeracy, technical and vocational 
education and teacher training are accepted, together with new policies given the budgetary 
constraints. There does however, exist fundamental differences!. The nature of education 
financing and the areas of priority are noted, but the crucial area of policy processes, the role 
allocated to the market and to the state are resulting in a deadlock of sorts.
The ANC, COSATU and the NECC emphasised national planning and national co-ordination 
with local or regional administrations serving as functional departments within a unified 
system. The national budget was seen as a key instrument with which to empower 
disadvantaged groups to transform the education system to one which is "open, democratic, 
non-racial and non-sexist". On the other hand, the state and some private sector bodies 
stressed deracialisation, possibly within a federal system, with consumer-led, market-driven 
policies in a future educational system. This proposal also calls for a reduced state provision 
for compulsory schooling, and reducing the role of the state in setting up an educational and 
vocational training system in the non-formal sector. In an important argument on the 
relationships between education, earnings and poverty, and on comparing experiences of a 
wide range of countries during transition, Nasson asserts:
In essence, it seems to be the only in condition of cataclysmic social rupture and 
reconstruction that educational reform can be seen to be playing some positive part 
in a collectivist policy framework which attempts a redistribution of income and 
wealth. Regardless of where one may stand in debates about educational change, the 
important point is surely to recognise the extent to which educational issues are linked 
to the social order, so that any conflict about education inevitably becomes conflict 
about the nature of society. In social change, therefore, education might be seen as 
an important participating force, but not as an arbitrating one (Nasson, 1990, 102-3).
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A central issue as to the unfolding process is the level of co-operation in the broad forums, 
its purpose and whether the dealings meant a "social contract" or forum at the education 
level. The question of mass participation to the process is identified, noting that only the 
people themselves can transform education. What will come of the process will need to be 
closely monitored and any strategy will need to consider the grotesquely huge legacy 
confronting apartheid education.
TOWARDS A CONCLUSION
Education "as a site of struggle" in South Africa rests firmly on the experience of firstly, 
decades of uncompromising, and then on "reformist" strategies, which are in turn rooted in 
notions of the reproduction of the class stratification of a capitalist system. Bantu Education, 
and subsequent reformist strategies, have been geared towards the reproduction of labour as 
required by the needs of capitalist accumulation. In fact, the state strategies contain the 
reproduction of the inequalities of power and wealth, which only gains legitimacy from those 
it directly privileges.
The educational crises that rose to the fore in the 1970’s as a central aspect of the deep 
seated "organic crisis”, coincided with the end of the long economic boom in South Africa 
(1948-1973). Early state educational policies as based on capital accumulation motives, did 
not match the new skill requirements of the economy, in effect leading to serious structural 
contradictions which were coupled to the economic crisis.
The South African educational crisis, in the final analysis, can only be solved along with 
fundamental transformations in the crisis ridden economy and with other socio-economic and 
political structures. Any attempt to "reform" the education crisis from above is bound yet 
again rebound off the aspirations of the majority of the people. Thus, Education for 
Transformation and of Liberation: stresses the restructuring of the entire educational 
infrastructure, towards meeting the social, economic and political obligations of "popular" 
classes.
Broadly stated, the education question is synonymous to the debate around the future shape 
of the South African economy and the national democratic question. An understanding of 
the centrality of the education struggle, however also requires an unravelling of the links 
between education and capitalist society in general, as well as scrutiny of the specific forms 
which capitalism and education in South Africa have assumed in the past, at present and into 
the future.
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THE LIMITS OF CAPITALIST REFORM 
UNDER CONDITIONS OF CAPITALIST CRISIS
Patrick Bond
A questioner from the floor of the World Bank’s final function at the annual 
meetings asked bank president Lewis Preston whether this year’s meetings had 
been any different because of the absence of socialists following the collapse 
of the command economies. "There are still some socialists here," Preston 
replied. "There are still even some communists around. But they are talking 
in very low voices, and they are mostly South Africans." Business Day, 25/9/92
Has capitalism served historically to support the struggle for democracy in South Africa or 
to oppose it? Can the fundamental needs and aspirations of the vast majority of South 
Africans be met within a capitalist framework? What will democracy mean in a new South 
Africa which depends on foreign investment and capitalist profitability? What are the present 
interests of the capitalist class? To what extent can capitalism be forced to make concessions 
by the struggles of the oppressed?
These are some of the direct questions posed by this Marxist Theory Seminar series, and I 
am flattered to be asked to help debate the answers. I think that by focusing on South 
Africa’s capitalist crisis some of the questions may become clearer, and hints at answers may 
even emerge. Short notice requires the reworking in this paper of previously-published 
material about the nature of South Africa’s crisis (Section 2), which is preceded by a brief 
theoretical discussion (1), and followed by an update on the course of the present crisis (3), 
concluding with some ideas about the manner in which the crisis compels us to consider 
reforms in general, and in particular with respect to the major basic commodity required by 
the working class: housing (4).
In the midst of what appears to be another dangerous stage of a long-term global capitalist 
crisis,1 I believe it is important that we again place such issues at the front of our critique 
of capital, not only for local purposes, but because the next few years of political change in 
South Africa will provide vital lessons for Marxists across the globe.
THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS
The crisis of apartheid-capitalism: Understanding the dujuncture
The standard Marxist critique of capitalism relies not only upon moral disgust with 
exploitation at the point of production, upon concern with unveiling commodity fetishism, 
or upon the need, denied by capital, to liberate the full human potential of all women and 
men. Of equal importance within all Marxist argumentation is reference to the inner 
contradictions o f  capita l. This means, simply, that the system has self-destructive dynamics, 
and tends toward "crisis.”2 Moreover, such crises offer new opportunities and incentives 
for the working class to struggle for revolutionary change.
Today the South African economy faces a classical capitalist crisis that Marx would not have 
cringed at describing or theorising. Yet the paucity of good, insightful material about this
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crisis is as striking from the progressive forces as it is from the establishment. We will 
return shortly to an account of the crisis, but I want to argue in this initial section that the 
theoretical legacy of Marxist thought in South Africa has, unfortunately, not facilitated an 
easy engagement with classical crisis theory.
Elsewhere in the "Third World" (especially Latin America), the Marxist intelligentsia 
attempted to understand periodic economic crises as external phenomena through what 
became known as dependency theory, which advances the notion that global economic 
processes actively underdevelop those areas which are dependent upon exporting primary 
commodities to "First World" markets.3 Although few South African analysts have engaged 
the theory directly, there may well be a role for dependency analysis — historical and 
contemporary — of South Africa in the world economy.4
For obvious reasons, South Africa’s radical political economists instead focused more on the 
internal and institutional nature of the social structures which affect race and class relations. 
Some of the "neo-Marxist” literature of the 1970s emerged from an intellectual struggle with 
proponents of the well-known South African equivalent of modernisation theory, namely, the 
traditional liberal thesis that racially-inscribed underdevelopment would succumb to the 
market’s incessant drive to growth, progress and racial equality. Radical analysts contested 
this vigorously, arguing that the evolutionary paths of apartheid and capitalism were 
interwoven, and to break from one required breaking from the other. In retrospect it appears 
neither camp got it right.
How do we know this — in other words, how do we return easily to evaluate the theoretical 
assertions popular two decades ago amongst the South African left? Concretely, what 
happened to verify or to discredit aspects of the liberal and radical theory? Simply this: 
from the late 1970s leading elements of the ruling bloc made clear their desire to jettison 
apartheid. But, as reform was occurring in a slow and extremely painful way, it also became 
evident that the condition for reform was not capitalist growth  (as liberals such as O’Dowd 
posited),5 but rather stagnation  (hence the need for capitalists to explore a new export- 
oriented route to accumulation unhindered by South Africa’s status as global pariah). If this 
is true, then the strategic orientation of the ANC — to weaken the economy with 
international sanctions (especially financial) as one pillar of the national democratic struggle 
— appears to have been essentially correct.6 (There are implications here for post-apartheid 
reintegration into the global economy, and for avoiding huge foreign indebtedness, as 
discussed later.)
The evolution of theory
Returning to theory, consider this paradox from the standpoint of historical materialist 
analysis. On the one hand a hegemonic project was gradually constructed within the ANC- 
SACP-Mass Democratic Movement alliance during the recent period, suggestive of a "two- 
stage revolution" (bourgeois democracy followed by socialism). The second stage of the 
revolution will have to begin rather soon, but it is by no means clear that the first has yet 
been either consummated or adequately understood by protagonists. Nevertheless, 
"colonialism of a special type" (CST) the South African Communist Party analysis officially 
adopted in the early 1960s, is a form of internal dependency theory  still in use today.7
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But on the other hand, the CST framework came under repeated questioning from left 
intellectuals.® This took place over a period of two decades, and had various stages. True, 
a version of CST was rescued by SACP member Harold Wolpe’s application of "articulations 
of modes of production" theory: the idea that South African capitalism required and nurtured 
the superexploita tion  that was available by harnessing colonial-style dominance of pre­
capitalist modes of production.’ Simply put, migrant workers were to be subsidised by their 
kin in rural areas, such that wages could be kept at ultra-low levels. Yet as subsequent 
research and theoretical argumentation showed, there was ample room for contesting Wolpe's 
chronology and understanding of the dynamics of capitalism.10
Meanwhile, international trends in historical materialism — especially the success of 
Althusserian and Poulantzian structuralism — were by the mid 1970s having a major impact 
on South African political economy. From articulations of modes of production emerged a 
fascination with which "fractions of capital* controlled the state at particular moments of 
political change. Although the various fractions became increasingly blurred by the 1960s 
as South Africa’s big mining finance houses diversified into manufacturing, several leading 
neo-Marxist researchers identified earlier distinctions between capitals in terms of their sector 
of production (mining, manufacturing or agricultural), their location within the circulation 
of capital (industrial, financial, commercial, landed), or their "nationality" (Afrikaner, 
English-speaking, foreign).11 Before long the Poulantzian analysis itself came under sharp 
attack. Whereas focusing on fractions of capital highlighted questions of power, the costs 
of this single-minded focus were excessive: the capital accumulation p ro cess  was 
downplayed, capital-labour conflicts dismissed, and thus a sense of necessity and contingency 
in the development of the social and economic formation diminished.12 (There has been 
little or no subsequent work in the Poulantzian tradition.)
The fractions perspective was also criticised by a new school of South African so c ia l history  
which prided itself for looking at society and economy not from the top (state and capital), 
but from the very lowest levels of the voiceless majority. However, no matter how rich and 
interesting the particularities of the social history case studies proved, they added up to very 
little that was generalisable for the purpose of answering the larger questions of capitalist 
development.13 The broader theoretical discourse about race and class in South Africa 
seemed to peak in the 1970s, and with rigorous detailed probing underway in the 1980s in 
the context of the search for specificity, research into the nature of the mode of production 
tailed off markedly.14
The need for Marxist theory today
Conveniently, in the late 1980s, the larger questions were again placed on the agenda. It was 
a time when South Africa’s capitalist class demanded, more sincerely and energetically than 
ever before, an end to formal apartheid. The reasons for this are relatively clear (again, 
related directly to capitalist stagnation and financial crisis) but what was disconcerting was 
how dramatically this shook many Marxist theorists who, earlier, so profoundly rejected the 
liberal thesis that apartheid and capitalism were incompatible. As Gelb put it, radicals must 
"develop a substantial and consistent analysis of capital accumulation which preserves their 
view of the earlier relationship between apartheid and capitalism, explains the transformation 
from long run apartheid boom to economic crisis and then analyses the crisis itself. ”15
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To that end Gelb introduced "regulation theory" to dissect the relative stability of South 
African capitalism from 1948 through the early 1970s. A new wave of international 
scholarship had just emerged from France under the rubric of regulation, seeking to explain 
how post-war "fordist" economies faltered.16 South African "racial fordism," as Gelb 
termed it, captures the post-war combination of formal apartheid with industrialisation based 
on import-substitution: "As with fordism in the advanced countries, accumulation in South 
Africa during this period involved the linking of the extension of mass production with the 
extension of mass consumption, but in a manner that was restricted on both sides of the 
equation, as is very familiar.”17
With the crisis in racial fordism largely understood as a breakdown in the institutional 
apparatus that regulated capitalist instability (witnessed in the form of 1970s strikes and 
social unrest, the import of international inflation, and the oscillating gold price), the key 
task for the regulationists now becomes how to stitch together a new set of "post-fordist" 
institutions and assist in the process of "kick-starting" capitalist growth. Wage restraint, 
productivity quid p ro  quos, social contracts and even Taiwan-style export-orientation have 
been advocated by Gelb and progressive economists (many connected to the Economic 
Trends Group "Industrial Strategy Project" of Cosatu) who gain inspiration from the post- 
fordist discourse.18 Controversies over trade union policy — particularly social contracts 
and shopfloor flexible specialisation — have begun to emerge.”  Meanwhile, as with earlier 
approaches to neo-Marxist analysis, a historical materialist critique of regulation theory has 
become widespread in international radical circles.70
What, then, is a more appropriate framework for capturing capitalist development processes 
that have eluded so many local Marxists, neo-Marxists and post-Marxists? If we return to 
the brief posited at the outset of this section — to understand why the condition for political 
reform was not capitalist growth, but rather stagnation (and hence the need for capitalists to 
explore a new export-oriented route to accumulation) — a classical Marxist approach to 
cycles o f  cap ita l accumulation may be rather more helpful. Cycles of accumulation are the 
waves of investment and growth which are invariably followed by periods of excess capacity 
and stagnation.21
The classical theory can, I believe, adequately incorporate the best insights of previous 
radical scholars. If, for example, there is a pre-capitalist subsidy to capitalism — as 
"articulations of modes of production" analysis suggests was the case during at least part of 
the 20th century in South Africa — that would have a substantial impact on the cycle. Given 
the possibilities for superexploitation, certain kinds of South African production were 
consequently more labour-intensive. The fact that workers were severely oppressed allowed 
South Africa’s cycle of accumulation more time to develop, from the beginning of the current 
long cycle in 1933, before labour problems — skills shortages and militancy — arose in the 
1970s. Indeed, as suggested in the next section, a more classical Marxist crisis theory would 
insist that neither labour problems nor the international economic slump are at the very root 
of South Africa’s present economic crisis. Instead, the key variables were excessive 
investment and subsequent inventory gluts in domestic luxury consumer goods in the late 
1960s and again in the early 1980s, reflecting the race and class extreme distortions in the 
economy.
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Similarly, if one "fraction of capital" — mining, in this case — has an historically dominant 
role in the economy (especially in terms of earning exports), that will affect the way the 
cycle plays out. South Africa is often said to be "cursed" by having such wealth in the form 
of natural resources, for that gave capitalism an added subsidy such that the development of 
an indigenous skilled labour force could be avoided, and instead sophisticated machinery 
("capital goods") required for luxury consumer goods production could be imported rather 
than produced locally. In turn, the conditions required to operate such machinery in South 
Africa — high import tariffs on finished products — attracted multinational corporations, 
which only exacerbated the import-substitution bias towards luxury goods and primary 
commodity exports. The implications of this historical legacy for the current crisis are taken 
up next.
A crisis of overaccumulation22
South Africa’s economic slump has, since the mid 1970s, reduced the rate of economic 
growth per person to less than zero. Inflation has ravaged the currency, new investment in 
the manufacturing base has been slashed, and hundreds of thousands of jobs have 
disappeared. At the same time, billions of rands in profits have been made from financial 
speculation.
Some mainstream commentators have explained the slump in terms of the barriers that 
apartheid placed on free market allocation of resources. They have also accused trade unions 
of demanding excessive wage increases at a time when worker productivity was slipping. 
The lack of new investment in production, bourgeois economists continue, is largely the 
result of multinational corporate disinvestment and the absence of confidence in the country’s 
political stability and future. Militant worker calls for sanctions and nationalisation have 
contributed to slump. If black workers were more reasonable and the international 
community again embraced South Africa, the economy would recover, by this argument.
But there are other explanations of the crisis, advanced by a host of more progressive 
economists. Marxist explanations of economic crisis often fall into three different camps. 
First, insufficient demand for goods — or "underconsumption" — is the cause of crisis. As 
Stephen Gelb and John Saul put it in 1981 (in The Crisis in South A frica), "From the late 
1960s, the growing saturation of the white consumer market limited not only sales but also 
the ability of the manufacturing industry to benefit from economies of scale. Since an 
expansion of the black consumer market was not then contemplated, this made more urgent 
the state’s often reiterated, yet difficult to realise, call for an increase in manufacturing 
exports."
This is a common argument, drawing on a mix of the British liberal economist John Milton 
Keynes and the US Marxist Paul Sweezy. The implications are morally satisfying: give 
blacks more income, they’ll consume more, and that will spur the economy. At first blush, 
this sounds logical both as a way to explain economic stagnation and as a possible solution. 
But does it really get to the root of the way capitalism works? Marx commented that "It is 
sheer tautology to say that crises are caused by the scarcity of effective consumption." 
Moreover, adds Charles Meth of the University of Natal, "‘Underconsumption,’ while always 
lurking, is not a theory of crisis, nor a permanent hindrance to capital accumulation."
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More recently, Gelb has rejected the underconsumption argument, and predicts that if a 
post-apartheid government simply attempted a general redistribution of income from rich to 
poor, it "would lead quickly to supply bottlenecks and higher levels of inflation eroding any 
real gains. Furthermore, it would simply exacerbate one of the underlying causes of the 
crisis, which originated on the supply side of the South African economy.” In other words, 
boosting the purchasing power of low-income blacks might fuel the economy for a very short 
while, but would do nothing to solve the underlying problems.
A second explanation for the crisis focuses on labour. As white privilege became even more 
extreme during the 1960s — after black political resistance was decimated — African labour 
came under much more intense pressure. As is well-known, this resulted in an explosion of 
strike activity in 1973. On top of new-found labour militancy, Saul and Gelb also identify 
the shortage of skilled labour as a crucial weakness created by the apartheid system’s colour 
bar and bantu education policies. These shortages became acute by the early 1970s. The 
argument here is that economic crisis is rooted in resistance by (and problems of) workers, 
which led to a "squeeze" on corporate profits and a slowdown in growth. This argument is 
central to the question of the labour movement’s post-apartheid wage demands.
For Gelb rising wages are a key culprit — an "originating cause" — of the crisis. The mid 
1970s wage demands stemmed from rising inflation (not the other way around) and labour’s 
increased clout in the wake of the 1973 Durban and PWV strikes. Mining industry wages 
were also possible following the 1971 rise in the gold price. A second round of wage 
increases in the 1980s coincided with the massive consolidation of trade union organisation 
first in the Federation of South African Trade Unions, and then Cosatu.
But this explanation for the economic slump is distasteful for some people. As Meth puts 
it, "There is a slight awkwardness about holding an analytical position which may be used 
to justify an attack on workers. * After all, a progressive post-apartheid economy would aim 
to provide higher wages for exploited black workers. And while class struggle certainly 
affects profitability — both on the shopfloor and at the negotiating table over how corporate 
income is distributed between profits and wages — such struggles cannot be the essential 
reasons for capitalism falling into a long-term structural crisis. Normally, in fact, wages fall 
during a crisis. To paraphrase Meth, a profit squeeze arising from struggles over wages, 
while always possible, is not a theory of crisis, nor a permanent hindrance to capital 
accumulation.
If worker demands are seen to be a cause of economic crisis, there is a simple capitalist 
solution: "wage restraint.” Gelb, for instance, cites "a need to lower costs and improve 
productivity in the existing productive sectors, especially mining and manufacturing. This 
will require increased investment in new technologies, and/or lower wages at least in real 
terms. In other words, capital in these sectors needs to be strengthened, that is, profitability 
restored." But can such wage restraint resolve the crisis? Experience from the US and 
Britain in the 1980s is telling. There, highly distorted "growth" was essentially "borrowed" 
through massive debts and military spending. Substantially lower wages did not contribute 
to any sort of longer-term economic solution.
In a third explanation, Gelb’s recent work goes beyond the consumer and labour 
explanations. He now includes causes of the crisis more directly related to capital
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accumulation. Increasing automation at the end of the boom (1970-73) ate away at profits, 
since automation shrinks the labour force that is the basis for exploitation. "The growth of 
the capital-labour ratio accelerated, while productivity growth began to level off,” says Gelb. 
Using this explanation, the "solution” proposed for the slump is a new investment programme 
directed by the state and aimed at producing mass consumption goods for a local market of 
low- and middle-income people. Key to the programme is that production would be much 
more labour-intensive than the current strategy of the state and big business.
The overaccumulation of capital
It is this third approach — examining the process of accumulation — which is most faithful 
to classical Marxism, and which takes us to a richer understanding of the present capitalist 
crisis. in short, the New South African economy is burdened by the legacy of
overproduction  and excessive autom ation  of the 1960s, which led to the decline in economic 
growth and the drought of new investment during the 1970s and 1980s. This 
"overaccumulation" of capital best explains why South Africa’s economy has become rotten 
with waste and speculation.
The basis for Marx’s theory of overaccumulation crisis is the unstable combination of 
technological change and intercapitalist competition. Individual capitalists cannot afford to 
fall behind the industry norm, technologically, and this leads to a continual introduction of 
state-of-the-art production processes, especially labour-saving machinery. With intensified 
automation, the rate of profit tends to fall, for the following reason. Profit correlates to 
"surplus value" which is only produced through the exploitation of labour. (Labour is paid 
a certain proportion of the value produced, but some surplus goes to capital.) Since 
capitalists cannot "cheat in exchange" (ie, consistently buy other inputs — especially capital 
goods — from each other at a cost less than their value), the increases in value that are the 
prerequisite for commodity production and exchange must emanate from workers. This 
simply means, in class terms, that capitalists can’t exploit other capitalists; but they can 
systematically exploit workers.
Here arises the key contradiction: with automation, the labour input becomes an ever-smaller 
proportion of the total inputs into production. And as the labour content diminishes, so too 
do the opportunities for exploitation, for surplus value extraction and for profits. Automation 
thus engenders, in the medium-term, productive capacity far beyond an expansion in what 
consumer markets can bear. The result, a permanent tendency under capitalism, is termed 
overaccum ulation  of capital. Failure to stave off overaccumulation is typically behind the 
business cycle downswing.
In sum, at the root of overaccumulation is the continual improvement of machinery and other 
productive forces. Too many goods are produced, workers are replaced by machines, and 
competition between capitalists becomes ruinous. Overaccumulation thus leads to a situation 
in which goods cannot be brought to market profitably, leaving capital to pile up without 
being put back into new productive investment. Other symptoms include unused plant and 
equipment; huge gluts of unsold commodities; an unusually large number of unemployed 
workers; and the rise of speculative financial markets, particularly in shares and real estate.
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In the words of Karl Marx,
The capital already invested is idle in large quantities because the reproduction 
process is stagnant. Factories are closed, raw materials accumulate, finished 
products flood the market as commodities. Nothing is more erroneous than 
to blame a scarcity of productive capital for such a condition. It is precisely 
at such a time that there is a superabundance of productive capital, partly in 
relation to the normal, and partly in relation to the paralysed consumption.
Then, a crisis could only be explained as a result of a disproportion of 
production in various branches of the economy, and as a result of a 
disproportion of production between the consumption of capitalists and their 
accumulation.
Charles Meth translates the quotation: "It seems obvious that it is overaccumulation and the 
non-fulfilment of capitalist plans that is at issue, not the restricted consumption of the masses. 
That condition is a given in capitalist development." Thus when an economy reaches the 
stage of overaccumulation, it becomes difficult to bring together all these resources — 
surplus capital and labour — in a profitable way to meet social needs.
How, then, does an economy recover from the illness of overaccumulation? Capitalism is 
a system that must, to regenerate itself, always engage in creative forms of destruction of the 
overaccumulated capital, painful as these may be for the majority of people who are in the 
way. That process of destruction can be thought of as devaluation  of capital. In short, 
economic deadwood is cleared away, inefficient and outmoded companies are weeded out 
through collapse or takeover, large firms often get much bigger in the process, and labour 
is sharply disciplined as workers’ living standards plummet. (But overaccumulation crisis 
is also a time of extreme chaos and flux at the pinnacle of the economy, and this gives poor 
and working people a chance to affect the outcome in sometimes substantial ways.)
There are many examples of overaccumulation and devaluation throughout history. 
Measured as the world economy, capitalism has suffered through such crises lasting from 
1815-48, 1873-96, 1917-48 and 1974-present, according to the British historian Eric 
Hobsbawm. And as Marx points out, the ebb and flow of overaccumulation and devaluation 
usually affects different parts of the economy in different ways. One important symptom is 
an imbalance in investment between consumer goods production and production of heavy 
machinery. In South Africa, this imbalance — or in Marx’s terms, "disproportion in 
production” — was particularly extreme. In 1978 Simon Clarke wrote: "The economic crisis 
in South Africa is a manifestation of the failure to solve one of the perennial problems of 
South African capitalism, that of the relations between the different departments of social 
production." The departments Clarke was referring to are consumer goods (whether for 
luxury consumption or basic needs) and machines (here taken to mean metal products, 
machinery, electrical machinery and some transport equipment).
In the 1950s and 1960s an extensive range of consumer goods was produced locally within 
South Africa because the state provided generous protection from foreign competition. On 
consumer goods, import fees and tariffs amounted to 15%, compared to only 2% for 
imported machinery. This captive market for first world goods attracted all kinds of foreign 
investors, who largely brought their own equipment with them, much of it top-of-the-line
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quality. The South African economy was based in large part on production of consumer 
goods, but this led, in the 1960s, to overaccumulation in this sector. The machines for local 
production of consumer goods were paid for with foreign exchange revenues earned from 
gold mining and agriculture. According to regulation theory, this relationship between local 
manufacturing and gold exports provided enough balance to stabilise racial fordism. But the 
balance was already becoming undone — half a decade or more before the crisis really 
showed itself as a long-term decline in growth and investment in late 1974.
Evidence of overaccumulation
It is often difficult to tell exactly where an overaccumulation crisis begins, because capitalists 
and the state have so many avenues available to move the problems around, without letting 
them bubble up to the surface. This was especially true in the 1970s, when the awesome 
economic power of the South African state increasingly supported what it perceived to be the 
long-term interests of South African capitalism, rather than just expanding Afrikaner 
employment rolls.
Indeed there were unmistakable premonitions of crisis quite early on, from the late 1960s. 
The stunning crash of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, from mid-1969 through 1971, was 
particularly telling. The big gainers in the two years before the collapse were real estate, 
banking and insurance, and mining finance. Of the industrial shares, commerce (including 
transport and services) rose highest and dropped fastest. The feedback wounded some 
discount houses and commercial banks, and showed that South African markets were not all 
they were cracked up to be. Luckily for capital, though, the economy’s "fundamentals" were 
still reasonably strong, so the only serious losers this time around, it appeared, were 
investors in the new unit trusts.
But the speculative financial markets were an indication that all was not well with the 
underlying economy. Just prior to the stock market boom, one of the most obvious signs of 
the impending overaccumulation crisis was the glut of private sector inventories — that is, 
goods that couldn’t immediately be sold and instead sat on shelves gathering dust. The five 
years leading to 1971 witnessed an unprecedented R2,8 billion worth of inventories piling 
up in the private sector.
This commodity glut was worst for wholesale trade, retail trade and catering establishments. 
Between 1967 and 1974, these companies accumulated R2,2 billion worth of inventories (at 
1975 prices), while over the same period, they put R3,2 billion into new investments. In 
contrast, the previous eight years (1959-66) saw inventories of just R453 million pile up in 
this part of the economy, as against a healthy and"balanced Rl,6 billion of investment. 
Thus, from 1959-66, the ratio of inventories to new investment was a reasonable 28%, but 
from 1967-74 it had jumped to an untenable 69 %. This glut in consumer goods should have 
become apparent to observers well before the stock market surged and economic growth 
began to slump.
Overaccumulation is always a potential feature of capitalism, but one that only becomes 
agonizing when there appears to be no further profitable outlets for investment. In South 
Africa’s case, overaccumulation exhibited itself first in wholesale and retail goods, next in 
financial speculation from 1967-69, and then also became apparent throughout the economy.
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By 1974, the bottlenecks first associated with the commodity gluts spread into other sectors. 
In manufacturing industries, new investment in plant and equipment raced along until about 
1973, levelled off, and then dropped significantly in 1976. At that point, efforts to unload 
unprecedented manufacturing inventories also began in earnest. What new private sector 
investment there was, went mainly towards automation rather than opening new factories.
The essential dilemma was the continual drive of capitalism to overproduce relative to what 
can be sold. This quickly became obvious in specific manufacturing sectors. Local 
production simply reached certain limits to growth in the 1970s. Some manufacturing sectors 
were affected much more than others, but the general response was even more intense 
automation. From 1970-73, companies automated at an astonishing 57% more rapid annual 
rate than during the 1960s. The automation growth rate from 1919 to 1976 was 1,5% per 
year — in the 1970s automation increased by more than 4% every year. As a result, private 
sector manufacturing jobs dipped dramatically, especially from 1975 on. "The introduction 
of new technology meant changes in the imposition of the rule of capital at the point of 
production, on the one hand, and the creation of large scale redundancy, on the other," 
according to Simon Clarke. "During the boom of the 1960s economic expansion made it 
possible to keep the lid on the situation as employment opportunities expanded and some 
limited concessions could be made." But not in the 1970s, as the Durban and PWV strikes 
were to prove.
Ironically, although the 1970s automation may have seemed to offer businesses temporary 
relief through lower production costs, the basic economic crisis worsened. Industry after 
industry ran up against the barrier of overaccumulation. By 1975, the chemical industry 
stabilised at a point where it could produce about 85% of the total chemicals consumed in 
South Africa, but no more. In textiles and paper products, local manufacturing also hit the 
85% barrier in the mid 1970s. South African-made rubber products had already stabilised 
at 80% of the local market. The most serious barriers appeared in the motor vehicle 
industry, which moved quickly during the 1970s to occupy a stable 70% of the local market. 
But when that level was achieved, it was accompanied by near-ruinous overproduction (the 
motor vehicles and transport equipment industry was forced to cut back capacity by more 
than 3% a year during the 1980s).
Other manufacturing sectors also overproduced, and subsequently also had to cut back. 
These included motor vehicle parts and accessories, furniture, clothing, wood products and 
metal products, footwear and leather. Other basic sectors simply stagnated during the 1980s, 
finding no way to expand profitably. These included industrial chemicals, basic iron and 
steel, textiles and rubber products. None could find the means to increase their production 
capacity by more than 1 % a year. A few manufacturing industries escaped the worst effects 
of general overaccumulation, including beverages, paper and plastic products, food, tobacco, 
printing, and a few others. New investment in these and several other industries was 
especially impressive during the brief economic upturn of the late 1980s, reflecting how worn 
out existing manufacturing equipment had become by that time.
Geographical responses to overaccumulation
The wide variety of responses to overaccumulation by capital and the state are instructive. 
Devaluation of overaccumulated capital is generally resisted by those who must pay its costs,
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and this resistance leads to new ways of displacing the crisis elsewhere, even if only partially 
and temporarily. For example, one problem facing South Africa, according to Charles Meth, 
is that "when the phase of import substituting industrialisation came to an end and an export 
orientation was mooted beginning in the early 1970s with the Reynders Commission, those 
capitals which had overaccumulated stood exposed. Not only can they not export profitably, 
but continuing protection is required as well for these high-cost producers, to prevent them 
from being eliminated by competition." Yet such protection from lower-cost foreign 
producers would later be called into question by a few major export-oriented producers who 
understood how manipulating an economy’s geography can help provide short-term relief 
from a crisis of overaccumulation.
Thus the decline of private sector investment in South Africa since 1974 is closely linked to 
international expansion by Anglo American and other mining companies, Barlow Rand 
(grain), Liberty Life (British insurance), Rembrandt (international cigarettes), and the like. 
These companies were able to move enormous amounts of funds abroad (or, just the same, 
to reroute funds from abroad — such as Minorco’s birth from compensation paid when 
Zambian copper mines were nationalised). By 1980, more than R4,2 billion had been moved 
into foreign direct investments. By 1985, this figure had soared to R16,6 billion.
While major private sector firms moved investment offshore in response to overaccumulation, 
the government also addressed the deepening crisis with a new geographical strategy. 
Parastatal firms that classify as manufacturers — including Iscor and Sasol — undertook 
major building plans during the 1970s. Overall, their investments in plant and machinery 
increased by 17% annually from 1970-77, compared with 9% a year in the 1960s. To some 
degree, this expansion paralleled the goals of the 1967 Physical Planning Act, an 
unsuccessful attempt to address the imbalance of investment in the PWV and other major 
economic centres.
The state’s chosen "growth points" were mainly on the borders of bantustans. This allowed 
the state to combine its political goals with a manufacturing export strategy based on the 
familiar themes of cheap labour plus subsidies. State incentives to decentralised businesses 
included everything from rail, road and harbour transport subsidies, to inexpensive services, 
interest and wage bill subsidies, and tax relief. By 1990, 4 700 companies employing 200 
000 workers had benefited from subsidies and the National Productivity Institute calculated 
that these enterprises generated nearly R10 billion in sales. The strategy also bred 
corruption, rapidly replaced male workers with females on the presumption that the latter are 
easier to control, and weakened urban trade unions in sectors like textiles. Plant closings in 
South Africa’s major cities coincided with new opening in decentralised zones.
More generally, most of South Africa’s "built environment" — the entire range of factories, 
office buildings, residences, and infrastructure that alter the natural landscape — was 
constructed during the overaccumulation crisis, so that at least temporarily, if ultimately 
fruitlessly, overall investment and employment growth could be sustained. As the Marxist 
geographer David Harvey has argued, "Each of the global crises of capitalism was in fact 
preceded by the massive movement of capital into long-term investment in the built 
environment as a kind of last-ditch hope for finding productive uses for rapidly 
overaccumulating capital."
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How "massive" a movement of capital was there into the built environment, as the slowdown 
in productive investment commenced? During those crucial recessionary years, 1976-77, 
when business investment declined so drastically, hundreds of millions of rands that could 
have otherwise gone into new machinery — had this been profitable — made their way 
instead into outlets that could potentially help overcome the barriers to profitability presented 
by distance. Some of the money went into better transportation (which, to use Marx's 
phrase, "annihilates space by time"). From 1970-77 the increases in annual investments in 
transport, storage and communication were 65% higher than during the 1960s, even after 
inflation is discounted. Richards Bay was constructed during this period in order to lower 
transport costs for international trade. Iscor funded similar facilities — Sishen-Saldanha — 
to export iron ore. And South African Airways invested heavily in new airplanes, in part 
for its cargo trade. Parastatals also made huge investments in new electricity grids and water 
lines, for which the increases in annual spending from 1970-77 were 28% higher than during 
the 1960s. These also expanded the prospects for capitalist production and markets.
But while South African capitalists gained the benefits of the state’s new spatial investments 
right away, the crisis in production itself was not fixed. Overaccumulation was not truly 
cured, and would bubble up again beginning around 1982, following the dramatic rise and 
fall of the gold price. At that point a new response to overaccumulation emerged: financial 
speculation during a period of declining productive investment.
Financial responses to overaccumulation
Since the early 1980s there has been a period of relative drought for new fixed capital 
investment in the South African economy. The total amount of manufacturing capital stock 
(mainly plant and equipment) peaked in 1984 at around R50 billion, and has been falling ever 
since (when inflation is taken into account). Employment in manufacturing also declined, 
since what little new investment there was made production relatively more capital-intensive, 
not labour-intensive.
The problem was not, as many mainstream economists argued, the lack of savings in the 
economy. Savings or not, the banking system found ways to create record amounts of credit 
each year. Corporate savings increased from a low point in 1982 to 1990. But the savings 
did not translate into investment in productive plant and equipment. In South Africa 
corporate savings are rarely used — as they should be — to plan for new investment or as 
a nest-egg to guard against unforseen problems. Instead, corporate savings were funnelled 
into high finance. In the money markets of the 1980s, the rate of return was much higher 
than what corporations received from new productive investments.
Indeed perhaps the most damaging feature of the South African economy in the early and late 
1980s was the extremely high rate of interest, which represents the cost of money. This 
tendency was no accident, nor merely a particular strategy of government. As Vishnu 
Padayachee (University of Durban/Westville) and Mike Morris (University of Natal) 
conclude, government policy "was buttressed by the international ascendancy of monetarism 
and of finance capital. The domination of international economic affairs by developments 
in the international capital markets from the late 1970s bear testimony to this. In South 
Africa, local finance capital appeared to have a lot to do with shaping the local monetarist 
initiative, iincluding the removal of interest rate ceilings and foreign exchange controls." 
Marx once put his finger on precisely this tendency: "In times of crisis the demand for loan
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capital, and with it the interest rate reaches its maximum; the rate of profit as good as 
disappears, and with it the demand for industrial capital."
X
Ironically, the demand for loan capital — credit — rose dramatically during the early and 
late 1980s, during exactly those years when interest rates peaked. South African banks once 
limited the amount of their outstanding private sector loans to around 30% of annual 
economic output. But in 1980 that figure began rising steadily, reaching nearly 50% a 
decade later. After taking inflation into account, interest rates were at a very low -6% in 
1980, so initially it was very much to the benefit of people and companies to borrow. That 
low interest rate only lasted briefly, however, for as a result of international financial 
pressure, South African interest rates soared to 12% (after inflation) over the next four years. 
South African finance had become, by early 1985, the most dynamic sector of the economy.
Corporate debt grew rapidly, but was not the only source of rising financial activity. 
Personal savings (much reduced in recent years as incomes dropped) are mainly captured by 
insurance and pension funds, which have been pumped largely into speculative outlets. A 
trade union guide to pension fund investment returns during the 1980s listed the best earners 
as unit trusts (23,6% annual return), Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) financial and 
industrial shares (21%), and property (16,6%). The inflation rate during these years 
averaged 14,5%. The high rate of return on the JSE meant that the value of shares rose 
from around R50 billion in 1982, following the slight gold slump, to nearly R400 billion in 
1990. And real estate transactions doubled from around R10 billion a year in the mid 1980s 
to R20 billion in the late 1980s.
The JSE is absurdly speculative; its mission is accurately described by ANC economists as 
"paper chasing paper." South Africa’s largest company, Anglo American, controls anywhere 
from 33 % (Anglo estimate) to 45 % (independent estimate) of the JSE, while Anglo and the 
next five firms account for 80% control of the stock market. The paper value of JSE shares 
has risen dramatically over the years in spite of the very small volume of shares traded (just 
5% a year, compared with 50% or more in many major stock markets). This has allowed 
just a few major players to tinker with share values nearly at will. In 1989 the JSE rose by 
50% in US dollar terms, the highest increase of the world’s major stock markets. And again 
in 1990, the JSE rose fastest, in terms of local currency, even though the economy was 
shrinking badly.
During the 1980s then, overaccumulated capital was placed in the JSE, real estate, and 
various other financial markets, rather than in new productive plant and equipment. In 
essence what was being achieved was the displacement of the overaccumulation crisis across 
time (because credit and finance are essentially promises to pay tomorrow for 
overaccumulated capital consumed today), much as the reorganisation of South Africa’s 
economic geography represented a displacement of overaccumulation across space.
In sum there were many ways in which overaccumulated capital avoided devaluation. Capital 
stood exposed, but trade barriers, new ways of organising the economy’s geography, and 
debt and speculative outlets all helped South Africa displace — though not resolve — the 
conditions of crisis. Nevertheless, aside from mining (temporarily), finance and a few other 
successful industries, it became increasingly obvious that South Africa was experiencing a 
long-term economic slump. Disruptions caused by intense township and shopfloor protests
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were becoming debilitating. Big business and the state were faced with a range of problems 
arising from the very structure of society, and this was one area which received growing 
attention through the 1980s.
Socio-political responses to overaccumulation
In the late 1970s, following the advice of the Riekert Commission, Pretoria launched a 
programme aimed at coopting urban, middle- and some working-class blacks, while leaving 
the masses of poor Africans in the homelands. Riekert was supplemented by the Wiehahn 
Commission’s legalisation of trade unions, the Kleu Commission on industrial development 
and the De Kock Commission on monetary policy. "They formed part of a market-oriented, 
monetarist state reform policy," according to Morris and Padayachee. "Capital and the state 
were starkly confronted with the realisation that their policy towards the popular classes had 
resulted in an overt unification along colour lines rather than a political division along class 
lines. This was very quickly recognised as a serious and dangerous problem."
But the Riekert Commission’s attempt to decentralise government responsibility to new black 
township councils, only intensified black resentment and politicised more township residents. 
Other tactics followed during the 1980s: state-owned houses would be privatised, the urban 
economy deregulated, and "orderly" urbanisation would be allowed. "The point was to 
encourage informal settlements for the poorest layers of the working class and thereby 
differentiate them from those layers of the working class which could afford ordinary, or 
upgraded, township housing," conclude Morris and Padayachee. "It proposes to use to use 
urbanisation to increase competition between workers, not only to hold wage levels down, 
but principally to act as a process of class differentiation. Those black workers who are 
unable to secure steady employment, secure housing and services are hence forced out of the 
more stable urban townships."
For the "insider" blacks, there would be a few more social benefits, ranging from more 
education funding to electrification to township upgrading, collectively known by critics as 
the "winning hearts and minds" (WHAM) strategy. Indian and "coloured" South Africans 
were also given a minor role in national policy through the tri-cameral constitution. All such 
efforts failed, of course, to pacify increasingly militant township and shopfloor activists. 
And so while the socio-political responses to the deeper South African crisis included new 
uses of economic geography and financial markets (epitomised by R8 billion in mortgage 
bonds pumped into townships during the late 1980s), none of these attempts to displace 
overaccumulation were ultimately effective.
THE CRISIS CONTINUES
Since the previous pages were penned in late 1990, thirty months have produced only a 
deepening of the overaccumulation and devaluation crises. South Africa has experienced this 
in something of a see-saw form — occasionally declines in speculative activity and the odd 
burst of cheer on the industrial front (a new investment here, access to a foreign market 
there), but usually the reverse — while overall economic management has been oriented to 
carefully-controlled devaluation. The standard of living of the average South African has 
fallen 13,5& since the present downturn began in 1989, putting the country back to mid
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1960s levels. In this century, only the 1930-33 Great Depression was deeper, and only the 
1904-08 depression was (at this writing) longer.
The fact that significant devaluation of excess manufacturing, mining and Agricultural 
capacity is now underway has not, however, precluded the South African economy’s most 
parasitical, self-destructive processes (such as bank profiteering and capital flight) from 
gaining steam at the same time. Simultaneously, the international economic environment — 
the source of so much hope for the growth denied during South Africa’s pariah years — has 
turned hostile. While a profusion of characteristics of South Africa’s capitalist crisis should 
come under discussion, limited space prevents this section from considering anything more 
than anecdotal evidence of the most recent trends in these three areas, laying the basis for 
political implications in Section 4.
Industrial decline
The most significant single indicator of the economic downswing is the complete cessation 
of net new investment. Net fixed capital investment (plant and machinery) has now declined 
to 1% of GDP from average levels of 14,5% in the 1970s and 8% in the 1980s, leading 
Business D a y ’s  lead finance writer to conclude, "A revival of investment needs an act of 
faith" since "a decade of local economic stagnation while world demand has been sluggish 
does not provide a rationale for private investment spending."23
What new investment is being planned, is of the old-style capital-intensive, publicly- 
subsidised variety. The R7,2 billion Alusaf project (supported by at least R700 million in 
taxpayer funds) produces jobs at a cost of R3 million each (the Small Business Development 
Corporation cost is R18 000 each),24 while the R3 billion Columbus stainless steel plant 
generates no new net jobs. The movers and shakers behind Alusaf and Columbus include 
Anglo American, Sanlam and Gencor, the Industrial Development Corporation and Eskom. 
Such investments completely contradict the labour-intensive, non-subsidised approach that 
appears to have become a consensus position within the World Bank and hence among many 
local bourgeois economists. (However, the megaproject approach does stress an export- 
oriented "beneficiation" strategy, and this — unfortunately — has led to endorsements from 
within even the ANC and Cosatu.)
Setting aside the boondoggles which unite monopoly capital and the giant parastatal 
corporations, the lack of investment and shrinking markets have proven disastrous for many 
small and medium sized enterprises. The only manufacturing sectors which claimed growth 
in 1992 were plastic products, other chemical products, nonferrous metal products and 
professional/scientific instruments. Worst hit were footwear, glass and textiles, which 
suffered large excess capacity problems. Still to come are major shakeouts in heavier 
industrial sectors, especially automobiles, as the international law of value begins to play a 
more important role. While 300 000 vehicles were produced and sold annually in the early 
1980s, the early 1990s averaged less than 200 000.
This desperate need to downsize the industrial economy to restore profitability cannot be 
blamed on the advanced stage of class struggle in South Africa, as bourgeois economists are 
often wont to do. True, large strikes have been witnessed in the auto, metals and public 
service (especially health and teaching) sectors in the past year, while Cosatu shop-stewards
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have maintained a salutary militancy and class-consciousness.23 Nevertheless, while 
workers demanded wage increases of 55% in 1992, they were forced to accept just 12,6% 
(i.e., below inflation).26 Overall working-class advance on the wage and benefits front has 
been reversed even further in recent months (leading to reduced demand for consumer goods 
and further problems in repayment of outstanding consumer credit), while a further spate of 
retrenchments are expected until a fragile upturn takes hold, possibly sometime in 1994.
On the other side of the class struggle, monopoly capital appears more highly concentrated, 
collusive and anti-social than ever. Economic Trends members Joffe, Kaplan, Kaplinsky and 
Lewis note that price fixing and agreements to allocate market shares are customary, and that 
product lines of many key manufacturing sectors remain dominated by a single firm. South 
African monopoly capital is still characterised by interlocking directorates, a tiny number of 
major corporate shareholders (Anglo American, Rembrandt, Old Mutual, Sanlam, Liberty 
Life), and an incessant search for profits via short-term financial ratios (rather than long-term 
R&D).27
In sum, industrial development remains stymied by the limits of the market (the 
overaccumulation problem) and by the extremely distorted productive infrastructure in the 
country, through which linkages and articulations between different sectors (capital goods and 
consumer goods, for example) remain underdeveloped or bottlenecked. The challenge lies 
in moulding the present industrial sector into one more capable of generating mass production 
of basic needs goods, through conversion of the capital-intensive, luxury consumer-oriented 
infrastructure into a labour-intensive, more locally-responsive, environmentally-friendly 
economy.
Financial parasitism
With a growing crisis in manufacturing and the demise of new investment in plant and 
equipment, it is difficult for many observers to understand how the big banks and other 
financial institutions are earning record profits. Are they not carrying billions of rands of 
unpayable farm debt on their books, and experiencing record levels of corporate, consumer, 
housing bond, and taxi loan defaults? Are they not, like most landowners, facing the 
problems of the crash of the commercial property market? The answers are yes, but that 
somehow has not mattered.
The most immediate reasons for banking and financial ascendance during industrial decline 
are, it appears, market power and pilfering. The four large banks rarely engage in 
generalised price wars on their product (i.e., the interest rate charged for a loan, or paid to 
a saver). Just before the current depression began, the margin between what bankers charge 
borrowers and what they reward savers was 2,25%; it now stands at more than twice that. 
One result was record profits for banks, and a huge rise in share values of banking stocks.2'
Financial profits are also gained through Johannesburg Stock Exchange speculation. 
Although between June and October 1992 the JSE shed 20% of its share value (more than 
R100 billion), there has been a comeback on the basis of the steady annual flow of R40 
billion of "contractual savings" (insurance and pension funds) into institutional investors like 
Old Mutual, Sanlam and Liberty Life, who together control more than R200 billion in assets. 
As a result m this guaranteed income stream and the prohibition on foreign investment of
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such funds, the JSE share value soared to R560 billion at its recent peak. It was the fastest 
growing stock exchange in the world from 1989-mid-1992. In 1991 JSE industrial shares 
increased in price by 56%, while the industrial economy experienced negativ^growth. The 
recent fail-back does not, however, yet represent a real "correction," and leading analysts 
say the JSE "cannot defy gravity for much longer" (meanwhile Wall Street too "is more 
overvalued than at any time in history, more expensive than in both 1929 and 1987.")”  
Nevertheless, until the JSE crashes the 30% or so it is due, profits for institutional investors, 
led by Liberty Life, remain glorious.
These institutions’ control of contractual savings should, in a working capitalist economy, 
provide the long-term basis for fixed capital formation. But in the hands of JSE brokers like 
Greg Blank their role in backing corporate investment diminished and they more quickly 
became putty for yuppie fraud. This sort of financial parasitism — even by men who in 
earlier years garnered enormous respect — completely justifies Keynes’ plea for the 
"euthanasia of the rentier. ” Whether it is Blank and his insider-trading network at the upper 
echelons of Old Mutual, superbanker Bob Aldworth and his enemies in the ABSA hierarchy, 
former MP Jan Marais (implicated as a director in a failed investment company), Sol Kerzner 
(still subject to extradition to the Transkei on bribery charges), or dozens of other leading 
financiers convicted or charged with various forms of fraud, today’s models of high-flying 
financiers and cutting-edge entrepreneurs are caricatures of capital.
Even at the industrial heart of the South African economy a man like Anglo chief executive 
Julian Ogilvie Thompson is reduced to a hapless shyster, when trying to market rancid De 
Beers shares to sceptical London stock market investors in mid 1992.30 Capturing Unita’s 
diamonds (thus fuelling Angolan civil war) may have temporarily rescued De Beers (whose 
share price had crashed by more than 50%), but the diamond market’s decaying fundamentals 
(increased supply from Russia, diminished demand from shrinking East Asian luxury 
markets) will very likely yet prove to be decisive.
More generally, fraud has come to dominate many business (not just government) careers. 
More than 55 000 "economic crimes" took place in 1991, according to the Witwatersrand 
Attorney-General.31 Corporate crime on the order of R6 billion a year is estimated by the 
Office for Serious Economic Offenses. South Africa has been cited by a British organisation 
(the Centre for International Documentation on Organised and Economic Crime) as "a prime 
target for future growth in international economic crime and money laundering."32 One 
police report widely cited last year estimated fraud costs on the order of R374 billion, a 
figure so enormous that it defies belief.33
The worst cases of financial parasitism, however, are yet to come, and the vehicles again are 
the banks, the mechanisms various forms of "capital flight." What, after all, does First 
National Bank do with its new offices in Panama and the Cayman Islands? What does 
Standard do in the Isle of Man? These are notorious "hot money centres," the playgrounds 
of drug and currency smugglers. It is a travesty that before opening their first branch within 
a township of 300 000 residents (say, Alexandra), FNB and Standard have invested hundreds 
of millions of pensioner’s funds (raised on the JSE) for this purpose. In the process this not 
only crashed the finrand last October (according to the Reserve Bank) but is set to strip the 
country’s financial cupboards bare in the short- and medium-term.34
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International economic hostility
Meanwhile on the international trading and investment front the news remains appalling. 
Instinctively or through trial and error, South African manufacturers are learning what 
minerals and agricultural exporters have found out the hard way over the past couple of 
decades: the rules of the international trade game are simply not fair. After peaking in 
1973, raw materials prices have sunk to their lowest real level in recorded history at present, 
with no prospect for an upturn in sight. As a result, orthodox economists and politicians 
expect manufacturers to lead an export-oriented growth strategy.
But manufacturers themselves are learning that this is a foolish approach — the "export 
confidence barometer" of the SA Foreign Trade Association fell from a level of 32 in late 
1991 to 16 during 1992.35 Of more than 600 manufacturers surveyed by the Department 
of Trade and Industry last year, 43% produced exclusively for the local market while another 
42% could only export 10% or less of their production.34
Cosatu-affiliated economists seem to recognise the dangers too. Joffe, Kaplan, Kaplinsky 
and Lewis concede that "Entry in external markets has been difficult, partly because of the 
growth of protectionist barriers in key, large economies and partly because of heightened 
competition. At the same time, most of the developing world (including South Africa) is 
being forced to open domestic markets to imports." (Yet we must also note, sadly, that Joffe 
et al "agree with most of the World Bank proposals for trade policy reform" — which in the 
pre-lending stage, it must be said, appear to be much more lenient for South Africa than for 
other developing countries — and even call for the "selective liberalisation" of basic wage 
goods such as wheat, shoes and garments, a liberalisation "that goes beyond that of the 
Bank," and a sure route to more retrenchments in sectors that are extremely vulnerable.)37
Searching high and low for export-oriented industries, the World Bank has gone on record 
with a claim that South Africa is "able to compete internationally" at the high end of the 
clothing market, where South African "wages were up to ten times lo w er  than Korea, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Italy."3'  Yet for good reason (tough foreign competition) nearly 
every South African apparel manufacturer still produces at least 75% of output for local 
markets.39 Indeed, if South Africa’s export strategy has not been working it is not for lack 
of trying. For example, energy costs for export producers have been priced artificially low 
(to the extent that bauxite will be shipped to South Africa for conversion into aluminum by 
Alusaf thanks solely to very low Eskom rates), leading to concerns about further coal-related 
destruction of the environment. More generally, the government’s General Export Incentive 
Scheme costs the equivalent of a 2% increase in the VAT rate; yet it is "relatively useless 
for boosting exports" according to officials from the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. An ANC trade advisor adds, "Many companies are exporting only because they 
receive GEIS payments. It is questionable whether the benefits warrant the cost."40
Why, then, can’t South African manufacturers compete? While some economists claim that 
protectionism within the rest of the South African economy generates a bias against exports 
(due to higher materials prices), a recent World Bank report concedes that in comparison to 
31 other developing countries, a variety of exemptions and special arrangements within the 
South African tariff structure result in the lowest "effective tariff take" of all the countries.41 
The World Economic Forum and the International Management Institute (both based in 
Switzerland) studied the economic competitiveness of 22 industrialised and 14 "newly
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industrialised economies" and ranked South Africa 29th overall. Amongst the 14 countries 
in the latter category, the sectors where South Africa showed a comparative advantage were 
finance (ranked fourth) and science and technology (fifth), neither of which can claim much 
contact with the majority of the South African population. With respect to education, equal 
opportunity in jobs, and "worker motivation," South Africa is worst of all contenders.42
Foreign investors report paradoxical experiences in South Africa. Thanks to monopolistic 
conditions in local markets the average US manufacturing multinational earned huge profits 
in 1989 (the latest year surveyed): an 8,3% after-tax return on South African investment, 
compared with 6,5% in Latin America, 5,5% in Asia and 4,9% in Western Europe. 
Nevertheless, there seems no real scope for substantial additional growth of the saturated 
local market.43
Anti-apartheid pressure has contributed to multinational corporate disinvestment in recent 
years, but the dwindling of foreign investment in South Africa actually began two decades 
ago when overaccumulation become increasingly evident, as total foreign direct investment 
(measured in 1985 rands) fell from R31 billion in 1973 to R26 billion ten years later and R22 
billion today. As for the future, as Sanlam’s "scenario planning" exercise put it, "It would 
not be wise to overestimate the foreign investment potential."44
What is also important here is to specify the conditions under which direct foreign investment 
and foreign loans are brought back to South Africa. Foreign investment typically involves 
profit repatriation of R95 for every R5 invested, and foreign debt is particularly worrisome, 
given the strings typically attached (IMF and World Bank "conditionality"), its high cost 
(what with a declining rand) and the emphasis it puts on an export-oriented growth strategy 
to repay the hard currency.45 According to some experts, South Africa’s annual 
development-related borrowing in coming years will not exceed $1 billion (aside from likely 
IMF balance-of-payments loans), of which the World Bank would provide around half. 
Repayment or rescheduling of the existing foreign commercial bank debt (still at around $19 
billion) will be a serious challenge, given continuing international doubts about political 
stability in South Africa.44
If other developing countries provide any lesson, it is in the ideological policing function that 
prospective foreign investment plays — "If you demand higher wages or housing for all, we 
will get no support from US or European companies or banks" — that most care will have 
to be exercised. Which leads directly to the question of what reforms might most optimally 
be demanded, and what strategies and tactics appear to correspond with the opportunities that 
present themselves in the continuing crisis.
POSSIBILITIES FOR CAPITALIST REFORM
The three areas of particular difficulty outlined in Section 3 — industrial decline, financial 
speculation and the international environment — and the profusion of problems mentioned 
in Section 2 are by no means exhaustive. State management of macroeconomic variables (the 
money supply, interest rates, inflation, currency values, the budget, state investment, etc) 
deserves a paper or two on its own, as do micromanagement issues ranging from new 
techniques of labour control at the point of production to control of women in the household.
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However, it is to the central theme of Section 1 — classical Marxist crisis theory — that this 
conclusion turns to argue for certain political insights.
If one studies the crisis through the lens of the classical theory, the ebb and flow of 
overaccumulation and devaluation present themselves as central points of political, social, 
labour and community intervention. In setting up some broad principles for debate, there 
are two central aspects of capitalist reform that deserve attention (but again, far more than 
space presently allows): political will and financial viability. Hard enough as it is to 
calculate the strength of the post-apartheid fiscus (government budget) and the capital 
markets, these financial variables are nevertheless far easier to judge than the political 
balance of forces. It is there we begin, first with a quick overview of some political 
constraints, followed by an ideal-type trajectory of political mobilisation around economic 
demands utilising insights from crisis theory.
Political constraints and opportunities
"Big business says it accepts the need for stability based on social compacts, for consultation, 
for democracy," complained two leading ANC economists in an article about the Alusaf and 
Columbus steel projects.
In these conditions, we would expect massive, capital-intensive ventures to 
emerge only after a serious review of other options, and as part of detailed 
plans to maximise upstream and downstream linkages so as to provide more 
jobs. Surely, then, the captains of industry — whether in the private or the 
parastatal sector — will seek wide debate before taking decisions that affect 
all our lives.47
The harsh reality, however, is that while many on the Left strive mightily to realise 
expansive social contracts (and while they may be egged on by the likes of Nedcor/Old 
Mutual "Scenario Planning" or "Mont Fleur Scenarios"), the agenda of big business remains 
one of contraction (or in the megaprojects case above, raiding the state coffers while there 
is still a chance). If the Sanlam-ftnanced Platform  f o r  Investment must so ponderously spell 
out the facts of life to its conservative constituents — "Social accords are not purely about 
limiting the demand for high wages"4* — then prospects would appear somewhat gloomy 
for this strategic approach to capitalist reform.
This is not merely because controlled devaluation of excess capacity is such a high priority 
prior for big business gearing- up for immersion into the international economy. It also 
reflects a fear expressed often that a Freedom Charter-oriented social welfare state could 
become uncontrollable; an irresponsible Sandinista/Mugabe-style fiscal populism could infect 
the economy, like AIDS, sapping its entrepreneurial life-blood.4’ If, for example, decent 
housing is built for all South Africans at an affordable price (a project eminently feasible in 
financial terms as argued below), so too must wages rise to pay for the higher standards of 
services, fittings, and new community facilities. While employers may complain occasionally 
about the problems associated with a poorly-housed and transported workforce, there is a 
certain convenience in maintaining relatively low wages such that the bulk of workers (and 
the unemployed) have no choice but to inhabit the lowest-cost housing available.
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As a result, there has been increasing concern on the Left about the prospect for the "insider- 
outsider" dichotomy, a "thirty-seventy solution" in which elite leaders cut deals and a small 
proportion of the upper echelons of the working-class is catered for (through vehicles such 
as job security, skills-upgrading, employer-guaranteed housing bonds and employer housing 
subsidies, pensions and pension-linked bonds, and various other insider programmes). Under 
this scenario, the masses of workers and the poor are faced with, at best, a site-and-service 
("I Do Toilets") so-called "housing policy" which entails self-help shack construction in peri­
urban dumping grounds far away from job opportunities or community facilities, and full 
cost-recovery for inadequate, expensive services.
It is not just the private sector which is to blame (although for designing the toilet policy the 
Urban Foundation will gain the condemnation of urban historians when all is said and done). 
Others in the ruling class — for whom the title "econocrat" (coined by Mark Swilling) still 
seems fitting — also exercise ideological control on what is considered financially feasible. 
"Kick-start" programmes (such as the first version of Nedcor/Old Mutual Scenario Planning) 
have run into opposition from extremely powerful econocrats, including Reserve Bank 
governor Chris Stals and special government economic advisor Japie Jacobs.50 Meanwhile, 
the corporate tax cuts in Minister Keys’ recent budget (from 48% to 40%) seem the height 
of fiscal irresponsibility, perhaps to be paid for, in spite of continued heavy opposition from 
Cosatu, by privatisation (South African Airways and Abacor meat processing are now in 
preparation, and Foskor fertilisers and Eskom also under study for privatisation or 
commercialisation).51
There are, of course, dangers in the econocrat strategy (which also apply to the kick- 
starters): by most accounts the society may implode — the Vaal has become the metaphor 
Lebanon once was — if certain basic improvements are not apparent. Strictly along racial 
lines, the main areas of demand and conflict will be as follows (according to Sanlam’s 
Platform)-.
•  whites in public service displaced to make way for blacks;
•  blacks able to reclaim original land;
•  whites more heavily taxed for welfare of blacks;
•  companies appoint more blacks to achieve quotas;
•  black farm workers given parts of farms; and
•  many blacks being appointed to good jobs.
In the soothing words of Lawrence Schlemmer (author of this section of the Platform ), 
"Many of the most severe perceived threats are symptoms of the twin current phenomena of 
competitive transition and deep recession. They will subside to some extent.” How will they 
subside?
Once in an interim government the ANC’s close association with the labour movement and 
with progressive NGOs will have to be loosened, allowing it to become more balanced in its 
approach. There is already a close working relationship between the ANC, the World Bank, 
the Development Bank of Southern Africa, the Consultative Business Movement and other 
organisations which are painstakingly pointing out the longer run costs of many redistributive 
strategies... Once it is functioning, the National Economic Forum will assist the process of 
establishing common ground. The recent positive interaction between ANC leaders and Mr 
Keys is an early indication of what could be achieved within an interim government.52 
This is the optimistic voice of big business; if it is guarded at all, then mainly by concerns
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of "inconsistency" in ANC policy.53 How realistic is this "convergence" scenario? Nicoli 
Nattrass (a social democrat) argues that "It would be a mistake to believe that some form of 
social democratic consensus is on the cards. In crucial respects, agreement is superficial 
only."54 At a Nattrass lecture at the Institute of Race Relations in late 1992, Bobby Godsell 
(of Anglo American and the Chamber of Mines) seemed to agree, terming the National 
Economic Forum a "talk-shop" due to the widely divergent interests.
If more sophisticated readings of social contracts conclude that there really is not much scope 
for anything more than symbolism here, it may be, then, that an appropriate response in this 
doubly-dangerous environment — devaluation of overaccumulated capital mixed with class 
differentiation along geographical lines — is to avoid those social pacts which have the 
characteristics of elite politics and insider-outsider dichotomisation. In contrast, there is an 
obvious need for labour and social movements to intensify mass struggles for basic human 
rights (access to meaningful employment, housing, education, health care, etc), and 
simultaneously to seek out what might be considered “non-reformist reforms"; i.e., those 
strategic gains which open the door to further struggles through empowering activists and 
their grassroots constituencies (on shopfloors and in communities) with new tools, new 
insights and new courage to press for what is rightfully theirs.
There are a few developments emerging which may be of particular interest to worker and 
community leaders aiming to maximize their impact against capital and state while gaining 
at least minimal non-reformist victories that keep momentum high. As hinted at previously, 
these sorts of developments often emerge organically from the conditions on the ground and 
strategically with respect to the opportunities tossed up by capitalist crisis. Two examples 
will suffice.
In the field of labour struggles, there is a strong argument for grappling with the 
contradictions in South African capitalism where they are most extreme. As shown above, 
the crisis has been displaced rather emphatically into the sphere of finance. It is here, for 
example, that workers indebted with housing bonds place the greatest pressure on their trade 
union leaders to settle a strike, for after a couple of months the threat of foreclosure and 
homelessness sharpens the choice between staying on the picket line for the final push to 
victory, or accepting the company’s offer. In turn it is the overindebted company which is 
being pressurised by its bank (a fair amount of the time) to cut the wage bill in order to pay 
the interest bill.
The financier then plays the complicated organising role for the devaluation of 
overaccumulated capital, which has now taken the form of a loan to the company. The 
squeezing of even South Africa's large firms by the banks has become commonplace (for 
example, ABSA against Tollgate, FSI Holdings and Bester Homes in recent months). To an 
ordinary trade union strategist, the complexity of these corporate power relations, and the 
prospect of a new, more powerful target (the financier standing behind the company), is 
daunting upon first consideration.
But it need not be so. In the US, the roaring 1980s — characterised by leveraged buy-outs, 
junk bonds, asset-stripping, greenmail, golden parachutes and other contraptions of high 
finance — l^ft industries, regions, individual companies, pension funds and workers in 
tatters. The logical response by the most militant workers, in the form of strategic trade
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union campaigns that often accompanied strike action, was to focus attention on the links 
between finance and production (and consumption — i.e., that housing bond). This entailed 
identifying means of raising the costs to the financier of its practices, which in tum translated 
into potent pressure upon the primary corporate target. Because such US trade union 
"corporate campaigns" were carefully constructed to build alliances with local forces 
(community groups, churches, anti-apartheid activists, civil rights groups, etc), there emerged 
enormous scope for linking issues, gaining respectability in the struggle for political and 
media influence, and raising social consciousness about the manner in which people’s money 
is handled by financiers. Such a process inevitably led to a much stronger bargaining 
position in negotiations over who, effectively, would bear the brunt of devaluation, and over 
how restructuring of a company (even an industry) might occur.53
A second example is drawn from South African community struggles over credit. When R7 
billion was pumped by banks and building societies into the townships between 1986 through 
1990 (170 000 housing bonds) — much of it at 12,5% interest rate but rising to 20,75% 
within a few months, at a time when civic associations were repressed, no community 
involvement was sought, serious retrenchments would soon affect borrower affordability, and 
for often shoddily-built housing geographically positioned far from commerce or employment 
— the result could only be a massive repayment crisis. The banks had saturated the top ten 
percent of their market (those who could afford a R35 000 house) and in mid 1990 promptly 
pulled out of the townships, even in areas mainly unaffected by repayment problems or 
political turmoil.54
Indeed this particular form of the broader financial crisis began to emerge in South Africa 
even before formal "bond boycotts" became a regular tactic of organised communities across 
the country facing problems with their lenders (in particular the South African Housing 
Trust), and long before the national civic movement SANCO threatened a bond boycott to 
pressure banks to stop supporting the government and homelands (in mid 1992). Rough 
estimates are that 30% of all such township bonds went into arrears or default in recent 
years. The inability of banks to actually foreclose (due to community opposition to the 
sheriff) meant that the devaluation of overaccumulated financial capital (i.e., that R7 billion 
so recklessly loaned out) would be borne by the banks, not by the borrower.
At one level this is an interesting and instructive response to the crisis, for here the bond 
boycott can be seen as a means by which organised communities used organic tactics aimed, 
strategically, at getting relief from anti-social financial practices. At another level, however, 
the effect of bond boycotts is rather more important. The end result of this extraordinary 
battle between borrower and lender, probably unique anywhere in the world, was a near- 
complete cessation of initiatives aimed at commodifying township housing and hence building 
the black middle class through housing finance. Even the Urban Foundation’s Home Loan 
Guarantee Fund, meant to chum out R1 billion of new low-cost housing guarantees every 
year, has sputtered to a halt at less than 10% of capacity. The much-vaunted secondary sales 
market, by which the old matchbox houses could be privatised and sold, does not work in 
any township because there is no financing. Prospects for "gearing up" further housing 
finance from state funds are dim under these conditions. A giant morass has emerged (not 
only due to the bond repayment crisis, of course) which has resulted in low-cost housing 
developers going bankrupt, communities overcrowded and underhoused, and growing social 
tensions.
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This is what urban capitalism has wrought through the banks' poorly-conceived strategy of 
providing loans to the top sliver of township residents, on an extremely uneven basis in 
which the flow of funds was rapid but the ebb of funding nearly instantaneous. Politically 
there appears no real hope for short-term resolution of this crisis of the circulation of capital, 
and certainly very little appears on the horizon (aside from SANCO’s agreement with the 
Perm) with respect to social contracts aimed at restarting the flow of funds into townships. 
However, where capital has failed so ignominiously, there arises the opportunity for a more 
creative approach to reforming capitalism, which is taken up in the concluding lines.
The financial viability of reform:
The case of housing
The argument that must be advanced, is that if reformed profoundly, South Africa’s financial 
markets and budget (under a new tax regime) could relatively easily generate the finance 
required to meet the basic needs of the country’s poor and working people. Due to the 
enormous number of state financing agencies, the overlap in these, and the extremely poor 
state of record-keeping more generally, it is not possible to accurately and conclusively 
document the amount of government resources currently being used for job creation, social 
welfare, health, education, housing, community development, etc. But it is the responsibility 
of progressive policy-makers (even Marxists) to actively search out the social (and private) 
resources currently being disguised, misused or misappropriated, and support the demands 
of labour and social movements to gain better access to these, and on terms that sustain 
rather than undermine social organisation. A brief exercise along these lines is presented 
next, using housing (the principal commodity demanded by the urban social movements) as 
an example. Mass housing provision is interesting because it is often considered the 
capitalist reform of primary importance, given its effects on ensuring social stability as well 
as for its counter-cyclical kick-start effects on the economy.
By most accounts, the cost of providing a basic housing unit (whether a two-room structure 
in a new development, an inner-city flat rehabilitation or unit in a high-rise building, or a 
decent shack-upgrading)57 is around R25 000. The capacity of the building materials and 
construction sectors to deliver a mass housing plan is hotly contested (industry representatives 
claim 300 000 low-cost houses per year is feasible; if strong anti-trust mechanisms and 
support for community builders was possible, add another 100 000). The housing shortage 
at present is, according to some guestimates, three million units; add another million for new 
household formation during the next decade.5'  The result: build 400 000 houses a year for 
the next ten years at an annual (present-value) cost of R10 billion, and the popular demand 
of "housing for all" can be satisfied in a decade. The next issue is, where to get the R10 
billion each year. How much of that can recipients reasonably afford to repay under the 
principle that "housing is a right, and housing payments should be affordable’?”
In 1991, expenditure on housing (measured in aggregate by the Reserve Bank as residential 
building expenditure, which is part of gross domestic fixed investment) was R6,533 billion 
for the economy as a whole, with public authorities responsible for R932 million and public 
corporations for R224 million. In real terms (measured in 1985 rands), this represents an 
enormous decrease and potential unutilised financial capacity. In 1984, for example, 
government spent Rl,029 billion on residential buildings (in R1985), as opposed to R527 
million (in $1985) in 1991.60 What this means, in effect, is that the government is
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spending effectively h a lf  o f  what it did in the mid 1980s.61
In contrast, the government spent just over R100 billion on total goods and services in 
1992/93 (a substantial real increase over previous periods). Under an optimal system of 
rationalised and efficient expenditures, the amount of government spending on housing and 
related infrastructural provision would be several times more than the present R2-R3 billion 
in total on- and off-budget spending. State spending of, say, even R5 billion a year on low- 
income housing subsidies, would put South Africa within (not at the top of) the range of 
countries such as Malaysia and Tunisia which have made a serious commitment to this sector 
of the economy.62
In addition there are substantial private sector resources that could be diverted from current 
unproductive uses into housing and infrastructural development if mechanisms, affordability 
enhancements and political will existed.63 There are several important private sector 
providers of finance for housing, including commercial banks and (former) building societies, 
and others (such as those institutional investors) which should be tapped.64 The point here 
would be to capture such funds at something close to the present market rate (for the sake 
of savers and pensioners), blend them with state grants, and distribute the proceeds to 
community-oriented intermediaries which can make loans and assure repayment effectively.
In somewhat technocratic terms, the principles under which such a subsidy scheme might 
work include a universal acknowledgement to the "right" to decent housing (not just to a 
toilet on a serviced site). The recipient would be expected to pay at least 20% of available 
monthly income towards the housing, and the collection agency would be a new, non-profit, 
community-controlled, development institution (a "People’s Bank" of some sort would be 
ideal). The pool of funds available for the housing would total RIO billion per year, coming 
from the state (in the form of a grant) and the private sector (at close to market rate, perhaps 
through a "prescribed assets" mechanism) such that the effective cost of funds is half the 
market rate (i.e., around 8%). Calculations using standard income distribution models 
suggest that the necessary amount of average subsidy for a R25 000 house would be around 
R12 500, which for 400 000 units is the amount the state would be expected to contribute 
each year (R5 billion). Hence this type of reform effectively decommodifies housing (in order 
that even the very poor gain access), and is financially feasible even under present conditions 
of deep overaccumulation crisis. The other R5 billion is not too much to draw (and repay) 
from annual contractual savings flows of R50 billion+ , since with little new fixed investment 
underway there is nothing of the mythical "crowding out" of the private sector to worry 
about. However, the political balance of forces in South Africa — in particular the influence 
of the IMF and World Bank which Schlemmer referred to above — suggest that it is 
exceptionally unlikely that such a "housing for all" reform programme will be implemented. 
Nevertheless the point of any socialist argument is that the capitalist system has provided the 
forces of production which make it possible to meet society’s basic needs. If the capitalist 
class is unwilling to actually make such a commitment to society, then that calls for a bit of 
a rethink about the mode of production itself.
CONCLUSION
Finally, this brings us to a very brief consideration of agency. Who might we expect to
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champion such far-reaching reforms, even beyond the point that they are rejected by the 
ruling class? Those who insist that it is organised labour that must be the standard-bearer 
for programmes such as "housing for all," often point to the inherent conservatism, 
communitarianism and inconsistencies of urban social movements.
What sort of rebuttal is in order? In the recent Amin, Arrighi, Wallerstein and Gunder 
Frank collection, Transforming the Revolution, the position of Frank and Fuentes is worth 
our consideration:
In seeking and organising to change society in smaller, immediate but doable  
steps, which did not require state power, the utopian socialists were perhaps 
much more realistic than the scientific ones — and they were more akin then 
to the social movements of our time than the "scientific" socialists of the 
intervening century. What is more, many utopian socialists proposed and 
pursued social changes and particularly different gender relations, which were 
subsequently increasingly abandoned or forgotten by scientific socialists...
The real transition to a "socialist" alternative to the present world economy, 
society, and polity, therefore, may be much more in the hands of the social 
movements. Not only must they intervene for the sake of survival to save as 
many people as possible from any threatening abyss. We must also look to 
the social movements as the most active agents to forge new links, which can 
transform the world in new directions.65
This is little more than an assertion, of course. But if there is any truth here, and if the 
broad forces of the Left are to capture the imagination of those alienated from a sunset- 
apartheid dispensation marred by continuing processes of capitalist devaluation and the 
continued intransigence of bureaucrats, police and army, it strikes me that struggles can 
effectively be waged against capitalism, even in the context of reform (not necessarily 
reformist) programmes. The rest of the seminar series no doubt provokes plenty of strategic 
insights. I would still insist, however, that classical Marxist crisis theory provides some of 
the most interesting ideas in the defense against capitalist economic tyranny, as well as in our 
efforts to creatively utilise those resources (such as liquid financial markets) which are still 
provided by a capitalist society today facing seemingly interminable decay and self- 
destruction.
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CAPITALISM AND THE ‘AGRARIAN QUESTION’ IN SOUTH AFRICA
Fred T Hendricks 
Sociology Department, UWC>
INTRODUCTION
It has become fashionable to introduce the agrarian question in South Africa with the 
complaint that it has been scientifically neglected and politically forgotten. With at least five 
major conferences and workshops on agrarian issues, land or rural development over the last 
three years(Okumo, 1990; ANC National Land Commission, 1990; Matlhape and Munz, 
1991; de Klerk, 1991; van der Walt, 1991),“  a number of journals with special issues on 
land67 and a variety of publications focusing on the rural and agricultural South Africa, this 
complaint has become rather passd. In contrast, this paper does not attempt to correct any 
quantitative imbalances or urban biases in the work of social scientists on South Africa. 
Rather, its purpose is to challenge the qualitative bases of the debate on land in South Africa.
The paper has four sections. Firstly, it attempts to provide a clear definition of the agrarian 
question in relation to the development of capitalism in the countryside and the political 
possibilities for alliances with rural classes. In the second section the process of class 
formation in South Africa is discussed with specific reference to the displacement of 
proletarians to the reserves. The third section gives a brief description of the rural crisis by 
emphasising the fundamental division between the reserves and white-claimed South Africa 
and by highlighting some of the problems confronting farm workers on white commercial 
farms. Finally, the paper advances the argument, peculiar as it may seem, that there is no 
social basis for the agrarian question in South Africa. Indeed, there is no agrarian question 
in South Africa at all.
It may seem paradoxical to address the agrarian question and then to assert that it does not 
exist in South Africa. My view is that this paradox is confined to the level of appearance and 
originates out of a crude conflation of the land problem and the agrarian question. Saying 
that the agrarian question is non-existent in South Africa, does not mean that exclusive white 
minority ownership of land is not a monumental problem for the oppressed. The 87:13 ratio, 
false as it may be in practice68, is still the core of the land problem. This argument instead, 
implies an entirely different approach, based specifically on the proletarian character of the 
vast majority of the rural population. The crucial question confronting rural South Africa, 
is thus not whether the agrarian question can be resolved within the framework of the 
capitalist system, but how best the interests of displaced proletarians in the reserves and farm 
workers on the so-called white ‘platteland’ can be advanced towards the eventual control of 
agricultural production in South Africa.69
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THE AGRARIAN QUESTION
There are a number of related issues which make up the broad agrarian question. In general, 
it refers to the transformation to capitalist production in the rural areas characterised by a 
complex variety of transitional forms of backwardness and uneven development and giving 
rise to specific class forces. More particularly, it relates to the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism, the specification of different modes of production and the possibility of a political 
alliance of peasants and proletarians (embodied in the symbol of the hammer and sickle).
The central questions, thus are, on the one hand, the extent to which capitalism has 
penetrated and transformed agriculture and proletarianised the rural population. On the other 
hand, there is the vital political question of identifying non-proletarian class allies in the rural 
areas for the urban working class.
The first question is elaborated most poignantly in Lenin’s (1977) seminal work, ‘The 
Development of Capitalism in Russia’ first published in 1899.70 In it, the main emphasis 
is on the historically progressive tendency of capitalism to sweep aside traditional forms of 
production, ensuring the decay of feudalism as well as the erosion of the commune. While 
recognising the resilience of household production in Russia, as well as the tenacity of 
consciousness71 which it facilitates, Lenin demonstrated, with detailed empirical 
substantiation, that capitalism was well-advanced in the Russian economy. Consequently, the 
communal organisation of villages could not be the basis for Russian socialism. Instead, the 
growth of capitalism in the countryside led Lenin to argue that the property-owning 
proletariat is not anomalous at all. After a lengthy exposition on why many rural-dwellers 
in Russia are in fact proletarians he writes:
...our literature frequently contains too stereotyped an understanding of the theoretical 
proposition that capitalism requires a free, landless worker... the allotment-holding 
rural worker is a type to be found in all countries, each bearing the traces ... of a 
specific history of agrarian relations-but this does not prevent the economist from 
classing them all as one type of agricultural proletariat. The juridical basis of his 
(sic!) right to his plot of land is absolutely immaterial to such a classification (Lenin, 
1977:178).
In his consistent battle against the position of the narodniki that the peasantry in general 
could be anti-capitalist, Lenin purports that the economic history of Russia demands a 
proletarian leadership over the democratic struggle. The narodniki view of ‘skipping the 
capitalist phase’ or a ‘direct transition to socialism’77 was inherently utopian since it was 
based on a class of middle peasants that was rapidly disappearing as it divided into 
capitalising farmers on the one hand and rural proletarians on the other:
I f  we take the peasan t agriculturalist we shall f in d  that on the one hand m asses o f  
peasants are g iving up the land, loosing their economic independence, turning into  
proletarians, and on the other, peasan ts are continually enlarging their crop areas 
and adopting im proved farm ing  m eth ods... sp lit (ting) our community peasan ts into a  
bourgeoisie and a  p ro le ta r ia t (Lenin, 1968:34).
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The differentiation of the peasantry thus dictated Lenin’s evolving theoretical formulations 
on the political role of the peasantry in relation to the urban proletariat in the Russian 
revolution (Alavi, 1973:296). From a tacit assumption that the rural bourgeoisie, the kulaks, 
would provide the main force in agriculture in the battle against feudal autocracy, Lenin’s 
position changed dramatically in favour of an alliance with the poor peasantry after 1905. In 
practice, however, this alliance never materialised and the failure of the Bolsheviks to 
mobilise the poor peasantry led Lenin, in 1920, to the conclusion that:
...the rural population...is capable of giving resolute support to the revolutionary 
proletariat only after the latter has won political power (cited in Alavi, 1973:305).
While Lenin was concerned with a political strategy involving the rural population on the 
basis of a thorough analysis of the economic history of Russia, Kautsky’s ‘The Agrarian 
Question’, also published in 1899, tried to demonstrate that large scale agriculture was more 
efficient than small-scale farming. Moreover, Kautsky predicted that the commercialisation 
of agriculture and concentration of landholding would undermine and eventually destroy 
peasant forms of production (Banaji, 1976; Pearce, 1985:66).
Quite clearly, the work of Lenin and Kautsky, at this stage, was complementary. They were 
in agreement that the peasantry as a class was a remnant of feudalism and therefore doomed 
to extinction by the inexorable advance of capital accumulation on an ever-increasing scale. 
Despite the fact that this may be true for South Africa, (I will be taking up this issue in a 
later section of the paper), the experience of the vast majority of poor countries has been a 
lack or a low level of commercialisation in agriculture. Peasantries have persisted, even in 
advanced capitalist countries (Byres, 1991:11; Goodman and Redclift, 1981:11). Indeed, the 
displacement of non-capitalist relations of production and the dispossession of independent 
producers, especially in agriculture, have been extremely varied processes.
Even though there is no single path for the integration of peasants into exchange relations and 
the wider economy generally, the common thread is the ever-greater dependence upon the 
commodities of and wage labour under the capitalist system. According to Giddens 
(1990:520) the concept of globalisation best describes this growing interdependence of world 
society. "Our lives," he asserts, "are increasingly influenced by activities and events 
happening well away from the social contexts in which we carry on our day-to-day 
activities." There can be little doubt about the truism of this statement. However, without 
examining the specific manner in which this ‘influence’ is brought to bear upon our lives, 
we may be left with the sanitised version of world history based on the ‘neutral’ concept of 
cultural diffusion. As Hoogvelt (1976:18) remarks about the work of the North American 
sociologist, Talcott Parsons:
In Parsons’s approach one gets the impression that the history of mankind (sic!) has 
been one happy, relaxed and peaceful exchange of ideas, stimulating progress here 
there and everywhere where contact between societies was made. Cultural diffusion 
appears as a friendly merchant traveller,... innocently roaming the world, gently 
picking up a few ideas in one place and harmlessly depositing them in another. 
Incredulously, domination, exploitation, imperialism and colonialism are not discussed 
in any of Parsons’s work on evolution.
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We may find coca cola advertisements in the remotest of Chinese villages but this tells us 
very little about rural life in China besides the fact that some commodities are available for 
exchange. The agrarian debate is an antidote to the grandiose claims that globalisation has 
brought about "dramatic transformation" in world society (Giddens, 1990:517).
At the heart of the agrarian question lies the rather rustic reality that many rural-dwellers 
have retained their access to land. How they hold this land, their land tenure system; and 
what they do on this land, their mode of agricultural production obviously vary considerably 
form place to place. A consideration of these regional variations and historical specificities 
is vital for a more informed interpretation of rural social relations and class formation in an 
era of world capitalism.
CLASS FORMATION AND ACCESS TO LAND: 
The Making of a Displaced Proletariat
Within South Africa, as elsewhere, the process of class formation was uneven. It was 
undoubtedly structured by colonial incorporation and capitalist transformation of indigenous 
society. White settlers, be they farmers, miners, industrialists or administrators, required 
cheap labour73. Invariably, this labour was supplied by Africans. But the conversion of 
independent producing Africans into wage labour was not uniform across the entire country 
or within communities. While some Africans were thoroughly proletarianised to become 
permanent wage earners soon after the arrival of whites, many became migrant labourers, 
only partially proletarianised, subsisting from both urban wages and rural production and 
living in specifically designated reserve areas for Africans. Still others entered a variety of 
rent, share-cropping and labour-tenancy contracts with white landlords. Against all odds, 
some Africans managed to secure freehold land rights in the white-claimed part of South 
Africa, the so-called, ‘black spots’.
Apartheid crucially influenced the various paths of proletarianisation and forms of 
landholding in South Africa. It also had a direct bearing on the distinctive development of 
capitalism in the country as a whole. Territorial segregation in the form of ‘scheduled’ rural 
reserve areas for Africans, the distortion of the communal system of land tenure in these 
areas and the brutal imposition of control over African influx into the cities through the pass 
laws and the resultant political exclusion, shaped African proletarianisation. In essence, 
apartheid policy attempted to drive a wedge between the processes of African urbanisation 
and proletarianisation.
While dispossessing and expropriating the mass of the people, the apartheid state prevented 
the permanent urban settlement of millions of Africans, compelling them to remain domiciled 
in the impoverished reserves where they had a semblance of access to land. Thus, the extent 
of their dependence upon wage labour far outweighed the level of their urbanisation. 
Needless to say, apartheid policy was not altogether successful in realising its objectives. 
Despite influx control in the shape of pass laws and a battery of other repressive legislation, 
apartheid failed to prevent the growth of an urban African proletariat. The emergence of an 
independent trade union movement as well as popular community and civic organisations, 
particularly from the 1970’s onwards, has effectively put paid to the notion of geographically
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confining the political expression of Africans to the reserves. The trade unions and 
community organisations have sunk their roots deeply in the factories and townships. These 
efforts, often against severe repression, ensured that African residence outside of the reserves 
is a permanent and extremely important feature of South Africa’s political’ landscape. 
Moreover, their labour power is no longer necessarily cheap.
But, apartheid policy was not without its impact. It certainly succeeded in maintaining a 
legacy of rural-rootedness through the institutionalisation of the one-man-one lot system in 
the reserves and setting up tribal authorities. The government’s imposition of a distorted and 
regimented version of the communal system of land tenure had a number of far-reaching 
consequences for the development of capitalism in South Africa. Firstly, it allowed the 
maximum occupation of land in the reserves by prohibiting the concentration of land- 
holdings, preventing the commercialisation of African agriculture and paralysing their 
accumulation of capital (Bundy, 1979). Africans were not to be self-sufficient nor surplus- 
producing peasants and certainly not capitalist farmers. Capitalist commodity production was 
the prerogative of whites and Africans entered this relation almost invariably as proletarians. 
Individualisation of land holdings was irreconcilable with territorial segregation and apartheid 
generally. In order to rule Africans separately they had to be kept quite apart from the 
institutions of white-claimed South Africa. The land market was one such institution. While 
whites could buy and sell land in virtually the entire country, Africans were supposed to 
‘develop along their own lines’ usually as displaced proletarians in the reserves.
The pre-colonial system of land tenure was premised on unfettered control over land matters 
by an independent community. Under conditions of confined reserves this system of land 
tenure only superficially resembles its pre-colonial predecessor. But, just like the chieftaincy 
in charge of local policing, it struck a chord of familiarity amongst the people. It gave some 
reserve dwellers access to an arable allotment and the majority, access to a homestead site. 
In many ways this access to land chained the consciousness of the people to the homelands. 
Only recently, with the growth of independent trade unions on a national scale, have these 
shackles become somewhat unbound. The important point is that access to either a residential 
or an arable allotment or livestock does not necessarily make peasants of the reserve 
population. Access to land by rural dwellers is a smokescreen for the extent to which the 
mass of the rural population have been proletarianised. Undue emphasis on this access leads 
to the conclusion that migrant labourers, who may spend eleven months of the year in wage- 
labour, are some category other than the proletariat.
It would be misleading to suggest that there are no differences between migrants and 
permanent urban workers. Indeed, until very recently, the constraints and controls placed on 
the latter were far more stringent than those on the former. The basis of commonality 
between them lies in the fact both migrants and non-migrants have been liberated from their 
independent means of livelihood and they have as their principal interest, the earning of 
wages. Communal tenure does not prevent proletarianisation at all. It merely deflects it onto 
the reserves and it is integral to this form of displaced proletarianisation in the country.
The communal system goes hand in hand with the political authority of a coopted chieftaincy 
which controlled the allocation of land and became the local extension of rural class power 
with their transformation from independence to subordination. Just as the system of land 
tenure was distorted, so was the chieftaincy. But both the chieftaincy and the system of equal
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share allotments are deeply-rooted in African society. By shoring up the chieftaincy and even 
creating these where there were none, an attempt was made to reinforce separate tribal 
identities and, stall united nationalist opposition.
Structurally, the vast majority of South Africa’s rural black population, in the reserves and 
on white-owned farms, is incapable of making a living out of farming. The people, en mass, 
have effectively been denied the wherewithal to undertake farming and reproduce families 
on this basis. Yet, the relational vestiges of tribalism in the shape of traditional leaders 
persists with its role in a future democratic South Africa legitimised by the ANC, PAC and 
AZAPO. It is clear that the political recognition of the existing chieftaincies has profound 
implications for; gender discrimination, the principle of universal franchise, the form of local 
government in the reserves and the possibilities for transforming the communal system of 
landholding in these areas.
Chiefs cannot be separated from tribes and tribalism. After all, it does not make much sense 
to speak about chiefs outside of a tribal constituency. The recognition of chiefs is therefore 
an implicit approbation of tribalism (Hendricks, 1992). Pandering to the political appeal of 
separate tribal or ethnic identities in order to muster as much rural support as possible for 
an oncoming election is, in my view, misguided. The advantage, if at all there is any in this 
strategy, will be short-lived as the long term implications of chiefly support are essentially 
inimical to democracy.
The chieftaincy and the distorted version of communal tenure under conditions of confined 
reserves persist even in the wake of the absolute decline in the productive capacity of the pre­
existing African society, its thorough dissolution and absorption by capitalism. Indeed, the 
chieftaincy as well as the system of communal tenure have been expediently moulded so that 
they have become an intrinsic part of the wider capitalist system in the country. Thus, the 
process of proletarianisation has assumed a particular form, shaped by apartheid policy and 
it has not been retarded, inhibited or prevented.74 No doubt, some agricultural production 
is undertaken by African smallholders in the reserves and in ‘black spots’. However, 
commodity production, the commoditisation of labour power and the accumulation of capital 
through expanded reproduction are both general and determinant in the country (Cliffe, 
1987:631). As Banaji (1977:34) argues:
Subsistence production now figures, under this system, as a specific form of 
reproduction of labour-power within a capitalist process of production. It becomes 
misleading therefore to regard it as a specific, separate mode of production...in a 
system of modes of production dominated by capitalism.
It is indisputable that the vast majority of the rural black population is heavily dependent 
upon wage labour for its survival. The fruits bome of independent agricultural production 
cannot hope to meet the barest requirements for subsistence even if a significant proportion 
of the people retains a semblance of access to land. The returns to an enormous amount of 
backbreaking work on the small arable allotments are so minimal that about half the people 
with access to these plots simply do not bother to cultivate anything. In addition, the 
residential (the so-called homestead or kraalsites) sites in the reserves are, in essence, rural 
slums and tljjis indistinguishable from urban townships (Bundy, 1992:5).
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APARTHEID AND CAPITALISM IN THE COUNTRYSIDE:
Uneven Development and Problems of the Rural Proletariat
The Glen Grey Act of 189975, The Native’s Land Act of 1913 and the Native’s Trust and 
Land Act of 193676 were the three pieces of segregationist legislation principally responsible 
for the creation of reserve territories for exclusive African occupation. Outside of these 
reserves, Africans were prevented from acquiring land until the passage of the Abolition of 
Racially Based Measures Act in 1991. State intervention in the shape of these laws produced 
two agricultures in South Africa, one White and one Black (Weiner and Levin, 1991:93). 
While Africans were systematically dispossessed of their land and confined to small reserves; 
their competitiveness, annihilated; their communal system of land tenure, undermined; their 
autonomy, smothered; as they drifted into debt and were compelled into wage labour: Whites 
were able, especially after the Anglo-Boer War, to commercialise their agriculture through; 
easy access to land, subsidies, grants, transport concessions, favourable credit facilities, tax 
relief, the availability of African labourers and a host of direct measures of state assistance 
(Bundy, 1979:116).
This uneven development in South Africa has left an indelible imprint on the nature of rural 
social relations, one that is certainly not overcome by the repeal of the land acts, as Lewis 
Nkosi (1992:18) notes:
Even after the abolition of the laws of dispossession, the white minority is not
inclined to give up control over the land they hold.
Currently, there are about 67 000 white commercial farmers in South Africa (SAIRR, Survey 
1992/93:401). Together, these farmers produce about 90% of gross farm income. Agriculture 
as a whole, however contributes only 4,7% to the gross domestic product and provides only 
9,6% of the labour force with employment on 85.7 million hectares, or 80% of the non­
homeland area, of designated white farmland. (SAIRR, Survey 1992/93:396; Weiner and 
Levin, 1991:94)77. The rural population on these white farms is about 4,2 million while 
between 9 and 12 million people live in the reserves. Thus, the per capita availability of 
arable land is 3.7 hectares for the white areas and 0.2 hectares for the homelands (SAIRR, 
Survey 1992/93:382). These averages tend to hide the differentiation and uneven development 
within the white commercial sector. About twenty thousand or one third of all white farmers 
produce 75 % of total agricultural income and 6% of these farmers produce 40% of total farm 
income. (Cooper, 1988 cited in Weiner and Levin, 1991:94: de Klerk 1990:181) A tiny 
minority within this small group of white farmers (they make up only 0.17% of South 
Africa’s population) dominates and controls the agricultural sector in South Africa, with 
strong ownership links in other sectors of industry (Marcus, 1991:26).
The concentration of landholdings amongst white farmers is directly linked to the question 
of the economic viability of the farms. Apartheid governments have heavily subsidised this 
sector in an attempt to maintain white farmers on the land while removing blacks. The 
collective effect of this assistance is that a substantial proportion of the white farmers are 
totally dependant upon it for their survival. In fact it is estimated that only two thirds of the 
white farmers could be regarded as farming on viable units and that 40% of them would be
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forced into liquidation if state assistance was suddenly withdrawn (SAIRR, Survey 
1992/93:401; Weiner and Levin, 1991:9s)7*.
The continuing drought, the worsening terms of trade and the state’s macro economic policies 
are, according de Klerk (1991:208-217), the immediate causes of the accumulation crisis in 
South African agriculture. Possibly the most visible symptom of this crisis is the inordinately 
heavy debt burden of R16 billion. It is expected that agriculture’s contribution to the gross 
domestic product will continue to decrease and the capacity for employment creation in 
farming is due to decline absolutely, not only because of the drought (de Klerk, 1991:222- 
223).
The fact of the matter is that all is not well in white agriculture. It is precisely this parlous 
state of agriculture: the debt of the farmers, their dependence upon the state, their reliance 
upon cheap labour, their ideological backwardness, their low profitability and the limited 
monopoly control over agriculture which dictates the resistance of the white farmers to the 
extension of post-Wiehahn labour legislation to agriculture (Krickler, 1987:100-104). From 
May day this year however, farmers were supposed to implement the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act (BCEA) on their farms. In sum the, the act contains the following 
provisions: a 52 hour week, fourteen days’ annual leave, thirty-six days’ sick leave over a 
three year period, regular inspections and regulated Sunday work. The act does not provide 
for the right to strike or to organise nor does it encompass a minimum wage for farm 
workers Haffajee, 1993:14).
The independent union movement is particularly weak in agriculture. Only 0,03% or 41 000 
out of a total of 1,3 million farm workers, excluding the estimated 1,8 million seasonal 
workers, are organised into trade unions. The majority of these workers, 26 000 are 
members of the Food and Allied Workers Union (FAWU), an affiliate of COSATU 
(Madlala, 1992:18). There is much, much room for improvement in the organisation of rural 
proletarians on commercial white farms. Yet, this sector is notoriously difficult to organise. 
The dispersion of the workers, the inaccessibility of the farms to the unionists, the practice 
of seasonal labour, child labour, the tot system79, the extreme poverty of the workers, their 
low level of education, their lack of legislative protection against retrenchments, their utter 
vulnerability since their place of work is simultaneously their place of abode (loss of work 
thus implies immediate homelessness) together make it difficult to advance the interests of 
the farm workers. Notwithstanding the obstacles, there is clearly an urgent necessity for 
organising these workers, for training them in trade union skills and ensuring that they may 
be capable of defending themselves. Without this organisation it will be impossible to 
implement even the minimum conditions of employment set out in the BCEA. The president 
of the Transvaal Agricultural Union, Dries Bruwer, makes it very clear that his constituency 
will defy the new act: "Farmers have no choice but to disobey the law when a disloyal 
government wants to force it on them." (Haffajee, 1993:14; Taljaard, 1993:2) COSATU 
simply has not committed the resources necessary for the urgent task of organising the rural 
workers and challenging the likes of Bruwer. There is much discussion about the formation 
of a separate Farm Workers Union within COSATU. But, in the absence of the 
infrastructure, administrative and technical competence and proper structures, this idea will 
not see the light of day (Bosch, 1991:60).
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THE POLITICS OF RURAL OPTIONS
The agrarian question was the peasant question. The fact of a differentiated and 
differentiating peasantry was crucial. It looms large in Kautsky. It lie$ at the very 
heart of Lenin’s treatment (Byres, 1991:10).
If indeed, the agrarian question is synonymous with the peasant question then the crucial 
question concerns the empirical weight of the peasantry in the country. In this regard, it has 
been argued that the extent of proletarianisation in South Africa has been exaggerated. 
Instead, African attachment to the land is widespread and so are claims that the land belongs 
to them which goes together with a solid commitment to agriculture as a means of 
reproducing families (Claasens, 1991:58; Budlender and Latsky, 1991:126). As evidence, 
they point to the battles on ‘black spots’, the legalisation of labour tenancy and the demand 
for land in the reserves (Weiner and Levin, 1991:112). Invariably, the political hope inherent 
in these arguments is that small-scale African agriculture will mushroom all over the country 
if the land is made available. This peasant option or the re-peasantisation of the population 
needs to be treated with caution. The evidence of black commitment to farming, detailed as 
it may be for particular communities in ‘black spots’, is flimsy in relation to rural South 
Africa as a whole and it amounts to a little more than rural romanticism.
Despite all the legislative impediments and resource restrictions placed in the way of black 
commercialisation of agriculture, there are currently 1 700 black commercial farmers in the 
country (SAIRR, Survey 1992/93:402). Proponents of market-based options for a resolution 
to the crisis in South Africa point to this increasing African occupation of ‘white land’ in a 
variety of forms, the growth of small-scale farming, possibilities for the extension of tenancy 
arrangements, a greater access to capital by blacks. The question remains, can these 1 700 
African farmers, about whom very little is known, make a real difference to the political 
economy of the country? Is peasantisation of the rural poor a viable means for eliminating 
poverty?
Yet again, the vital question concerns African access to land. To explore the possibilities for 
African access to land it is imperative to focus on the policies of the different organisations 
in the country.
The evolution of the ANC position on land can be traced through three of the important 
policy documents of the organisation, the freedom charter of 1955, the constitutional 
guidelines of 1988 and the policy guidelines of 1992.
The land clause in the Freedom Charter reads as follows:
The land shall be shared by those who work it. Restrictions of land ownership on a 
racial basis shall be ended, and all the land redivided among those who work it, to 
banish famine and land hunger. The state shall help the peasants with implements, 
seeds, tractors and dams to save the soil and assist the tillers. Freedom of movement 
shall be guaranteed to all who work on the land. All shall have the right to occupy 
land wherever they choose. People shall not be robbed of their cattle, and forced 
labour and farm prisons shall be abolished.
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In 1988, the Constitutional Guidelines were adopted ostensibly as means through which the 
principles of the Freedom Charter could be put into effect in the country. However, while 
the clause on land in the Freedom Charter allowed for the possibility for a socialist 
reorganisation of land, no such possibility is mentioned in the Constitutional Guidelines. The 
relevant statement in this regard instead asserts:
The state shall devise and implement a Land Reform Programme that will include and 
address the following issues:
Abolition of all racial restrictions on ownership and use of land.
Implementation of land reforms in conformity with the principle of affirmative action, 
taking into account the status of victims of forced removals.
Last year, at the National Conference of the ANC, policy guidelines were adopted which 
included a new policy on land and agriculture. It calls for a redistribution of the following 
categories of land; vacant, unused and underutilised state land, land held for speculation, land 
which is being degraded and hopelessly indebted land (ANC Policy Guidelines, 1992:17).
The stated policy of the ANC is thus to uphold existing property relations, to compensate for 
land that is expropriated and to set up judicial procedures for land claims. The shift from the 
implied nationalisation of land in the Freedom Charter to the recognition of the legitimate 
rights of the present land holders in effect means that the unequal division of land will only 
be tinkered with but not fundamentally transformed at all. As Bundy (1992:8) asserts that 
there is:
...a gap between the language of these intendons (of the land policy) and the 
mechanisms specified for achieving them...the gap between the rhetorical intentions 
of the ANC's land policy and the means towards realising those intentions.
Affirmative action and a land claims court are simply inadequate as methods to rid the rural 
poor of their misery. By recognising existing property relations on the land, the ANC 
effectively spikes its own stated policy of providing access to land. It cannot provide this 
access and protect the existing property holders. The two intentions are necessarily 
contradictory. Another major problem, according to Bernstein (1992:14), is the success of 
the apartheid regime in dominating the constitutional negotiations by restricting what is 
achievable to the balance of forces in the negotiations. In this manner, the demands of the 
popular forces may be delimited to what is acceptable to the regime. According to Bundy 
(1992:7) this is already happening in practice:
...one can identify an emerging area of consensus over land issues between De 
Klerk’s government and the ANC. Both parties accept that access to land should be 
open to all, regardless of race; that future policy will involve the need to settle and 
to assist a layer of small black farmers; and that different forms of tenure, not just 
individual private property, will have to be protected in law.
At the Ruth First Memorial Colloquium at UWC last year, Laurence Harris (1992:1) made 
the point, in agreement with Bernstein, that, "...the legalisation of the ANC and SACP 
...(has beenj^followed by self-censorship discouraging arguments for nationalisation lest they 
discomfort big business."
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The PAC also adopted a new policy on land at its economic seminar in Durban last year. The 
PAC would make use of state-owned land for redistribution and the organisation recognises 
that nationalisation of privately-owned land would require equitable compensation (Sole, 
1992:3).®°
For its part the National Party government as well as monopoly capital reject affirmative 
action in relation to land. Instead they supposedly advance a free market policy of promoting 
individual agricultural enterprise (Marcus, 1991:30).
It seems to me that the legislative proposals of the major parties in the negotiation process 
as well as existing evidence of African peasant production, do not provide for the peasant 
option in any real or radical sense. By guaranteeing the rights of existing property holders 
in their land, the possibilities for genuine land reform that opens up access in a fundamental 
way are slim. The hope of African re-peasantisation is, consequently, facile.
We are dealing with an extremely complicated situation where even the minimalist reforms 
of the BCEA are rejected by the organised white farmers, bearing distinctive fascist 
tendencies. Their argument is that the legislation will destroy the, "...special relationship 
between farmers and workers" and, in any case, it does not make much sense for a, 
"...biological process to be the subject of legislation."(Haffajee, 1993:14) The total number 
of farm labourers, ie permanent and seasonal workers, in the country is about three million. 
If we compare this concrete reality with the dubious 1 700 African farmers then it is clear 
that the emphasis of organisation and struggle should be with the rural workers. Put 
differently, can 1 700 African farmers constitute a peasant question and therefore an agrarian 
question in the country? Given the compromises that are inevitable in the negotiation 
process, very little land will be made available for land reform. The process will necessarily 
be limited by its own weak social basis and the recalcitrant white farmers whose right to land 
both the PAC and ANC are prepared to safeguard.
It is quite clear that the negotiation process is not going to lead to a dismantling of the white 
monopoly ownership of land on highly capitalised farms. There may be some resettlement 
of Africans on unutilised land. But the experience of Zimbabwe where this was attempted 
should teach us the lesson to avoid it. The land is not utilised for very good reasons. In most 
cases it is poor land and the state then needs to commit an inordinate proportion of its 
resources in order to make this land productive. Thus, within the framework of the capitalist 
system, which inherently separates the owners of the means of production, in this case, the 
land, from the workers, the possibilities for a resolution to the problems of poverty in the 
rural areas are slim.
The overwhelming majority of our rural population are proletarians who are rotten ripe for 
organisation. If there has been neglect then this is precisely where it lies. Our rural 
proletarians have simply not been organised along the same lines as the urban working class. 
This is undoubtedly the first step towards a solution to the abysmal conditions of the rural 
poor. The essential question thus is proletarian through and through. There is nothing 
agrarian about mobilising the rural proletariat around the issues of wages and working 
conditions on capitalist farms owned by whites. The question of the displaced proletariat in
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the reserves is obviously quite different to that of rural workers on the ‘platteland'. But with 
the repeal of influx control regulations masses of these workers are becoming permanently 
urbanised, albeit in squatter camps on the periphery of the cities. Those that remain in the 
reserves will continue to be subjected to the distorted version of the communal tenure system 
under chiefs who may now parade as legitimate traditional leaders.
Lewis Nkosi (1992:18) speaking at the New Nation Writers’ Conference introduced a sour 
note to the discussion by making the forcefully simple point that nothing has changed very 
much. By examining the possibilities for change in rural social relations I am left with the 
same sour note. The type of settlement proposed is not going to change things fundamentally 
for the vast majority of the people.
K now ing R uth's uncom prom ising princip les 1 think that today she would say  it  is  tim e
to p u t socia lism  back on the agenda in South Africa (Harris, 1992:1).
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THE LIMITS OF CAPITALIST REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
THE OPPRESSION OF WOMEN1
Debbie Budlender
INTRODUCTION
A colleague was recently asked, together with several other leading political and economic 
thinkers, to speak at a forum on “economic democracy". The forum was organised by a 
German funding agency. My colleague’s task was to speak about women and economic 
democracy. Most of us would like to be considered democrats. Nevertheless, the subject of 
the talk had us confused. "Economic democracy" seems even more open to widely differing 
interpretations than the adjective-less version of the abstract noun. One interpretation would 
be that at this forum economic democracy was a synonym for capitalism. Another, more 
nuanced, interpretation is that it is the particular type of (capitalist) institutional structure of 
Germany (or what was previously West Germany).
The organisers of this UWC series of talks have suggested that, just as we are all in favour 
of democracy, "all participants in the negotiation process are agreed that one fundamental 
characteristic of the social order must be preserved: the new South Africa is to be a capitalist 
society..." (Outline of proposed seminar series). My brief was to look at how far such a 
society could go towards reaching the other much-vaunted goal - that of non-sexism.
DDEMOCRACY AND VOTES
In a democratic political system the people (demos?) have power through their votes. Ideally 
these are distributed equally among all adult citizens. In a capitalist/democratic economy 
people have power through economic votes. These come in the form of rands, mark, pounds, 
yen, dollars or whatever. Every rand is more or less equal to every other rand. (The equality 
or equivalence between the various currencies is somewhat less democratic.) But economic 
votes, or rands, are not at all equally distributed between the people.
I will no doubt be taken to task (a) for simplifying the economic system in this way, and (b) 
for concentrating on distribution rather than production, or ownership of the means thereof. 
But I would argue that a too exclusive focus on production has done women a disservice. It 
is the distribution level which most strikes the woman or man in the street, impoverished 
rural area, factory or home. It is the inability or acquire adequate goods and services that is 
the most immediately felt aspect of poverty. And a focus on this level throws up clearly some 
of the reasons why women generally have less economic and other power under economic 
democracy.
1 Some q£ the ideas in this paper come out of discussions with Adrienne Bird.
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I am not going to bore or bamboozle you with a load of statistics. The figures are there, in 
South Africa and all other capitalist countries, to back up the blunt statements I will now 
make: x
* Women predominate in the lowest-paid jobs
» Women predominate in the lowest-paying sectors
* Women do many jobs for no pay at all
* Women with equal qualifications receive lower remuneration than men
* Women are less likely to receive training than men
* und so weiter...
Thus, according to an oft-quoted United Nations statistic, women worldwide, in a world 
economy dominated and shaped by capitalism, perform two-thirds of the world’s work, 
receive one-tenth of the world’s income, and own one-hundredth of the world’s property. 
(Quoted in Bazilli, p. 17)
PRODUCTION AND REPRODUCTION
The "facts" above raise several issues. Perhaps the most fundamental is the distinction 
between the private and public spheres, coinciding in large part with that between 
reproduction and production, and also with that between predominantly unpaid and 
underpaid, rather than paid, labour. This distinction is present under other economic systems, 
but is particularly prominent under capitalism.
Under capitalism production and reproduction occur to a large part in different places. 
Production occurs in the factories and on the farms. Reproduction in the (private) homes, in 
the family, in the community. Production is visible and valued, and its performance rewarded 
with economic votes. Reproduction is largely invisible, undervalued in a variety of 
ideological and other ways, and almost completely unvalued (i.e. unpaid) in terms of 
economic votes.
This has obvious and serious repercussions for the many women who perform all the 
domestic and other reproductive tasks, yet are reliant on those who own or earn the rands 
to buy the vital necessities unobtainable without these rands in today’s society. It also spills 
over onto many women who (also) engage in the public sphere. Women are employed in jobs 
- as cleaners, tea-makers, teachers, nurses - which reflect the reproductive work they do in 
the home. Women are employed in sectors - garment, food, services - which reflect tasks 
undertaken in the domestic sphere. Even women employed in unstereotypical jobs and sectors 
usually also do a fair amount of reproductive work back home. In the private sphere the jobs 
and tasks are unpaid. In the public economy they are undervalued and underpaid.
One way to address this type of problem is through legislation. Many countries have variants 
of equal pay acts. In 1981 South Africa’s Wage and Industrial Conciliation Acts (now Labour
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Relations) outlawed different minimum wages for men and women doing the same job. The 
National Party’s latest proposals have further clauses aimed at eliminating obvious 
discrimination.
Recent statistics from the United States, the centre of capitalism and the home of many 
militant feminists, bear testimony to the shortcomings of this type of legislation. The Equal 
Pay Act was introduced in the US in 1963. Employers were forbidden to discriminate in the 
wages paid to men and women doing essentially the same job. The law was later refined and 
the National Committee on Pay Equity was established “to help workers win pay based on 
the skill, effort, responsibility, and working conditions of the job - not on the race or sex of 
the person doing it." Yet, "after 30 years of litigation, legislation, and agitation, a black man 
in America takes home only 73 percent of a white male’s wage; a white women, only 69 
percent; a black women, 62 percent; a Latino women, 54 percent; and a Latino man, 65 
percent." (Public Employee, January 1993, p28)
Legislation can ameliorate the condition of individual women, and even groups of women, 
and provide some protection. The move from calls for equal pay for equal work to that of 
equal pay for work of equal value was an improvement. But the problem of value has not 
been adequately addressed. Nowhere have women been able to find a form of legislation 
which removes the patterns seen above. None of the legislation addresses the underlying 
social patterns and assumptions.
DISTRIBUTION
I noted above that "economic democracy" could refer to a specific type of capitalism, that 
of Western Germany. This conception acknowledges the presence of groups, in particular 
groups involved in production. Many official bodies have representation from what are seen 
as the two main parties - the employers and the workers. Workers have won significant 
advances under this system. But, again, women’s position and roles are not adequately 
addressed.
In tandem with their role in reproduction, most women are involved in distribution. It is 
women who are most involved with the bearing, rearing and caring of children and adults. 
It is women who have to find the wherewithal to do these tasks. It is women in their role as 
consumers who have to make ends meet. It is women in the home and community who have 
to deal with housing, water, fuel and the other mundane but essential matters on a day to day 
basis. Again, most of these jobs are unpaid. They are invisible, taken for granted. And the 
groupings and roles are not included in the German conception of economic democracy.
UNPAID LABOUR AND VALUE
Until the question of unpaid labour is addressed and its value acknowledged, there will not 
be an end to'Women’s oppression, whatever the economic system. Value is an unsolved, but
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central problem, in Marxist economics. There is the distinction between exchange and use 
value. There is the conversion between one and the other. There is the problem of 
productivity, which means that goods incorporating the same use value incorporates vastly 
different amounts of labour time. In the absence of other measures, monetary value, or 
exchange value, is used as the measure. And we get to the problem of work for which no 
money is paid.
There have been some moves to place a value on unpaid labour. Estimates in various 
countries suggest that adding in the value of unpaid work would increase the GDP of these 
countries by amounts of 30% and more. In its economic policy of last year the ANC agreed 
that it would work towards the incorporate of unpaid labour in a set of supplementary 
national accounts.
Demanding recognition of unpaid labour is not a matter of demanding wages for housework. 
It is a demand that the value which women bring to the economy and society be 
acknowledged and rewarded and taken into account in framing policy. Sam Bowles analyses 
the economy in terms of the three goals of efficiency, fairness or equity and democracy. 
Efficiency is the production of the greatest value using the least resources. Fairness is fair 
distribution of both the burdens (i.e. the labour) and the benefits (i.e. the use of the good and 
services produced). Democracy is seen in terms of participation in the government of the 
country.
What would this mean for unpaid labour?
Efficiency would mean that everything possible is done to aid production and increase 
productivity in the unpaid sector. For example, it would mean ensuring water and fuel 
supplies in rural areas so that women no longer need to spend such long hours fetching fuel 
and water, cooking and washing. It would mean providing production aids such as fertiliser 
and transport to enable more efficient production and marketing.
Fairness would mean distributing the burden of unpaid work more equally between people 
(and between men and women). It would mean ensuring that unpaid work is rewarded in 
proportion to the benefit society gains from it. For example, this would mean maternity and 
other social benefits would take account of women’s work in the home. It would mean that 
social services are not cut without some payment to the women who have to cope with the 
shortfall by themselves caring for the sick, the elderly, the children. It would mean more 
equal sharing of household tasks by men and women.
Democracy would mean not only full participation by all in the government of the society. 
It would extend to democracy on a smaller scale - in the workplace and in the home and 
family.
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THE ADAPTABILITY OF CAPITALISM
Capitalism has impressive adaptive abilities. In South Africa we have seen this in racial 
terms. In the late sixties and early seventies the revisionists put forward their theory on the 
relation between the polity and economy, developed in opposition to the prevailing liberal 
theory. The revisionists pointed out that the retention of the bantustans, with a distorted pre­
capitalist mode of production, aided capitalism by cutting the costs of the reproduction of 
labour. Crudely, children were bom and reared in the bantustans at a lowered cost and older 
ex-workers lucky enough to live that long were sent back to the bantustans to die. The money 
wage on the mines and in the factories did not have to cover the full costs of a family. Influx 
control has ended. But South African capitalism has survived. (I have not yet heard anyone 
argue that the weakened state of the post-influx control economy is a result of the "end of 
apartheid").
The bantustans are largely people by women. And there are analogies between the role 
played by the bantustans and that played by the family. Like the bantustans, women lower 
the costs of reproduction of labour by performing unpaid but necessary work. Like the 
bantustans, women fall in to provide goods and services not provided by the social wage. 
Where there are limited pensions and other provisions for the aged, limited child-care, 
limited and/or expensive health care, limited education, it is women who provide these, 
usually unpaid. Again at a crude level, this free or cheap provision of goods and services is 
a saving to capitalists. If these services were provided by the state, it would mean an increase 
in taxes. If these services were provided on the market, it would mean an increase in the 
wage so that the worker and family could afford them.
But the lack of a social wage - of child care, health care, etc - also limits women’s freedom, 
choice and ability to compete. She bears a double, triple or whatever load. In terms of time 
alone she does an impossible juggling act. If a child is ill, it is the woman who needs to take 
time off. She is then judged a less reliable worker, one less worth training and one deserving 
of lower status and a lesser job. The unwillingness of the state to provide social services thus 
impacts on women’s economic position.
In other countries capitalism has used the differences between men and women in another 
way. In the Export-Processing Zones of many countries, employment is almost entirely 
female. This occurs even where there is an exceptionally high level of unemployment among 
the men. It is chiefly the exceptionally young women who are employed. Part of the reason 
is the type of production - often garment or other sectors stereotyped as women’s spheres. 
Probably more important is that by employing such young, and unmarried women, employers 
are, as with South Africa’s migrant labourers, supporting only a single person rather than a 
family. Here one could argue that it is men who are losing out. But they too are losing 
because of the lack of explicit acknowledgment of the importance of unpaid and reproductive 
labour.
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THE PRESENT SOUTH AFRICAN CONJUNCTURE1
Some analysts argue that women are part of the reserve army of labour. Women add to the 
pool of available labour. They increase the supply of labour and so, in pure'-supply and 
demand terms, lower the wage of those who are employed. Added to this is the (totally 
incorrect) assumption that the norm is a household consisting of man, wife and two and a bit 
children. Because men are seen as the primary bread-winners in this set-up, they will usually 
be employed before women. Women will therefore be even more vulnerable to fluctuations 
in employment and periods of recession.
In South Africa of 1993 we have an exceptionally high rate of unemployment and little 
prospect of improvement. If the reserve army analysis is correct, the outlook for women is 
poor: "the time is not ripe". If one wanted to be really cynical, one could see the Nationalist 
Party proposals not only as an election ploy, but also as a response to the one area - skilled 
workers - who are both their most likely supporters and in which labour shortages may exist.
In this situation women could have difficulty securing even the limited types of equality 
gained in other capitalist countries. On the other hand, employers could choose to employ 
women rather than men because of their perceived cheapness, or use the presence of women 
to equalise wages, but at the lower, female, level.
CONCLUSION
The likelihood of ending the oppression of women in a capitalist South Africa are slight. The 
form of the oppression of women may change, just as the form of capitalism has changed and 
will change over time. As Phumzile Ngcuka said at a conference some time last year, what 
women need is money and power. I argue here that women will only get this money and 
power when the value of all the work they do is acknowledged. They need power to ensure 
that this value is acknowledged at the level of public policy as well as in the home. This will 
mean the inclusion of domestic workers under labour legislation. It will mean the upgrading 
the value of nurses’ salaries relative to those of engineers. It will mean including those 
involved in subsistence agriculture among those listed as "economically active" in the labour 
statistics. It will mean ensuring that unpaid work reaps benefits in money or the equivalent 
in goods and services. In the present economic system women need money, because money 
buys power. In another economic system they may no longer need money in the same way, 
but, if they want equality, they will still need the power to ensure that all their work is 
valued.
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NOTES
1. For classical Marxist crisis theory applied to the world economy since the early 1970s see 
Clarke, S. (1988), Keynesianism, Monetarism and the Crisis of the State, Aldershot: Elgar, 
pp.279-360; Harvey, D. (1989), The Condition of Post-Modernity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
pp. 180-197; Mandel, E. (1989), "Theories of crisis: An explanation of the 1974-82 cycle," 
in M. Gottdiener and N. Komninos (Eds), C apitalist D evelopm ent and C risis Theory: 
A ccum ulation, Regulation and Spatia l Restructuring, London: Macmillan, pp.30-58; 
Armstrong, K., A. Glyn and J. Harrison (1991), Capitalism Since 1945, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, pp. 169-260.
2. Definitions are often crucial to the way a question is posed and hence the answers that are 
supplied. One way to think about "crisis," especially the current South African capitalist 
crisis, is as a "turning point." "The popular connotation associated with ‘crisis’," according 
to Stephen Gelb (South Africa’s leading radical economist), "is an idea of collapse or 
breakdown. But the original, more useful, meaning of the term is ‘turning point.’ In this 
sense a crisis of capitalism implies that the system cannot continue to develop along the same 
path as before — it must ‘adapt or die,’ as P.W. Botha eloquently expressed it more than a 
decade ago."
However, Gelb is only partly right about the origins of the word. When Hippocrates 
originally used the term in this way — possibly its first recorded use, in ancient Greece — 
it was in referring to diseases, and there the "turning point" was a point at which either death 
or recovery was the result. In other words, the possibility of a "collapse or breakdown," in 
addition to a new round of growth, was indeed there from the beginning.
Is the idea of "turning point" appropriate to a radical understanding of capitalist 
crisis? Not particularly. Such crises are "violent eruptions," in Marx’s words, "forcible 
solutions of the existing contradictions which for a time restore the disturbed equilibrium." 
The term crisis is best invoked, then, when problems arising logically from within a system, 
cannot be resolved according to  the norm al operation o f  that system; in other words, some 
form of extraordinary intervention is required. That intervention, as explained below, is 
"devaluation of capital." It is this which provides the "forcible solution" to capitalism’s 
troubles and allows a new round of growth to begin. The task ahead is to understand how 
the South African economy has already begun devaluation — while it has attempted to 
withstand the worst effects, by expansion of the credit system — and is now preparing for 
more devaluation.
3. Andre Gunder Frank offered one of the more radical versions, which in turn was critiqued 
— by Laclau, for example — as not being sufficiently true to Marxist thought. A useful 
review of dependency theory in the context of Marxist economic analysis is Brewer, A. 
(1980), M arxist Theories o f  Im perialism : A C ritical Survey, London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul. A contrary line of work, much more amenable to classical Marxist crisis theory (since 
it concerns itself more with articulations between "Departments of Production"), is de 
Janvry, A. (1982), The A grarian Question and Reformism in Latin A m erica , Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press.
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4. An example, in the spirit of Frank, is Martin’s thesis concerning South Africa in the 
1930s:
Having broken the power of mining capital and free trade, the state laid the 
foundations for industrialization, a corporative institutionalization of tyhite 
labour movement, and a more assertive — and momentarily autonomous — 
state. Interwar advancement would have been impossible without each of 
these ruptures. None of these features are encompassed, much less explained, 
within the restricted ambit of either black-white conflict or even national 
boundaries. Indeed, the resolution of the crisis of the primary-producing, 
free-trade regime was only possible by shifting the country’s position in core- 
peripheral networks and the interstate system. This endeavour was, 
nevertheless, movement down an uncharted path. It depended to a very great 
degree upon world conditions of hegemonic crisis and great depression. 
(Martin, W.G. [1990], "From NIC to NUC: South Africa’s semiperipheral 
regimes," in idem , [Ed], Sem iperipheral States in the W orld-Econom y, New 
York: Greenwood Press, p.213.)
Simply stated, as South Africa delinked from the world economy from roughly 1933 
to 1945, its secondary manufacturing industry (ie, beyond mining equipment) burgeoned. 
Moreover, the rate of growth of the black wage share rose more than 50% during this period 
(from 11% to 17% — the black share had reached only 21% by 1970). And the overall 
GDP growth rate (8%) was the fastest recorded in modem times. (Nattrass, J. [1981], The 
South African E conom y, Cape Town: Oxford University Press.) This rough evidence 
supports the general dependency position. Furthermore, as noted below, it was the 
subsequent post-war reintegration of South Africa into the world economy which fostered the 
crisis conditions that are so overwhelming today: a near-exhausted raw materials export 
sector, an overproductive and overprotected luxury goods sector, an inadequate capital goods 
sector, and a hopelessly under-resourced basic needs sector. As in many countries, import- 
substitution industrialisation was geared to the desires of the local bourgeoisie.
5. See, e.g., O’Dowd, M. (1978), "The stages of economic growth and the future of South 
Africa," in L. Schlemmer and E. Webster (Eds), Change, Reform and E conom ic G row th in 
South A frica, Johannesburg: Ravan.
6. Ovendon, K. and T. Cole (1989), Apartheid and International Finance, London: Penguin. 
It is interesting to note that it was Simon Clarke, the classical Marxist crisis theorist, who 
first rigorously formulated this strategy in the late 1970s.
7. SACP (1989), The Path to  Pow er, London. The following extract is a useful summary:
The South African capitalist state did not emerge as a result of an internal 
popular anti-feudal revolution. It was imposed from above and from without.
From its birth through to the present, South African capitalism has depended 
heavily on the imperialist centres. Capital from Europe financed the opening 
of the mines. It was the colonial state that provided the resources to build the 
basic infrastructure — railways, roads, harbours, posts and telegraphs. It was 
an imperial army of occupation that created the conditions for political 
unification. And it was within a colonial setting that the em erging South 
A frican ca p ita lis t c lass entrenched and extended the racially exclusive system  
to  increase its  opportunities f o r  profit. The racia l division o f  labour, the
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battery o f  racist law s an d  p o litica l exclusiveness guaranteed this. From these 
origins a pattern of domination, which arose in the period of external 
colonialism, was carried over into the newly-formed Union of South Africa.
From its origins to the present, this form of domination has been maintained 
under changing conditions and by varying mechanisms. In all essential 
respects, however, the colonial status of the black majority has remained in 
place. Therefore we characterise our society as colonialism of a special type, 
(emphasis added)
From this analysis, it is not hard for the SACP to defend a vision of a revolution first 
of national liberation from internal colonialism, followed by the socialist struggle against 
capitalism. The SACP’s Joe Slovo has also suggested that the there is no "Chinese Wall" 
separating the stages, and that "dominant ingredients of later stages must already have begun 
to mature within the womb of the earlier stage."
8. Perhaps the most vituperative analysis can be found in Callinicos, A. (1988), South A frica: 
Between Reform and Revolution, London: Bookmarks.
9. See Wolpe, H. (1972), "Capitalism and cheap labour power,” Econom y and S ociety , #1; 
and Wolpe, H. (Ed)(1980), The A rticu lations o f  M odes o f  Production, London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul. Some of the best evidence for the articulations thesis came from the 
Chamber of Mines, which in official testimony to a government commission in 1944, 
admitted that a subsidy drawn from pre-capitalist society was crucial to the maintenance their 
profits:
The ability of the mines to maintain their native labour force by means of 
tribal natives from the reserves at rates of pay which are adequate for this 
migratory class of native, but inadequate in practice for the detribalized urban 
native, is a fundamental factor of the economy of the gold mining industry.
From this foundation, Wolpe went on to argue that as capitalism increasingly 
dominated pre-capitalist society, employers necessarily exploited the cheap labour pool ever 
more thoroughly. Although more and more workers began living permanently in cities near 
manufacturing jobs, there was still a large supply of migrant labour. That coincided with 
more and more families being pushed onto the reserves, which could simply not handle the 
environmental demands placed on them. From its inception in 1948, the apartheid state’s 
response, according to Wolpe, was to make the problems worse by dumping more and more 
"surplus people” into the bantustans and more strictly controlling the movement of workers 
and their families. From the standpoint of apartheid and capitalist managers, it was better 
that the families starve, rather than move to the workplace where the wage-earner would 
require — and demand and perhaps win — higher pay to support their women and children. 
In the face of political and economic protest in the 1940s and 1950s, Wolpe concluded, 
"Apartheid may be seen as the attempt of the capitalist state to maintain the system of cheap 
migrant-labour, by means of the erection of a ’perfected’ and ’modernised’ apparatus of 
political domination." Thus the fun ctionality  o f  apartheid to  capitalism  was thus a logical 
outcome of the post-war development of South African capitalism. After apartheid controls 
were applied and the problems got worse, Wolpe concluded that it was here — in the 
"articulation" between capitalism and pre-capitalism — that the dom inant contradiction  in 
South African society appeared. Moreover, the political implications of this argument were 
self-evident: the ANC, supported by the SACP, should struggle first for national liberation 
to overcome1" that contradiction. The second stage of the struggle would follow when
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capitalist relations were established and the end of the cheap labour subsidy would transfer 
the contradiction into South African capitalism directly.
Wolpe’s more recent Race, Class and the Apartheid State (1988, Paris: UNESCO) 
backtracks substantially from the earlier position that apartheid was necessary^io capitalist 
development; Wolpe now suggests that aspects of their mutual evolution were contingent.
10. The first, and perhaps most powerful critique (focusing on the tenuous link between the 
Bantustans and cheap labour), was Williams, M. (1975), "An analysis of South African 
capitalism: Neo-Ricardianism or Marxism?, Conference o f  Socia list E conom ists’ Bulletin, 
v.4, #1. Legassick’s work on the increasing capital intensity of manufacturing offered a 
much more fertile direction of inquiry; Legassick, M. (1974), "South Africa: Capital 
accumulation and violence," Economy and Society, It'S.
11. See, e.g., Davies, R. (1979), Capital, State and White Labour in South A frica, 1900- 
1960, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities; Davies, R. D. Kaplan, M. Morris and D. 
O’Meara (1976), "Class struggle and the periodization of the state in South Africa," R eview  
o f  African P olitica l Econom y, #7; Kaplan, D. (1976), "The politics of industrial protection 
in South Africa, 1910-1939," Journal o f  Southern African Studies.
From one account — Davies, R., D. O’Meara and S. Dlamini (1986), The Struggle  
f o r  South A frica, Volume I, London: Zed Press — the historical argument of the fractions 
of capital school can be summarised as follows. In 1910 the Union of South Africa was 
founded, and led by a South African Party representing an alliance of foreign-oriented mining 
capital and more prosperous capitalist agriculture, and also commercial capital and the 
incipient industrial bourgeoisie. The National Party/Labour Party "Pact" government 
followed in 1924, combining the interests of small white landowners, local capitalists 
(especially in manufacturing) and racist workers. Pact policies also supported agricultural 
capital. A decade later, in 1934, the United Party was a fusion of the National Party and 
South African Party, with mining interests increasingly favoured. Mining ties to industrial 
capital also strengthened at this stage, but agricultural capital eventually deserted the party 
to support the Herenigde Nasionale Party. The Labour Party and Dominion Party 
(representing large sugar farmers and petty bourgeoisie) joined a coalition government in 
1939. By 1948 a coalition of the Herenigde Nasionale Party and Afrikaner Party won the 
election on the broad support of capitalist agriculture, non-monopoly industrial and financial 
capital, the white petty bourgeoisie and white labour. Renamed the Nationalist Party in 
1951, it codified the existing set of measures of racial segregation known as apartheid. In 
the late 1970s Nationalist Party leaders became increasingly ambivalent about their social 
base in white rural and labour constituencies (who have largely moved to the Conservative 
Party), while instead supporting reform policies originally advanced by big capital’s 
Progressive Federal Party (now Democratic Party).
12. Criticism emerged from a variety of angles, most convincingly from Clarke, S. (1978), 
"Capital, fractions of capital and the state: ‘Neo-marxist’ analysis of the South African 
state," C apita l & C lass #5. It has subsequently become clear that there is a more appropriate 
means of utilising insights into fractions of capital: to gear these towards the circulation o f  
capita l, not merely institutional interests. Fractions represent the vehicles by which capital 
circulates through the various profit-making outlets that are open for investment, whether 
factories, mines, farms, retail shops, banks and other debt markets, the stock market, 
speculative real estate, etc. Thus it is far less important to theorise how fractions are
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organised and what methods they use to gain access to state power. These largely depend 
on a variety of circumstances particular to each setting. Instead, the focus becomes what 
kind of capital accumulation — landed, industrial, commercial, financial, etc. is most 
dynamic at particular periods. See, e.g., van der Pijl, K. (1984), The M aking o f  an A tlan tic  
Ruling Class, London: Verso.
13. This is a central point of the rebuttal to social history offered in Morris, M. (1988), 
"Social history and the transition to capitalism in the South African countryside," R eview  o f  
African P olitica l Econom y, #41.
14. A notable exception was an approach to understanding the social formation known as 
"racial capitalism," in Saul, J. and S. Gelb (1981, 1986), The Crisis in South A frica , New 
York: Monthly Review.
15. Gelb, S. (1987), "Making sense of the crisis," Transformation #5.
16. It is clear, of course, that capitalism does manage to generate fairly long periods of 
growth before its internal contradictions become overwhelming. Describing how capitalism 
could stabilise itself over a period of several decades was the task that the founder of 
regulation theory, Michel Aglietta, set for himself in his study of United States economic 
history, A Theory o f  C apita list R egulation  (1979, London: Verso). According to Aglietta, 
the seeds of the greatest stability and most stupendous growth capitalism has ever known — 
in the US from the late 1940s to the late 1960s — were actually sown from 1915-45. They 
could be found in automaker Henry Ford’s assembly lines and visions of mass consumption, 
in the growth of huge corporations, and in the power of the US government to provide 
limited social welfare handouts and to control financial markets. Subsequently, the post-war 
period of prosperity was based on the articulation of mass production and mass consumption 
organised at the commanding heights of US society. Success was based not merely on the 
fact that the US won World War II, but that the new system of growth had already begun 
developing within the decay of the old pre-war system, and simply needed the chance to 
blossom that was provided by the catharsis of the depression and war. The label for the 
stability that came of this articulation, in honour of a phrase coined by the Italian Marxist 
Antonio Gramsci, was "fordism." As a "regime of accumulation,” fordism coherently locked 
together certain forces that are necessary for capitalist accumulation. Fordism involved 
intensive kinds of production in which capital "deepened" (i.e., production became capital- 
intensive with high productivity). Prior to fordism there were various extensive regimes of 
accumulation which relied on the "widening" of capital (but with relatively unproductive, 
labour-intensive production) and on its geographic mobility and expansion (particularly 
through classic imperialism). With fordism, workers’ wage gains closely matched increases 
in their productivity. Productivity was related mainly to the amount of fresh new labour- 
saving machinery invested in the production process. In this manner workers tended to be 
paid according to how efficiently they produced, and they also consumed according to the 
same rhythm. Too, there was a fairly good balance between production of consumer goods 
and production of the machines that in turn could produce more consumer goods. Moreover, 
the coherence of the regime of accumulation ensured a match between the financing  of 
production to the financing of consumption. This was particularly important because more 
widespread use of credit gave the economy an extra degree of latitude such that problems that 
arose today cbuld be put off until tomorrow. Through an expansion of the credit system,
92
financiers could ensure that profits plus other forms of corporate finance like debt or new 
share issues were consistent with new investment in plant and equipment. And they ensured 
that wages and consumer credit roughly corresponded to the purchase of consumer goods. 
With the post-war boom, there was plenty of room for give and take, trial and error, so long 
as the basic assumptions are shared by most of society. To make sure those assumptions 
were adopted by the working class and that the general business environment was hospitable, 
there emerged under fordism a wide range of social and political institutions. Those that 
were most important to the US version — which then served to spread the fordist regime 
throughout the advanced capitalist world — were the Bretton Woods agreement (which 
stabilised the world financial system under the power of the US dollar); a social contract 
between big business, big government and big trade unions (which also involved the 
McCarthyite purge of communists); and a limited but real welfare state (which supported 
consumption). Radical analysts found regulation theory useful as a heuristic device, to help 
tie down divergent economic components into simple concepts. (The US version uses the 
phrase "social structure of accumulation," which in many respects can be considered a 
tangent of regulation theory.) The regulation school and its various offshoots now encompass 
a large proportion of the world’s radical political economists, and that alone was one reason 
for taking the approach seriously in South Africa. A useful review is Jessop, B. (1990), 
"Regulation theory: Retrospect and prospect," Econom y an d  Society , #19.
17. In "Making sense of the crisis" and his 1991 edited collection South A fr ica ’s  Econom ic  
C risis (Cape Town: David Philip), Gelb explained that expensive imported machinery was 
paid for by a relatively stable flow of foreign currency provided by mineral exports. 
Although political turmoil disturbed the economic boom in 1960, growth was relatively 
secure for at least two decades after apartheid was introduced, and this qualifies as the 
longest uninterrupted period of prosperity that the country’s entire white population had ever 
had. Even short-term business cycle downturns helped correct imbalances in the system, 
says Gelb, in a "reproductive" rather than destructive way. But white mass consumption 
only goes so far — an entire industrialised economy with South Africa’s aspirations could 
not build on so small a base. Because "the size of the internal market is the main barrier to 
this type of accumulation," ANC economists Maria Ramos and Fuad Cassim write, "the 
fordist model within a domestic economy must be described in terms of the conditions of its 
interaction with the world economy." South Africa’s location on the periphery of the world 
economy gives it certain peculiar characteristics, which Ramos and Cassim call "peripheral 
fordism" (unpublished paper presented to economic conference, Lausanne, 1989). Contrary 
to Gelb’s analysis of racial fordist regulation, the mass production-mass consumption link 
occurred betw een  the global and economy and South Africa, and not primarily within  South 
Africa, although at first, "peripheral fordism began by producing for a middle class both at 
home and abroad," Ramos and Cassim acknowledge. "To survive, the (international) fordist 
regime had to relocate to a country where high rates of exploitation existed," which explains 
the post-war manufacturing boom in places like South Africa and Brazil. "But though 
foreign capital has been crucial in underpinning South Africa’s growth, South Africa has 
been unable to penetrate the world manufacturing market, in particular against the 
competition of more skilled and better utilisation of labour elsewhere." Thus South Africa 
must still rely on mining exports. In sum, it is the international link, insist Ramos and 
Cassim, that accounts for the development of South Africa during the post-apartheid 
economic boom years, when many other nations on the periphery were submerged in the 
stagnation of "dependency."
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36. Business D a y , 1/9/92.
37. Joffe et al, "Meeting the global challenge," pp. 1,8,9.
38. Business D a y , 11/3/93.
39. Locally, of course, the (non-homeland) clothing sector is being decimated by a series of 
post-fordist innovations — the output of informal cottage manufacturing, home sewing, 
homeland export processing suburbs, second-hand imports, etc — and as a result the sector’s 
output today is 40% lower than in 1981. Finally, it is worth noting that the World Bank 
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only R l,6  billion was appropriated for housing support in the 1990/91 budget, and was 
augmented by another Rl,3 billion by means of repayments on past loans, utilisation of other 
sources of income, and borrowing from the capital markets.
62. Notwithstanding a recent IMF report to the contrary, South Africa’s own fiscus can be 
geared up for far greater housing expenditures. Professor Dennis Davies of the University 
of the Witwatersrand Centre for Applied Legal Studies has estimated that R8 billion per year 
could be added to government revenue through a rationalisation and reorganisation of the tax
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Research Services argue that a ten-year 5% "wealth tax" on all net wealth in excess of R1 
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a year). Dr Neva Makgetla Seidman of Wits University Economics Department estimates 
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R7,2 billion (17%) 
R6,2 billion (66%) 
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Note that these are the outstanding bonds (including bonds on commercial property), and that 
this figure (and bank asset growth generally) increased at a rate far greater than the 15% 
inflation rate in recent years. Increases in the late 1980s were above 30% per annum, 
although the current rate of increase is today below 10%. If banks were to increase their net 
bond portfolios by, say, 20%, that would make available R13,5 billion in net new funds for 
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which are currently invested as bank deposits and stock market shares. Finally, independent 
pension and provident funds hold a R62 billion in assets, of which R21 billion is invested 
with insurers. The rest is mainly stock market shares (R25 billion), bank deposits (R10 
billion) and fixed property (R6 billion). Other potential sources of funds within private
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development investments through blending with state-subsidy sources of various <ypes — in 
contrast to the likely negative returns that will be experienced by further speculative 
investment in the JSE and overbuilt commercial real estate.
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68. This ratio is false for the following reason: At the time of the passage of the Native’s 
Land Act in 1913, the scheduled reserves constituted only about 7% of the land surface of 
South Africa. Under the recommendations of the Beaumont Commission of 1917 these areas 
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99
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surplus value between the capitalist and the landowner, and Bernstein (1990:417-419 ) for 
a summary of the debate around petty commodity production as an explanation for class 
differentiation.
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72. Cf Marx’s (1975:320) letters to Russian Narodniki, Zasulich and Mikhailovski where he 
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Africa, Southall (1982:85) takes up the position of the process has been retarded:
By preserving the com m unal land system  fas adjusted by  the one-m an-one lo t system  
o f  individual tenure), it  (the state) attem pted to  retard  the p ro cess  o f  
proletarian isation b y  m aintaining the ties o f  the m igrant labourers to  the land.
Beinart (1988:142) graphically emphasises the persistence of peasant production:
Som ewhere am idst the sw ollen population  o f  the Bantustans, am idst the p o ver ty  areas  
that have suffered deep ly  from  apartheid po licies, there are  fa m ilies  which have been  
able to cling onto sufficient land and resources to m aintain som e sm allholding  
agricultural production.
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